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Introduction
9Abstract
In my dissertation I study the transmission of monetary and ﬁscal policy in New Keynesian DSGE
models. In the ﬁrst chapter we revisit the exchange rate channel in a two-country model of the
U.S. and a panel of industrialized countries to analyse how monetary policy transmission in the U.S.
changes if it becomes more trade integrated. We ﬁnd that more opennesslowers the sacriﬁce ratio, al-
though the effect is quantitatively small and depends on the pricing of the ﬁrms. In the secondchapter
we simulate the impact of the U.S. ﬁscal stimulus package in 2009 on GDP. We ﬁnd that the govern-
ment spendingmultiplier is well below 1. The ﬁnding is robust to including rule-of-thumb consumers
and simulating the stimulus in the recent recession. In the third chapter we collect the ﬁscal stimulus
measures in the eleven biggest countries of the euro area. Then we do a robustness study by simu-
lating the european package in ﬁve different models of the euro area. The macroeconomic models
vary in terms of backward-looking decision making of the agents and openness. Our ﬁndings provide
no support for a Keynesian multiplier. Instead they suggest that additional government spending will
reduce private spending for consumption and investment purposes. If government spending faces an
implementation lag, the initial effect on GDP may even be negative. In the fourth chapter I estimate a
DSGE model for Germany and compute forecasts for the debt-to-GDP ratio. I ﬁnd that the expected
economic recovery will lead to a decrease in Germany’s indebtedness in the medium-term given that
policy makers stick to the ﬁscal policy rules.
Zusammenfassung
In der vorliegenden Doktorarbeit befasse ich mich mit der Wirkung und Übertragung von Geld- und
Fiskalpolitik in makroökonomischen Modellen. In Kapitel eins untersuchen wir die Auswirkung von
zunehmenden Handelsverpﬂechtungen oder größerer Offenheit von Volkswirtschaften auf die Über-
tragung von Geldpolitik in einem Neukeynesianischen Zwei-Länder-Modell. Bisherige Analysen
zur Übertragung von Geldpolitik in den USA, wie z.B. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
haben Modelle geschlossener Volkswirtschaften angenommen und konnten empirische Impulsant-
wortfolgen hinreichend gut erklären. Allerdings werden Volkswirtschaften zunehmend offener. In
den USA ist der Anteil der Importe am Bruttoinlandsprodukt von 6 Prozent 1973 auf 16 Prozent
gestiegen. Daher untersuchen wir in diesem Kapitel die Frage, wie sehr sich eine größere Offenheit,
die wir durch das Verhältnis von Importen zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt messen, auf die Übertragung
von Geldpolitik auswirkt, die wir durch den quantitativen Effekt eines geldpolitischen Schocks auf
die Produzentenpreisinﬂation und die heimische Nachfrage messen.
Wir beziehen in unserem Modell strategische Komplementaritäten in die Preissetzung der heimis-
10chen Firmen ein, die variierende Gewinnaufschläge implizieren. Über diesen Mechanismus führt
eine Zinserhöhung der Zentralbank, die die Währung des heimischen Landes aufwertet zu einem
Sinken der Importpreise, welches den Wettbewerbsdruck auf die heimischen Firmen erhöht. Dies
reduziert die Gewinnmargen der heimischen Firmen und wirkt dämpfend auf die Produzentenpreise.
Auf diese Weise entsteht ein weiterer Wechselkurskanal neben der direkten Auswirkung geringerer
Importpreise auf den Konsumentenpreisindex. Die Wirkung dieses Kanals steigt mit zunehmender
ökonomischer Offenheit der Volkswirtschaft. Gleichzeitig hängt sie von dem Preissetzungsverhalten
der ausländischen Firmen ab. Je größer der Anteil der ausländischen Firmen, die ihre Preise in aus-
ländischer Währung kalkulieren und dann mit dem bestehenden Wechselkurs übersetzen, anstatt ihre
Preise direkt im jeweiligen Land zu setzen, desto größer die Wirkung des Wechselkurskanals.
Wir schätzen ein Vektor Autoregressives Modell (VAR), in das wir Konsum, Investment, Produzen-
tenpreisinﬂation, Zins, Konsumentenpreisinﬂation und Nettoexporte integrieren, mit Quartalsdaten
der USA relativ zu einem Aggregat aus OECD Ländern. Wir kalibrieren die Schlüsselparameter
des Modells, indem wir die Differenz der Impulsantwortfolgen des Modells auf einen geldpolitis-
chen Schock und der des VARs mit einem Mechanismus vorgeschlagen von Christiano et al. (2005)
minimieren. Wir ﬁnden eine geringe Handelspreiselastizität, starke strategische Komplementaritäten
der Preissetzung von Firmen und eine geringe Durchreiche von Wechselkursänderungen auf die Im-
portpreise. Die ökonomische Offenheit setzen wir auf 12 Prozent, den Durchschnitt des Import zu
Bruttoinlandsprodukt Verhältnisses in den Daten der USA.
Um die Rolle von ökonomischer Offenheit zu untersuchen, berechnen wir den Effekt eines geld-
politischen Schocks in einer Ökonomie die fast geschlossen ist und einer in der Importe 40 Prozent
des Bruttoinlandsprodukts ausmachen. Wir ﬁnden quantitativ nur einen geringen Unterschied in den
Reaktionen von heimischer Inﬂation und heimischer Nachfrage im Vergleich zur Basiskalibrierung.
Das hat zwei Gründe. Der geschätzte Wert für die Handelspreiselastizität liegt nahe an dem Wert für
die intertemporale Substitutionselastizität. Dieses führt laut Erceg, Gust, and López-Salido (2007) zu
einem geringen Effekt von Änderungen in der ökonomischen Offenheit auf die Modelldynamiken.
Zweitens die Durchreiche von Wechselkursänderungen auf die Importpreise ist gering. Dies
impliziert einen geringen Effekt des Wechselkurskanals im Modell. Im Prinzip stellen aber strate-
gische Komplementaritäten der Preissetzung von Firmen einen wichtigen Kanal dar, durch welchen
zunehmende Handelsverpﬂechtungen die geldpolitische Übertragung beeinﬂussen. Wenn wir die
Durchreiche von Wechselkursänderungen auf die Importpreise von 11 Prozent, dem geschätzten
Wert, auf 40 Prozent erhöhen, steigt die Inﬂationsreaktion nach einem geldpolitischen Schock um
25 Prozent, wenn die Offenheit der Volkswirtschaft von fast geschlossen auf relativ offen steigt. Wir
schliessen daraus, dass geldpolitische Entscheidungsträger sowohl ökonomische Offenheit als auch
die Durchreiche von Wechselkursänderungenauf die Importpreise beobachten sollten.
11In Kapitel zwei berechnen wir Staatsausgabenmultiplikatoren in einem Neukeynesianischen DSGE
Modell basierend auf Smets and Wouters (2007) und vergleichen die Ergebnisse mit denen, die kür-
zlich zur Politikberatung in den USA verwendet wurden. Wir ﬁnden, dass Staatsausgabenmultip-
likatoren einer permanenten Staatsausgabenerhöhungin NeukeynesianischenModellen viel geringer
ausfallen als in traditionellen Keynesianischen Modellen. Auch die Annahme, dass die amerikanis-
che Zentralbank die Zinsen in 2009 oder 2009 und 2010 konstant hält vergrößert die Multiplikatoren
nur gering. Die Differenzen werden noch größer, wenn man die Effekte des genauen Ausgabenpfads
des aktuellen Konjunkturpakets der USA, verabschiedet im Februar 2009, simuliert. Die Multiplika-
toren sind kleiner als eins, da privater Konsum und Investitionen verdrängt werden. Der Effekt des
Konjunkturpakets im ersten Jahr ist sehr klein. Wenn die Staatsausgabengeringer werden in späteren
Jahren der Simulation, wird der Staatsausgabenmultiplikator sogar negativ.
Um die Robustheit der Ergebnisse zu untersuchen, erweitern wir das Smets und Wouters Modell
mit einem Anteil keynesianischer Konsumenten, die ihr gesamtes verfügbares Einkommen in jeder
Periode konsumieren, schätzen das erweiterte Modell bayesianischund evaluieren die Auswirkungen
des amerikanischen Konjunkturpakets in diesem Modell. Der Staatsausgabenmultiplikator ist über
die gesamte Simulationszeit etwas größer, das quantitative Ergebnis ändert sich abernicht signiﬁkant.
Wir setzen unsere Simulationsergebnisse auch mit der Literatur in Beziehung,die Vektor Autoregres-
siveModelle oderanderweitige Regressionenverwendet,um Staatsausgabenschockszu identiﬁzieren
und die Effekte auf das Bruttoinlandsprodukt zu messen. In der empirischen Literatur werden Staat-
sausgabenmultiplikatoren von 0,6 bis 1,7 abhängig von der Identiﬁzierungsstrategie vorgeschlagen.
Der typische Zeitpfad der Staatsausgaben in dieser Literatur weicht aber von dem Ausgabenpfad des
Konjunkturpakets ab. Nach einer überraschenden Erhöhung der Staatsausgaben, kehren sie langsam
zum stationären Zustand zurück. Wir simulieren diesen Staatsausgabenpfad in unserem geschätzten
Neukeynesianischen Modell und ﬁnden das die Kurzfristeffekte solcher Schocks ungefähr in der
Mitte der Ergebnisse dieser Literatur liegen. Dieses Experiment unterstreicht den Nutzen von struk-
turellen Modellen in der Analyse von Fiskalpolitik, da diese die Reaktion von vorausschauenden
Haushalten und Firmen beinhalten.
Die Ergebnisse zur Wirkung des amerikanischen Konjunkturpakets in diesem Kapitel weichen stark
von denen im Papier von Christina Romer und Jared Bernstein ab. Sie ﬁnden einen sechsfach so
starken Effekt des Konjunkturpakets auf das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in den USA und eine um das
sechsfache größere Wirkung auf die Beschäftigung. Unsere Ergebnisse werfen zumindest Fragen
nach der Robustheit der Ergebnisse von Romer and Bernstein auf.
Wir untersuchen auch, ob unsere Ergebnisse, die wir durch Simulieren des amerikanischen Konjunk-
turpakets vom stationären Zustand aus erzielt haben, sich auch ergeben, wenn wir in einer tiefen
12Rezession weit entfernt vom stationären Zustand starten. Während in einem linearen Modell die
Ausgangssituation irrelevant ist, führt die Nullzinsgrenze des Nominalzinses eine wichtige Nicht-
linearität ein, die das Ergebnis beeinﬂussen könnte. Wir simulieren das Smets und Wouters Modell
mit aktuellen Daten bis zum ersten Quartal 2009 und erstellen Projektionen der ökonomischen
Erholung mit und ohne Konjunkturpaket. Diese Projektionen implizieren, dass die Nullzinsgrenze
für zwei bis drei Quartale bindet. Der Effekt des Konjunkturpakets auf das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in
den USA liegt sehr nahe an dem Szenario mit konstantem Zins in 2009 und einem Simulieren des
Konjunkturpakets vom stationären Zustand aus.
In Kapitel drei erstellen wir eine Übersicht der Konjunkturpakete der elf größten Volkswirtschaften
der Europäischen Währungsunion für 2009 und 2010 und berechnen daraus die Höhe der zusät-
zlichen europäischen Staatsausgaben in Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Nach unseren Berech-
nungen wird das europäische Konjunkturpaket hauptsächlich durch Maßnahmen der deutschen
Regierung getrieben und zu einem geringeren Teil durch Maßnahmen der spanischen und franzö-
sischen Regierung. Wir berechnen dann den Effekt dieser Maßnahmen auf das europäische Brut-
toinlandsprodukt mit einem vergleichenden, modelbasierenden Ansatz. Befürworter diskretionärer,
ﬁskalischer Stimuli betonen den keynesianischen Multiplikatoreffekt, der sich durch das Ansteigen
von privaten Ausgaben nach einer Erhöhung der Staatsausgaben ergibt und damit zu einem Staat-
sausgabenmultiplikator größer als eins führt. Wir untersuchen diese Behauptung mit empirischen
makroökonomischen Modellen mit keynesianischen Eigenschaften wie Preis- und Lohnrigiditäten.1
Vier dieser Modelle wurden entwickelt und geschätzt bei Zentralbanken und internationalen Insti-
tutionen. Drei dieser Modelle sind neukeynesianische DSGE Modelle, die dem neuesten Stand der
Politikanalyse entsprechen.
Wir ﬁnden keine Unterstützung für einen keynesianischen Multiplikator. Stattdessen führen zusät-
zliche Staatsausgaben zu geringeren privaten Ausgaben für Konsum und Investitionen. Die Ursache
ist das vorausschauende Verhalten der Haushalte und Firmen. Sie antizipieren höhere steuerliche
Belastungen und höhere Zinsen in der Zukunft und reduzieren daher Konsum und Investitionen so-
fort. Folglich kann der Effekt auf das BIP auch negativ sein, wenn zusätzliche Staatsausgaben zwar
bekanntgegeben werden aber mit Verzögerung implementiert werden. Eine geldpolitische Akkom-
modierung durch Konstanthalten des Nominalzinses in 2009 hilft ist aber nicht ausreichend um das
Verdrängen der privaten Ausgaben auszugleichen.
Nur das AWM-Modell der Europäischen Zentralbank, welches vorausschauendes Verhalten weitge-
hend ignoriert, generiert Staatsausgabenmultiplikatoren, die signiﬁkant größer als 1 sind. Obwohl
solche Modelle nützlich für Prognosen in der kurzen Frist sind, wenn es zu keinen größeren Poli-
1Die Modelle sind Teil des makroökonomischen Modellarchivs beschrieben in Wieland, Cwik, Mueller, Schmidt, and
Wolters (2009).
13tikänderungen kommt, sind sie nicht geeignet die Effekte dieser Politikänderungen zu analysieren.
Die neukeynesianischen Modelle stattdessen berücksichtigen die wahrscheinliche Reaktion von vo-
rausschauend optimierenden Haushalten und Firmen.
Wir haben auch die Möglichkeit von "Spillover"-Effekten innerhalb der Europäischen Währung-
sunion mit dem Taylor (1993) Modell analysiert. Dieses Modell, welches vorausschauende,rationale
Erwartungen und Preis- und Lohnrigiditäten annimmt, beinhaltet die deutsche, französische und
italienische Ökonomie getrennt. Die "Spillover"-Effekte des deutschen Konjunkturpakets auf
Frankreich sind sehr gering. Sie werden sogar Ende 2009 leicht negativ im Falle von Italien. Direkte
positive Nachfrageeffekte werden durch den negativen indirekten Effekt der Aufwertung des Euro
mehr als ausgeglichen.
In Kapitel vier befasse ich mich mit der Dauer und den makroökonomischen Implikationen des
Schuldenabbaus in Deutschand. Während der Finanzkrise haben viele Länder weltweit Maßnah-
men ergriffen um den Bankensektor zu stabilisieren und zusätzliche diskretionäre Konjunkturpakete
beschlossen um die heimische Nachfrage zu stabilisieren. Deutschland hat Anfang 2009 zwei Kon-
junkturpakete in einer Größenordnung von 3,37% des BIP für 2009 und 2010 verabschiedet. Diese
enthalten Infrastrukturprojekte oder die Abwrackprämie auf der Staatsausgabenseite und Einkom-
menssteuersenkungen auf der Einnahmenseite. Diese Maßnahmen haben die Staatsverschuldung
aufgebläht. In Deutschland ist die Verschuldungsrate relative zum BIP auf 77,4% des BIP nach 65,3
Ende 2007 gestiegen. Sie übersteigt den Referenzwert der Maastricht Kriterien jetzt bei fast 18%.
Und ein weiterer Anstieg wird durch die Konjunkturpakete in 2010 erwartet. Dieser Anstieg der
Verschuldung erhöht die Zinszahlungendes Staates in der Zukunft gegeben gleiche Finanzierungsbe-
dingungen, welches den Spielraum für Fiskalpolitik weiter einengt oder zu einem weiteren Anstieg
der Verschuldung führt.
Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) schlagen in ihrem Papier "Rethinking Macroeconomic
Policy" vor die Zielverschuldungsraten zu reduzieren. Sie schreiben: "Still, the lesson from the cri-
sis is clearly that target levels should be lower than those observed before the crisis. The policy
implications for the next decade or two are that, when cyclical conditions permit, major ﬁscal ad-
justment is necessary and, should economic growth recover rapidly, it should be used to reduce
debt-to-GDP ratios substantially, rather than to ﬁnance expenditure increases or tax cuts." Sie schla-
gen auch vor mittelfristig glaubwürdige Selbstverpﬂichtungenoder ﬁskalische Regeln aufzstellen um
die Verschuldung abzubauen. In Deutschland hat die "Föderalismuskommission II" vereinbart eine
Schuldenbremse ab 2011 einzuführen, welche den Staat verpﬂichtet die Staatsausgaben inklusive
Zinszahlungen auf die Trendstaatseinnahmen anzupassen. Diese Regel erlaubt automatische Stabil-
isierung, da die Regierung in Rezessionen einen Teil der Staatsausgaben inklusive Zinszahlungen
14durch Budgetdeﬁzite bestreiten kann, während sie im Boom Budgetüberschüsse generiert. Deﬁzite
und Überschüsse werden auf ein Anpassungskonto gebucht, welches über die Zeit durch Angleichen
der Staatsausgaben ausgeglichen werden muss.
Ich leite ein neukeynesianisches DSGE Modell mit detailliertem Fiskalsektor her, welches auf dem
Modell von Smets und Wouters basiert. Da der Fokus des Kapitels auf der Staatsverschuldung liegt,
ermögliche ich wechselseitige Beeinﬂussungen von ﬁskalischen Instrumenten und Verschuldung im
Modell. Wie in Kollmann (1998) und Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) können die Transfers des
Staates, die Einkommenssteuer, die Kapitalsteuer und die Mehrwehrtsteuer auf die Verschuldung des
Staates reagieren. Zusätzlich können die Steuern sich auch der Wirtschaftslage entsprechend an-
passen um progressive Besteuerung zu ermöglichen. Ich führe eine Schuldenbremse wie beschrieben
ein. Aber ich erlaube es, dass Staatsausgaben stärker auf die Wirtschaftslage reagieren, um die Situ-
ation vor der Einführung der Schuldenbremse zu beschreiben. Da die Literatur zur Fiskalpolitik die
Wichtigkeit von keynesianischen Konsumenten in DSGE Modellen herausstellt, beziehe ich einen
Anteil von keynesianischen Konsumenten wie in Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) zusammen
mit vorausschauenden Konsumenten im Modell ein. Ich berücksichtige auch Transfers des Staates,
welche gleichmäßig auf keynesianische und vorausschauende Konsumenten verteilt werden.
Ich schätze das Modell mit bayesianischen Techniken auf folgende deutsche Daten vom ersten
Quartal 1970 bis zum vierten Quartal 2009: Konsum, Investment, BIP, reale Löhne, geleistete Ar-
beitsstunden, Inﬂation, Nominalzins, Staatsverschuldungrelativ zum BIP, Einkommenssteuereinnah-
men, Mehrwertsteuereinnahmen, Kapitalsteuereinnahmen und Transferleistungen. Ich konzentriere
mich insbesondere auf die geschätzten Koefﬁzienten der Fiskalregeln und deren Implikationen für
die Entwicklung der Verschuldung und erstelle Prognosen für die Modellvariablen. Dies ist meiner
Ansicht nach das erste Papier, welches den Effekt der Schuldenbremse auf die Staatsverschuldung
analysiert und quantiﬁziert.
Ich ﬁnde, dass es durch die erwartete ökonomische Erholung nach der Finanzkrise in 2008 und 2009
möglich ist die Staatsverschuldung relativ zum BIP auf mittlere Sicht signiﬁkant zu reduzieren. Das
scheint ein überraschendesErgebnis zu sein, welches aber möglich ist, wenn die Regierung nicht von
den Fiskalregeln abweicht. Die folgenden Kanäle ermöglichen das Ergebnis. Erstens sinkt das Ver-
hältnis von Staatsverschuldung zum BIP direkt, wenn das BIP stärker als die Verschuldung wächst.
Zweitens wird erwartet, dass durch die konjunkturelle Erholung die geleisteten Arbeitsstunden und
die Reallöhne ansteigen, welches die Einkommenssteuereinnahmen erhöht. Drittens steigen die
Durchschnittssteuersätze in der Volkswirtschaft durch die konjunkturelle Erholung. Und die Steuer-
sätze reagieren auf die Verschuldung, welches niedrigere Steuersätze in der Zukunft erwarten lässt,
wenn die Verschuldung gesunken ist. Ich erstelle auch bedingte Prognosen, indem ich die Änderun-
gen der ﬁskalischen Variablen in 2010 durch das Konjunkturpaket und das Wachstumsbeschleuni-
15gungsgesetzmit in Betracht ziehe. Ich ﬁnde, dass die Konjunkturpaketenur eine geringe Auswirkung
auf das BIP haben. Die Verschuldung relativ zum BIP steigt in 2010 stärker an als in der Basisprog-
nose und erreicht den höchsten Wert bei 81,3%. Aber sie kann trotzdem im zweiten Quartal 2015 auf
unter 60%, dem Grenzwert der Maastricht Kriterien, sinken. Wenn ich die strikte Schuldenbremse
im Modell in 2010 erzwinge und die Elastizität der Einkommenssteuer auf das BIP halbiere, steht
die Regierung unter Druck die Staatsausgaben zu reduzieren und die Einkommenssteuersätze zu er-
höhen, welches die geleisteten Arbeitsstunden leicht reduziert. Beides verringert die Verschuldung
relativ zum BIP schneller, lässt aber das BIP kurzfristig leicht zurückgehen verglichen mit der Ba-
sisprognose. Die Unsicherheit der Prognosen wird hauptsächlich durch unvorhergesehene Schocks
getrieben.
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Does trade integration alter monetary
policy transmission?
1.1 Introduction
Recent research on the monetary transmission mechanism has focused on the quantitative perfor-
mance of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Speciﬁcally, interest has centered
on their ability to account for the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks as apparent from esti-
mated vector autoregression (VAR) models. In a seminal study, Christiano et al. (2005) show that a
medium scale New Keynesian model mimics quite closely the VAR-responses to a monetary policy
shock of as many as nine variables. This result is obtained while abstracting from external trade alto-
gether. Taken at face value, it suggests that trade integration, or openness,plays no important role for
monetary policy transmission—atleast as far as a large open economy such as the U.S. is concerned.1
There is, however, a secular trend in trade integration, suggesting that economies are becoming con-
siderably more open over time. In the U.S., imports, as a fraction of GDP, have risen from about 6
percent in 1973 to 16 percent to date. In fact, as this trend has been accelerating over the last decade,
some observers have identiﬁed increasing trade integration as an important manifestation of global-
ization.2 In this chapter, we investigate more systematically the role of trade integration for monetary
policy transmission, where we measure trade integration by the import-to-GDP ratio. Speciﬁcally,
we assess how increasing openness alters quantitatively the effects of monetary policy shocks on do-
mestic (i.e. producer price) inﬂation and domestic absorption. We focus on these variables, because
1Other studies which employ this approach ﬁnd similarly satisfactory results for variants of the New Keynesian model.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and Laubach (2003), Bovin and Giannoni (2006) and Meier and Müller (2006)
are examples. These studies also assume counterfactually closed economy models. Clearly, other studies have explored the
empirical performance of open economy DSGE models; yet these studies have typically not been particularly concerned
with monetary transmission, see, e.g., Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) and Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani (2007).
2The consequences of globalization for monetary policy are widely discussed both in academia and among policy mak-
ers. Most commentators, taking a fairly general perspective, have argued that globalization does not fundamentally affect
the central bank’s ability to control the economy, see, e.g., Mishkin (2007) and Bernanke (2007). Changes brought about
by globalization may nevertheless require, as Yellen (2006) puts it, “some recalibration of policy responses”.
18they are well deﬁned in closed economy models as well.
Taking an analytical perspective, earlier work by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2001) and Galí and
Monacelli (2005) has stressed the similarity between open and closed economy versions of the New
Keynesian baseline model. In fact, apart from being a source of additional shocks, ‘openness’merely
alters some of the reduced-form coefﬁcients of the canonical representation of the model which is,
in fact, shown to be isomorphic in closed and open economies. More recently, Erceg et al. (2007)
have shown that the difference between closed and open economies in this class of models hinges on
the relative size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the trade price elasticity. Moreover,
these authors argue that—for reasonable calibrations—increasing openness is unlikely to alter the
transmission of domestic shocks, monetary policy shocks inclusive, in a quantitatively important
way.
However, taking up the question within the New Keynesian baseline model twists the analysis to-
wards ﬁnding no effect of openness. A key assumption underlying the derivation of the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve and, hence, its isomorphism in closed and open economies, is that the demand
functions faced by intermediate goods ﬁrms are characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution.
This, in turn, implies that the desired markup is independent of the price of competitors, i.e. there
are no strategic complementarities in price setting. Such complementarities arise under a more gen-
eral formulation of the demand functions, or, rather, the underlying aggregation technology. In this
case, the isomorphism of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in closed and open economies breaks
down. Intuitively, strategic complementarities arise not only with respect to domestic, but also with
respect to foreign competitors. Hence, the domestic currency price charged by foreign competitors
enters the decision problem of domestic ﬁrms and eventually the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Re-
cently, Guerrieri, Gust, and López-Salido (2008) have highlighted the importance of this mechanism
in accounting for inﬂation dynamics.3
In this chapter, we take price-setting complementarities into accountwhen exploring the role of open-
ness for monetary transmission. As a result, a new dimension of the exchange rate channel emerges.
Traditionally, monetary policy is thought to directly impact CPI-inﬂation and to indirectly impact
domestic inﬂation via the exchange rate, where the latter effect comes about through changes in de-
mand induced by ‘expenditure-switching’. With strategic price-setting complementarities, changesin
the exchange rate, which alter the domestic currency prices charged by foreign competitors, directly
impact domestic inﬂation. The importance of this effect increases with i) the extent of strategic com-
plementarities in price-setting; ii) the openness of an economy and iii) the amount of exchange rate
pass-through.
Our analysis is based on a medium-scale two-country DSGE model. It features an aggregation tech-
3Speciﬁcally, they estimate the resulting variant of the New Keynesian Phillips curve on the basis of single equation
techniques. Importantly, in contrast to our analysis, they assume that all ﬁrms engage in local currency pricing.
19nology for the production of ﬁnal goods which gives rise to strategic complementarities in price-
setting; in addition, the aggregationtechnologydetermines trade integration by giving unequalweight
to domestically producedand imported intermediate goods. The modelalso features a numberof fric-
tions which the literature has found to increase the empirical success of this class of models; notably,
we allowexchangerate pass-throughto belimited in the short-run. Overall, themodelstructure is rich
enough to provide a quantitatively realistic account of the monetary transmission mechanism such as
to allow us to study the quantitative implications of trade integration on monetary transmission.
As a benchmark, we compute impulse responses to a monetary policy shock within a VAR model
estimated on quarterly time series data for the U.S. relative to an aggregateof industrialized countries.
In addition to standard ‘closed-economy’ variables, the VAR model also includes CPI-inﬂation as
well as U.S. net exports. We treat the impulse responses as a characterization of the actual monetary
transmission mechanism and estimate the structural parameters of the DSGE model employing the
minimum distance estimation strategy suggested by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Christiano
et al. (2005). To avoid identiﬁcation problems we ﬁx several parameter values prior to the estimation,
most notably the degree of opennesswhich we assume to be 12 percent, i.e. the average import-GDP-
ratio of the U.S. in our sample. We estimate the values of nine parameters and ﬁnd that the estimated
modelisabletoreplicatetheVARevidencefairly wellforplausibleparametervalues. Threeestimates
are particularly noteworthy: a low value for the trade price elasticity, strong complementarities in
price-setting and limited exchange rate pass-through.
In order to explore the role of openness, we compute the effects of a monetary policy shock in an
economy that is approximately closed and an economy where imports account for 40 percent of
GDP. Relative to the baseline economy, there is hardly any difference in the responses of domestic
inﬂation and absorption in these counterfactual economies. Two reasons are key for this result. First,
the estimated value for the trade price elasticity is close to intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
which, according to the results reported by Erceg et al. (2007), prevents openness from altering the
dynamics of the New Keynesian baseline model. Second, as exchange rate pass-through is limited,
the exchange rate channel is prevented from operating in a quantitatively important way. We ﬁnd,
however, that strategic complementarities in price-setting would, in principle, constitute an important
channel through which openness impacts monetary transmission. Speciﬁcally, if we increase the
exchangerate pass-throughfrom anestimated valueof12 percentto 40percent,opennesshassizeable
effects. In this case, moving from the closed to the very open economy increases the effects of a
monetary policy shock on domestic inﬂation by some 25 percent. As an implication for monetary
policy, we stress that the joint evolution of trade integration as well as exchange rate pass-through
should be monitored closely.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we introduce the details of
20the model economy. Section 1.3 presents time series evidence from the estimated VAR model and
discusses the estimation of the DSGE model. In section 1.4, we take a closer look at the role of trade
integration for monetary transmission. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
In this section we develop a two-country DSGE model to study monetary policy transmission in open
economies. Most of the model features are standard and familiar from so-called medium scale DSGE
models as put forward, for instance, in Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2005) in a
closed economy context.4 There is a representative household in each country owning the capital
stock which is rented together with labor services to intermediate goods producers on a period-by-
period basis. Adjusting the level of investment is costly. International ﬁnancial markets are assumed
to be complete.
We assume that in each country there is a continuum of intermediate good producers operating under
monopolistic competition and being constrained in price setting à la Calvo. A fraction of these ﬁrms
invoices exports in their own currency. Using common terminology, these ﬁrms are engaging in
‘producer currency pricing’, or ‘PCP’ for short. The remaining ﬁrms are engaging in ‘local currency
pricing’, or ‘LCP’, by invoicing domestic sales and exports in the currency of domestic and foreign
buyers, respectively. A key aspect of monetary transmission in open economies is the extent of
exchange rate pass-through. In our setup it will be smaller, the more pervasive LCP for any given
degree of price rigidity.5
In each country ﬁnal goods ﬁrms combine domestic and imported intermediate goods to provide
households with ﬁnal goods used for consumption and investment purposes. The aggregation tech-
nology employed by ﬁnal goods ﬁrms may imply unequalweights of domestic and imported interme-
diates in the production of ﬁnal goods—thereby determining the degree of openness. In addition, the
aggregation technology induces demand functions for intermediate goods which are characterized by
a non-constant price elasticity of substitution (NCES). Such an aggregation technology has recently
been advocated by Gust et al. (2006), and Guerrieri et al. (2008) in an open economy context. Impor-
tantly, it induces strategic complementarities in price-setting among intermediate good ﬁrms not only
with respect to domestic, but also with respect to foreign competitors.6
4In setting up the model we also draw on earlier work by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), Kollmann (2002), Galí
and Monacelli (2005) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), among others.
5See Bergin (2006) for a similar formulation, Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000) for early contributions and Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000) for a critical discussion. Note that in the present model nominal rigidities are critical for limiting the extent
of exchange rate pass-through. Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006), in contrast, provide real
models of limited exchange rate pass-through.
6The original closed economy formulation goes back to Dotsey and King (2005) or, more generally, to Kimball (1995).
Sbordone (2007) uses a similar technology when discussing the consequences of ﬁrm entry for the slope of the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve. While Gust et al. (2006) and Guerrieri et al. (2008) focus on pass-through and inﬂation dynamics,
21In the following we give a formal exposition of the model, discussing in turn the problems of ﬁnal
goods ﬁrms, intermediate good ﬁrms, and the representative household. We close the model with a
feedback rule to characterize monetary policy. As both countries are symmetric, of equal size, and
have isomorphic structures, we focus on the domestic economy, i.e. on the ‘home’ country. When
necessary we refer to foreign variables by means of a star superscript.
1.2.1 Final goods ﬁrms
Final goods are composites of intermediate goods produced by a continuum of monopolistic com-
petitive ﬁrms in both countries. We use j ∈ [0,1] to index intermediate good ﬁrms as well as their
products and prices. Final goods ﬁrms operate under perfect competition and purchase domestically
produced intermediate goods, At(j), as well as imported intermediate goods, Bt(j). Final goods,
Ft are not traded across countries, but are used for domestic consumption, Ct, investment, It, and
government spending, Gt. In each period, market clearing requires that Ft = Ct + It + Gt.
Letting PA
t (j) denote the domestic price of a domestically produced intermediate good and PB
t (j)
the domestic price of an imported intermediate good, the problem of the representative ﬁnal goods
ﬁrm is to produce Ft while minimizing expenditures given by
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where VDt and VMt are deﬁned as follows
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Our aggregation technology given by (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4) follows Gust et al. (2006) closely. A few
remarks concerning key parameters are in order. The trade price elasticity, i.e. the elasticity which
measures the extent of substitution from goods produced at home to those produced abroad for a
given change in relative prices, is a key parameter for the international transmission mechanism. In
our setup it is a function of several parameters and given by
˜ σ =
−σ
(σ(υ − 1) − υ)(1 + η)
. (1.5)
respectively, we explore the implications for monetary transmission.
22The elasticity of substitution between goods produced within the same country is generally time
varying. In steady state it is constant and given by
ǫ =
1
1 − υ
1
1 + η
. (1.6)
The parameter η plays a crucial role for both elasticities. It provides a measure of how strongly our
setup deviates from the special case where the elasticity of substitution is constant (CES), which is
nestedin ourmodelforη = 0. Finally, the parameterω measurestheweightofdomesticallyproduced
goods in ﬁnal goods in steady state. 1 − ω measures the fraction of imports in ﬁnal goods in steady
state and thus corresponds to the import-GDP-ratio.
Optimization behavior of domestic and foreign ﬁnal goods ﬁrms gives rise to demand functions for
domestically produced intermediate goods
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where Γt is a price index deﬁned below. Global demand for a generic good j is then given by
Yt(j) = At(j) + A∗
t(j). (1.9)
Note that the demand function includes a linear term if η  = 0. As a result, price elasticities of de-
mand and the desired markup of intermediate goods ﬁrms will be time-varying, or, in other words,
price-setting behavior at the level of intermediate goods ﬁrms is characterized by strategic comple-
mentarities.
The optimization problem of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms implicitly deﬁnes price indices. For further reference,
it is useful to explicitly distinguish between the prices charged by LCP and PCP-ﬁrms. Therefore, let
P
A,PCP
t (j) and P
A,LCP
t (j) denote the domestic price charged by a domestic intermediate goods ﬁrm
engaged in PCP and LCP, respectively. Letting α ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of LCP-ﬁrms and (1 − α)
the fraction of PCP-ﬁrms, the domestic producer price index PA
t and the import prices index PB
t are
given by the following expressions:
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The price index for ﬁnal goods is given by
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Finally, letting St denote the nominal exchange rate and assuming that the law of one price holds for
PCP-ﬁrms, we obtain the following relationships:
P
B,PCP
t (j) = StP
B,PCP∗
t (j); P
A,PCP
t (j) = StP
A,PCP∗
t (j). (1.14)
1.2.2 Intermediate good ﬁrms
The production of intermediate goods, Yt(j), is governed by a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt(j) = Kt(j)θHt(j)1−θ, (1.15)
where Ht(j) and Kt(j) denote labor and capital employed by ﬁrm j. Letting Wt and Rt denote the
nominal wage rate and the rental rate of capital, respectively, minimizing costs implies for (nominal)
marginal costs
MCt(j) =
WtHt(j)
(1 − θ)Yt(j)
=
RtKt(j)
θYt(j)
. (1.16)
We assume that price setting is constrained exogenously by a discrete time version of the mechanism
suggested by Calvo (1983). Each ﬁrm has the opportunity to change its price with a given probability
1 − ξ. Moreover, we assume that when a ﬁrm has the opportunity to do so, it sets the new price
in order to maximize the expected discounted value of net proﬁts before the realization of shocks in
a given period.7 Firms that do not reoptimize in a certain period index their price to last period’s
producer price inﬂation, where the degree of indexation is given by the parameter κ ∈ [0,1].
In setting the new price P
A,PCP
t (j), the problem of a generic PCP-ﬁrm is given by
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subject to the demand function (1.9), the production function (1.15) and the optimality condition on
factor inputs (1.16).8 ΠA
t = PA
t /PA
t−1 denotes domestic inﬂation. Proﬁts are discounted with the
stochastic discount factor, Qt,t+1, implicitly deﬁned below.
The pricing problemof a generic LCP-ﬁrm is subjectto the sameconstraints as those of the PCP-ﬁrm.
It sets two distinct prices for the domestic and foreign market. The domestic price P
A,LCP
t (j) is set
to solve
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7In other words, period t prices are set conditional on the information period t − 1, see Christiano et al. (2005).
8In our formulation we implicitly assume that demand for intermediate good j is met at all times.
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subject to the demand function (1.8).
1.2.3 Households
A representative household allocates consumption expenditures intertemporally on ﬁnal goods and
supplies labor, Ht, to intermediate good ﬁrms. The preferences of the household are given by
∞  
t=0
βt[(Ct − bCt−1) (1 − Ht)1− ]1−γ
1 − γ
, (1.20)
where β is a time discount factor and b ∈ [0,1) measures the extent of consumption habits. The
parameters γ and   are positive constants characterizing preferences.
Households own the domestic capital stock, Kt, which is internationally immobile as are labor ser-
vices. As in Christiano et al. (2005) it may be costly to adjust the level of investment, It. Speciﬁcally,
the law of motion for capital is given by
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + [1 − Ψ(It/It−1)]It, (1.21)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate; restricting Ψ(1) = Ψ′(1) = 0 and Ψ′′(1) = χ > 0 ensures that
the steady state capital stock is independent of investment adjustment costs captured by χ.
A complete set of state-contingent securities is traded at an international level. Letting Ξt+1 denote
the period t+1payoffof the portfolio held at the end of period t, the grossshort-term nominalinterest
rate, (1 + it), is implicitly deﬁned by (1 + it)−1 = EtQt,t+1, while the budget constraint reads as
follow
WtHt + RtKt + Υt + Tt − Pt (Ct + Xt) = Et {Qt,t+1Ξt+1} − Ξt. (1.22)
Υt denotes nominal proﬁts earned by monopolistic ﬁrms and transfered to households and Tt denotes
lump-sum taxes. We assume that government spending is ﬁnanced entirely through lump-sum taxes:
Tt = PtGt.
We assumethatthe householddecideson consumptionand investmentexpendituresin period t before
period-t uncertainty is revealed. Subject to this additional constraint as well as to (1.21) and (1.22),
the household maximizes the expected value of (1.20).
1.2.4 Monetary Policy
To close the model, we assume that monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule
as in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000). Speciﬁcally, we assume for the interest rate
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)
 
i + β−1φπ
 
ΠA
t − ΠA 
+ (4Fβ)−1φy (Ft − F)
 
+ νt, (1.23)
25where letters without time subscript refer to steady state values. The parameter ρ ∈ [0,1] captures
interest rate smoothing, φπ captures the long-run adjustment of the interest rate to producer price in-
ﬂation and φy capturesstabilization of domesticabsorption.9 Finally, νt representsa zero-meanshock
to the short-term interest rate not accounted for by the systematic feedback rule. It thus represents a
monetary policy shock.
1.2.5 Model solution
We solve the model numerically by applying standard techniques. Speciﬁcally, we use (1.23) to-
gether with the linearized ﬁrst order conditions and constraints of the ﬁrms’ and household problem
as well as their foreign counterparts to determine the equilibrium allocation near the deterministic
and symmetric steady state. We use the approximate solution of the model to investigate the effects
of monetary policy shocks on the economy. To simplify the analysis, we focus on country differ-
ences, i.e. the behavior of a domestic variable relative to its foreign counterpart. Before discussing
our strategy to assign parameter values, we brieﬂy turn to the implications of strategic price-setting
complementarities for the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission.
1.2.6 The exchange rate channel revisited
Strategic complementarities in price-setting may alter monetary policy transmission in open
economies by adding a new dimension to the exchange rate channel. Traditionally, two dimensions
of the exchange rate channel have been distinguished (see, for instance, Svensson, 2000). First, un-
der sticky prices, nominal exchange rate changes translate into real exchange rate changes that in
turn induce an expenditure switching effect. As a result, exchange rate changes alter the demand for
domestic goods and thus affect domestic producerprices. Note that in this case, the exchangerate im-
pacts only indirectly—via demand—on domestic inﬂation. Second, nominal exchange rate changes
feed directly into the prices of imported goods and hence into CPI-inﬂation. Both effects, however
depend on the extent of exchangerate pass-through. If import prices are insulated from exchangerate
movements, the exchange rate channel is failing to operate along both dimensions.
Strategic price-setting complementarities add a new dimension to the exchangerate channel. In order
to show this formally, we focus on the case where exchange rate pass-through is complete (α = 0)
and derive a variant of the New Keynesian Phillips curve as an approximation of the intermediate
9We assume that monetary policy responds to domestic inﬂation and absorption, because under this assumption we can
identify monetary policy shocks in our VAR model in a way which is consistent with our theoretical model. Note also that
in open economy models focusing on domestic inﬂation rather than CPI-inﬂation is often preferable from a welfare point
of view, see Galí and Monacelli (2005). In addition, our formulation of the interest rate rule (1.23) is meant to facilitate
a comparison of the parameter values φπ and φy to those obtained in the empirical literature on interest rate rules where
inﬂation and interest rate are typically annualized.
26goods ﬁrms’ price setting problem around a deterministic, zero inﬂation steady state:
Et−1πt = βEt−1πt+1 + λ(1 − Ψ)Et−1mct + λΨ(1 − ω)
2ω˜ σ
ǫ
Et−1qt, (1.24)
where πt denotes percentage points of domestic inﬂation, mct measures the percentage deviation of
marginal costs from steady state and qt denotes percentage deviation of the relative price of imports
expressed in domestic currency. The coefﬁcient λ = (1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)ξ−1 is familiar from the New
Keynesian baseline model and provides a measure for the pass-through of marginal costs onto inﬂa-
tion. The coefﬁcientΨ dependson the extentof strategic complementarities in price-setting and other
structural parameters of the model: Ψ = −1ηǫ(ǫ(1 − η) − 1)−1.10
The relationship (1.24) governs the dynamics of domestic inﬂation. Note that if η = 0, we have
Ψ = 0 and the term qt disappears from the Phillips curve. In fact, in this case the Phillips curve takes
the form which is well-known from the closed-economy New Keynesian baseline model. Clarida
et al. (2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) have stressed this isomorphism, i.e. the fact that the form
of the Phillips curve for the open economy corresponds to that of the closed economy. This case is
nested in our model.
Turning to the case where such complementarities are present (η < 0 → Ψ > 0), we observe that
the relative price of imports directly matters for domestic inﬂation. Consider, for instance, a decrease
in the domestic currency price of imports resulting from an exchange rate appreciation. In this case,
given strategic price-setting complementarities, domestic producers will ﬁnd it optimal to lower their
prices, because the price charged by foreign competitors is reduced: domestic inﬂation falls. In
addition to the coefﬁcient Ψ, two more parameters govern the strength of this effect. First, the larger
the trade price elasticity relative to the elasticity of substitution across domestically produced goods
(˜ σ/ǫ), the stronger the impact of import prices on domestic inﬂation. Second, the impact will also be
stronger, the more open an economy. This follows from imports making up for a larger fraction of
the ﬁnal goods basket, measured by 1 − ω.
As a consequence, monetary policy may directly impact domestic inﬂation via the exchange rate. A
monetary contraction which appreciates the nominal exchange rate and lowers the price of imports
reduces domestic inﬂation. This adds a new dimension to the exchange rate channel, which is not
present in models without price-setting complementarities. Its importance, however, depends on the
extent of exchange rate pass-through in addition to the parameters discussed above. If import prices
are unresponsive to exchange rate changes, the exchange rate channel fails to operate. In order to
gauge its importance, we need to quantify the extent of exchange rate pass-through along with other
key parameters of the model.
10Expression (1.24) abstracts from indexation. In appendix 1.F we derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve considering
the general case α ∈ [0,1]. Guerrieri et al. (2008) provide a derivation under the assumption that α = 1.
271.3 Estimation
Our model is agnostic as regards the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations and only allows for mon-
etary policy shocks. Accordingly, by bringing the model to the data, we isolate ﬂuctuations in actual
time series which can be attributed to monetary policy shocks. Speciﬁcally,we focus on the empirical
impulse response functions obtained from a VAR estimated on U.S. time series relative to an aggre-
gate of industrialized countries. We use these statistics to pin down the values of key parameters of
the model. Such a limited information approach enables our DSGE model to provide an empirically
plausible account of the monetary transmission mechanism.11
1.3.1 Empirical impulse response functions
We estimate the VAR on quarterly time series data for the period 1973–2006. We focus on relative
variables, i.e. the difference of a variable in the U.S. and its counterpart for an aggregate of industri-
alized countries, which is meant to proxy for the rest of the world (‘ROW’ for short), see also Clarida
and Gali (1994) and Rogers (1999). Speciﬁcally, we consider the log of relative consumption, the log
of relative investment, the difference in domestic inﬂation rates (computed on the basis of the GDP
deﬂator), the difference in short term interest rates, the difference in CPI-inﬂation rates as well as real
net exports for the U.S., where real net exports are deﬁned as the log difference in deﬂated exports
and imports.12 Letting Yt denote the vector of endogenous variables, we estimate the structural VAR
model
A(L)Yt = εt, (1.25)
where A(L) =
 4
i=0 AiLi,LYt = Yt−1 and E(εtε′
t) = I.
In order to identify (relative) monetary policy shocks, we assume that A0 is lower triangular, i.e.
we impose the recursive identiﬁcation scheme which is frequently employed to study the effects
of monetary policy shocks, see Kim (2001) for an open economy context. We attach a structural
interpretation only to the innovation in relative short-term interest rates. Hence, what matters for
identiﬁcation is how the other variables in Yt are ordered relative to this variable, see Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999). We order relative consumption, relative investment as well as the
differential of domestic inﬂation before and the differential of CPI-inﬂation and net exports after
the short-term interest rate differential. The implied identiﬁcation assumptions are consistent with
our DSGE model: consumption, investment and domestic inﬂation are predetermined relative to
monetary policy shocks,while consumer(i.e. ﬁnal goods)prices and real net exports are free to adjust
11A natural alternative is to estimate the model using full information techniques. This would require to take a stand of
all possible sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations, which we can avoid for the purpose of the present study.
12We treat CPI-inﬂation as the empirical counterpart of the DSGE model’s inﬂation rate for ﬁnal goods. A detailed
description of the data is given in appendix 1.G. We remove a constant linear trend from consumption and investment
before computing relative variables.
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Figure 1.1: Effects of a monetary policy shock
Notes: Shock and responses are in relative terms (U.S. vs. ROW), except for net exports which is the log difference of U.S.
exports and imports. Solid line: point estimate; shaded areas: bootstrapped 90 percent conﬁdence intervals; dashed-dotted
line: responses of estimated DSGE model; Vertical axes: percent, except for inﬂation and interest rate (percentage points).
Horizontal axes: quarters.
29immediately. As in the theoretical model, we are allowing monetary policy to adjust the interest rate
contemporaneously to changes in domestic inﬂation and domestic absorption.13
Figure 1.1 displays the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, i.e. an increase by 100 basis
points in the U.S. short rate relative to the aggregate of industrialized countries. The solid line shows
the point estimate, while the shaded area measures 90 percent conﬁdence bounds obtained from
bootstrap sampling. The upper row shows the responses of consumption and investment in relative
terms; for both we ﬁnd a protracted and hump-shaped decline. While consumption falls by roughly
0.3 percent, investment falls by about 1.25 percent, with the maximum effect occurring between three
and six quarters after the shock.
Domestic inﬂation responds somewhat sluggishly; the maximum decline of about 8 basis points is
observedﬁvequarters afterthe shock. Accordingto ourpointestimate,it takesanother3 to 4 yearsfor
inﬂation to return to its pre-shock level. The shock to the interest rate differential is mildly persistent,
with the short rate returning to its pre-shock level after about one year. The response of CPI-inﬂation
is remarkably close to that of domestic inﬂation, both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of
view. Finally, U.S. net exports display a hump-shaped increase with the maximum effect of about 0.2
percent occurring after about a year.
1.3.2 Estimation of general equilibrium model
The second step of the analysis consists in matching empirical and theoretical impulse responses in
order to obtain estimates for the parameters of the DSGE model. This approach has gained popu-
larity in closed economy studies of monetary policy transmission following the pioneering work of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Christiano et al. (2005).
To illustrate this approach, deﬁne IRe to be the empirical impulse response function characterizing
the data. The model itself assigns to each admissible vector of structural parameters θ a theoretical
impulse responsefunction IR = IR(θ). We obtain an estimate for the parametervectorof interest,   θ,
by minimizing the weighted distance between empirical and theoretical impulse response functions,
i.e., IRe and IR:
  θ = argmin(IRe − IR(θ))
′ W (IRe − IR(θ)), (1.26)
where W representsa diagonalmatrix whosediagonalentries are the reciprocalvaluesof the variance
of the empirical impulse responses. Using this weighting matrix ensures that the theoretical impulse
13Alternative approaches to identify monetary policy shocks in open economy frameworks consider on monetary ag-
gregates and non-recursive identiﬁcation schemes, see Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim
and Roubini (2000). More recently, Faust and Rogers (2003) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008) use sign restrictions to achieve
identiﬁcation. These studies have typically been concerned with the behavior of the exchange rate in the face of monetary
policy shocks and on the importance of the latter to account for ﬂuctuations in the former. In the present chapter, we are
not taking up these issues. Instead, we use the VAR responses as a key statistic to pin down parameter values of our DSGE
model.
30responses are made to be as close to the empirical ones as possible, in terms of point-wise standard
deviations. Regarding the length of the impulse response functions, we consider 20 quarters starting
from the second quarter as most variables return to their steady state within 5 years.
The relationship between structural parameters and the implied impulse response functions is non-
linear; we therefore obtain theoretical impulse response functions by applying standard numerical
techniques. Note that our procedure only admits saddle path stable solution and thus rules out by
construction any parameterization of the model which would give rise to equilibrium indeterminacy.
Standard errors for   θ are computed using the following expression for the asymptotic variance of our
estimator, taken from Wooldridge (2002):
[ Avar
 
  θ
 
=
 
G′WG
 −1  
G′W   ΣWG
  
G′WG
 −1 . (1.27)
where G = ∇θIR represents the Jacobianof the impulse responsefunction generated from the model
and   Σ denotes the variance matrix of the impulse responses obtained from bootstrap sampling.
1.3.3 Parametric setup
In practice, given the number of the structural parameters, it is not possible to identify all of them
simultaneously. We therefore ﬁx those parameters prior to the estimation which are either given by
ﬁrst moments of the data or are fairly uncontroversial.
First we set ω = 0.88 which implies an import-to-GDP ratio of 12 percent, the average value for
the U.S. in our sample period. Moreover, we set, as, for instance, in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1994) β = 0.99, γ = 2 and   = 0.34 as well as θ = 0.36 and δ = 0.025. In addition, we assume
that government spending accounts for 20 percent of GDP, close to the average in our sample period.
Regarding price rigidities, we set ξ = 0.75, which implies an average duration of prices of one year
which is broadly in line with the evidence discussed in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). We set υ
such that the markup earned by intermediate goods ﬁrms in steady state is 20 percent.
We are thus left with nine parameters for which we seek to obtain estimates by solving (1.26). We
estimate a value for the trade price elasticity, ˜ σ, by adjusting σ according to the relationship (1.5).
In addition, we pin down values for the parameters measuring investment adjustment costs, χ, price
indexation, κ, habits, b, as well as for those parameters which specify the interest rate feedback rule:
φπ,φy and ρ. Two additional parameters, which are of particular importance for the international
monetary transmission mechanismare α, measuring the fraction of LCP-ﬁrms and η which is directly
related to the degree of strategic price-setting complementarities.
1.3.4 Results
Table 1.1 provides the estimation results. We ﬁnd plausible point estimates and fairly narrow con-
ﬁdence bounds implied by the standard errors reported in parentheses. The estimated trade price
31Table 1.1: Estimated parameter values of DSGE model
Parameter Description
˜ σ Trade price elasticity 0.48
(0.71)
χ Investment adjustment costs 1.11
(0.75)
κ Price indexation 1.00
(−)
φπ Inﬂation coefﬁcient in policy rule 1.00
(0.50)
φy Output coefﬁcient in policy rule 0.02
(0.14)
ρ Interest rate smoothing 0.67
(0.09)
b Habits 0.89
(0.05)
α Share of ﬁrms with local currency pricing 0.89
(0.15)
η NCES-parameter −10.37
(14.30)
Notes: Parameter estimates obtained from matching DSGE and VAR impulse response func-
tions; standard errors are reported in parentheses. Those parameter values which have been
estimated to be at their theoretical bounds have been assumed to take this value prior to estima-
tion; in this case no standard error is reported.
elasticity is below the values often used or found in the literature. Yet several recent studies suggest
that a low trade price elasticity may help to account for a larger set of macroeconometric obser-
vations, see Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), Kollmann (2006) and de Walque, Smets, and Wouters
(2005). Also χ, the parameter capturing investment adjustment costs is somewhat below the value
reported in Christiano et al. (2005). This is likely to be the result of the aggregation function of ﬁnal
goods, see the discussion in Backus et al. (1994).
In line with earlier research we also ﬁnd full indexation of prices, see, for instance, Meier and Müller
(2006). Regarding monetary policy we ﬁnd parameter values which imply a fairly loose monetary
stance. Note, however, that our solution procedure rules out equilibrium indeterminacy. The degree
of interest rate smoothing is in line with previous ﬁndings in the literature, see, for instance, Clarida
et al. (2000) for the U.S. We ﬁnd a considerable amount of habits in consumption, somewhat above
the values reported in Smets and Wouters (2005) both for the euro area and the U.S.
For the share of ﬁrms engagedin LCP we ﬁnd a value somewherebetween 80 and 99 percentreported
by Campa and Goldberg (2005) and Bergin (2006), respectively for the U.S. Finally, the estimate for
the parameter η provides a measure for the curvature of our demand functions. Our estimate is
somewhat higher than the values assumed by Gust et al. (2006) and Guerrieri et al. (2008), but close
to the value assumed by Smets and Wouters (2007) in a closed economy context.
In order to assessthe implication of ourestimate for η, we display in Figure 1.2 the percentagechange
in demand for a generic good (vertical axis) resulting from a percentage change in its relative price
32−3 −2 −1 0 1 2
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
Figure 1.2: Demand function for intermediate goods
Notes: Solid line: CES case (η = 0); dashed-dotted line: NCES case (η = −10.37); vertical axes: relative demand in
percent; horizontal axes: relative price in percent.
(horizontal axis). The dashed line shows the implied demand function for our estimate of η, while
the solid line displays the results for η = 0 implying a constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
Relative to the CES case, our estimate implies strongly curved demand functions. As a result, if
the relative price increases, demand falls more than proportionally, while, if the relative price falls,
demand increases less than proportionally. This induces strategic complementarities in price-setting,
which, ceteris paribus, provides ﬁrms with an incentive to adjust prices so as to avoid large deviations
from the domestic currency price charged by domestic and foreign competitors.
Given the estimated parameter values, we compute the impulse responses of the model and compare
them to those obtainedfrom the VAR model. The dashed-dottedlines in the panels of Figure 1.1 show
that the model responses track the empirical responses quite closely. All the responses are within the
conﬁdence bounds of the VAR responses, except for the impact response of CPI-inﬂation and net
exports. Also the theoretical response of investment is somewhat less pronounced than its empirical
counterpart. The response of the consumption differential, as well as those of domestic inﬂation
and the interest rate are matched particularly closely. Overall, we conclude that the DSGE model—
if evaluated at the point estimates—provides a quantitatively satisfactory account of the monetary
transmission mechanism as apparent for the estimated VAR model.
1.4 The role of openness in monetary policy transmission
In this section we take up the question which motivates our investigation: does trade integration play
a quantitatively important role for the transmission of monetary policy? Given that the estimated
DSGE model provides a structural and quantitatively realistic account of the monetary transmission
mechanism, it is well suited for counterfactual experiments which allow us to quantify the role of
openness. We will also brieﬂy explore some implications for monetary policy.
331.4.1 The role of openness
Severalquantitativestudieshavedemonstratedthat it is possibleto accountfor the actualtransmission
mechanism while abstracting from foreign trade altogether, see Christiano et al. (2005). At the same
time, economies are bound to become more open as a result of increasing trade integration. While
the average import share for the U.S. over the period 1973–2006 has been about 12 percent, it has
been increasing secularly: from about 6 percent at the beginning of the sample to about 16 percent at
the end of the sample. Interestingly, the trend seems to have been accelerating over the last 10 years
or so. Against this background, we compare monetary transmission in the estimated model where
imports account for 12 percent to two counterfactual scenarios: an approximately closed economy
with imports accounting for less than 0.01 percent and a very open economy with imports accounting
for 40 percent of ﬁnal goods.
Figure 1.3 displays impulse responses of domestic inﬂation (upper row) and domestic absorption
(lower row) to a domestic monetary policy shock, i.e. an exogenous increase in the nominal interest
rate by 100 basis points. The responses in the left column are computed using the estimated DSGE
model where all parameters, except for ω, are kept at their (estimated) baseline values, notably α
measuring the fraction LCP-ﬁrms. The dashed lines show the responses for the baseline case where
imports accountfor12 percentofGDP,while solidlines showthe responsesfor the‘closed’economy;
the dashed-dotted line shows the responses for the high-openness scenario. Recall that we focus on
domesticinﬂation andabsorption,becausethesevariablesare well deﬁnedin closed-economymodels
as well.14 A comparison of the responses reveals that opennessmatters very little for the transmission
of monetary policy shocks in the estimated model (left column).
In a ﬁrst step to interpret this results, recall that Clarida et al. (2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2005)
have shown that there exists an isomorphic representation of the baseline New Keynesian model for
closed and open economies. Speciﬁcally, the dynamic ‘IS-curve’ and the New Keynesian Phillips
curve have the same structure. Relaxing the closed economy assumption induces only changes in
the parameters governing the pass-through of marginal costs onto domestic inﬂation and the interest
elasticity of demand, i.e. it alters only ‘slope’ coefﬁcients.15 More speciﬁcally, Erceg et al. (2007)
show that the difference between closed and open economies in this class of models can be attributed
to the effects of a single composite parameter: the weighted average of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and the trade price elasticity. As openness determines the relative weights, an increase
in openness will alter the dynamic behavior of the economy strongly only if the trade price elasticity
14The behavior of CPI inﬂation and output displays dynamics similar to domestic inﬂation and absorption, respectively.
An exception is the impact period where changes in the nominal exchange rate and net exports dominate the behavior of
domestic variables, because the latter are predetermined.
15Actually, for certain parameterizations even the difference in the slope coefﬁcients disappears such that ‘openness’ is
merely a source of additional shocks.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses to monetary policy shock
Notes: Shock is exogenous increase in domestic nominal interest rate by 100 basis points; lines show response of domestic
variables. Solid line displays responses for zero import share; dashed line: 12 percent import share; dashed-dotted line: 40
percent; all parameter values are kept at the values used or obtained in the estimation of the model.
differs considerably from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
This result is useful in interpreting our ﬁnding. Abstracting from habit formation, our choice of
parameter values for   and γ implies a value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for con-
sumption ofabout3/4 which is in the middle ofthe rangeof the valuesdiscussedin the literature. Our
estimate for the trade price elasticity suggests a value which is only slightly lower. It thus appears
that because the trade price elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are of similar
magnitude, openness plays a very limited role in the monetary transmission mechanism.16
However, we have so far drawn on a discussion of the New Keynesianbaseline model where strategic
price-setting complementarities are absent, while we stressed a new dimension of the exchange rate
channelemerging under such complementarities, see section 1.2.6. Speciﬁcally, in this case openness
is likely to alter monetarytransmission mechanismasit providesmonetary policywith directleverage
on domestic inﬂation. Yet this effect is not evident in the response of domestic inﬂation displayed in
Figure 1.3—despite our estimate for η which suggests strong complementarities.
16In fact, when we increase the trade price elasticity, we ﬁnd openness to impact more strongly on monetary transmission.
35Yet openness and complementarities are not sufﬁcient for this effect to be present. As stressed above,
a third condition is a fair amount of exchange rate pass-through. To see this, consider a monetary
contraction: only if the resulting appreciation is reﬂected in foreign competitors charging lower do-
mestic currency prices, will domestic ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to lower their prices as well. In this case,
there will be downward pressure on domestic inﬂation due to strategic complementarities, in addition
to downward pressure resulting from muted demand and marginal costs.
In principle, this dimension of the exchange rate channel can be quite powerful from a quantitative
point of view. This is illustrated in the upper right panel of Figure 1.3, which displays the impulse
responses of domestic inﬂation for the different degrees of openness, assuming a higher degree of
exchange rate pass-through: we lower the value of α from our estimate of 0.88 to 0.6. In this case,
increasing openness induces a much quicker and stronger fall in domestic inﬂation. In the open
economy (40 percent imports, dashed-dotted line) the response peaks after 3 quarters rather than
after 5 quarters in the closed economy. Moreover, the strength of the response increases by some 25
percent.17
The lower panels of ﬁgure 1.3 display the response of domestic absorption for all three openness
scenarios, both for α = 0.88 (left panel) and α = 0.6 (right panel). Generally, domestic absorption
falls less in responseto the monetary policy shock in the more open economy. The effect of openness,
however, is considerably more pronounced if the fraction of LCP-ﬁrms is lower, i.e. if exchange
rate pass-through is higher. To understand this result, recall that while a monetary policy shock
is an exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate, what matters for the dynamic adjustment of
domestic absorption is the ex ante real interest rate. Its response depends on the dynamics of CPI-
inﬂation which, in turn, will vary with the degree of openness. On impact, CPI-inﬂation falls more
strongly than domestic inﬂation, because of the exchange rate appreciation. Yet as the exchange rate
overshoots, subsequent changes in the exchange rate tend to raise CPI-inﬂation relative to domestic
inﬂation—thereby dampening the rise in the real rate. Hence, the fall in domestic absorption is less
pronounced in more open economies. Again, this effect is stronger, the more pervasive the exchange
rate pass-through.
1.4.2 Implications for monetary policy
Assuming strategic complementarities in price setting, monetary policy gains better control over do-
mestic inﬂation as trade integration increases, at least in principle. A necessary condition is that
import prices are not completely isolated from exchange rate movements. Yet our estimates suggest
that exchange rate pass-through is fairly limited. Moreover, several recent studies suggest that ex-
17Interestingly, Ercegetal. (2007) alsodiscuss resultsfor theNCEScase. However, they stillﬁndthat theroleof openness
(for the transmission of technology shocks) is limited which is likely to be the result of assuming that all ﬁrms engage in
LCP.
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Figure 1.4: Openness and pass-through for the U.S.
Notes: Left panel displays import-GDP ratio; right panel displays reduced form estimate of exchange rate pass-through for
10 year rolling window recursive estimates, shaded area displays two-standard error conﬁdence bounds.
change rate pass-through has been declining over the last one or two decades. Figure 1.4 provides
suggestive evidence for recent trends both in trade integration and exchange rate pass-through in the
U.S. The left panel displays the import-to-GDP ratio over the period 1973–2006. The right panel
displays a reduced-form recursive estimate of exchange rate pass-through for the same period.18 Our
results, suggesting a decline in pass-through over the last 10-15 years, are broadly in line with those
obtained in the literature, see, for instance, Marazzi et al. (2005) and Ihrig, Marazzi, and Rothenberg
(2006).
Hence, it appears that although openness is on the rise, pass-through will continue to decline, if
current trends prevail. This observationhasimportant implications for monetary policy. To assessthis
more formally, we compute, as a measure for the trade-off faced by monetary policy, the cumulative
reduction in domestic absorption relative to the cumulative reduction in domestic inﬂation for the
ﬁrst year after a monetary policy shock.19 Again we consider counterfactual scenarios and compare
it to our baseline case: an economy which is approximately closed and an economy where imports
account for 40 percent. First, we keep pass-through low (at the value implied by our estimate of
α = 0.88), but allow, in a last experiment, for higher pass-through by lowering α to 0.6.
18As it is not possible to obtain rolling window estimates based on the structural estimation approach employed above,
we resort to reduced form estimates. Speciﬁcally, similar to Gust et al. (2006) we regress recursively, using a 10 year rolling
window, the log-differenced relative import price (measured as the nominal price of non-commodity imports of goods and
services divided by the CPI-Index) on the log-differenced real effective exchange rate and a constant.
19To be precise about the trade-off faced by monetary policy, it would be necessary to specify an objective for monetary
policy. Assuming that monetary policy aims at stabilizing both domestic inﬂation and the output gap, one may argue that
there is no real trade-off in the present model: if both monetary authorities stabilize domestic inﬂation perfectly, they are
likely to stabilize the output gaps as well. However, this is only true in the absence of cost-push shocks, which are typically
found to be an important source of business cycle ﬂuctuations, see Smets and Wouters (2007). While our model is agnostic
about the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations, our measure for the monetary policy trade-off might provide some idea of
how much reduction in domestic demand is necessary in order to engineer a certain reduction in domestic inﬂation. Our
measure is thus related to the sacriﬁce ratio, except that we do not consider a permanent reduction in inﬂation.
37Table 1.2: Monetary policy trade-off
1 − ω α
0.00 0.88 4.8
0.12 0.88 4.5
0.40 0.88 3.9
0.40 0.60 2.6
Notes: Right column measures cumulative reduction in do-
mestic absorption relative to domestic inﬂation for the ﬁrst
year after monetary policy shock.
Table 1.2 reports the results, which conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings. As a result of strategic price-setting
complementarities, monetary policy has direct leverage on domestic inﬂation, which operates irre-
spectively of a contraction in demand. The more open the economy, the stronger this effect appears.
At the same time, domestic absorption falls by less, because the monetary contraction implies a
smaller increase in the real interest rate. Both effects tend to improve our trade-off measure. Yet
from a quantitative point of view, this improvement is contained if pass-through is limited—as be-
comes apparent from the results of the fourth experiment (last row) where pass-through is increased
to counterfactually high levels.
It thus appears that, as long as exchange rate pass-through remains limited, increasing trade open-
ness has little bearing on the monetary transmission mechanism and the trade-off faced by monetary
policy.20 As a matter of fact, current trends suggest that while trade integration is increasing, pass-
through is decreasing. Yet it is conceivable that both phenomena are intertwined at a fundamental
level. While the present framework has allowed us to study isolated the effects of features, it seems
worthwhile to explore the possibility of a joint cause for both trends in future research.21
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we explore the role of trade integration for monetary policy transmission. First, we de-
velop a New Keynesian DSGE model featuring two symmetric countries and several frictions which
recent business cycle research has found to be important in accounting for several macroeconometric
observations. In addition, following Gust et al. (2006), Sbordone (2007) and Guerrieri et al. (2008),
we assume a fairly general aggregation technology for ﬁnal goods. It induces strategic complemen-
20Erceg et al. (2007) simulate the reduction of the inﬂation target incorporated in an interest rate feedback rule using the
SIGMA model of the FED. They compute the sacriﬁce ratio for different degrees of openness ﬁnding no important role for
the latter. Note, however, that while they assume strategic complementarities in price-stetting, they also assume LCP such
that import prices are isolated from exchange rate changes in the short-run.
21Dornbusch (1987) argues that the extent of exchange rate pass-through and goods market integration are jointly de-
termined. Gust et al. (2006) also link trade integration and exchange rate pass-through in a framework with strategic
complementarities. However, they abstract from nominal rigidities.
38tarities in price-setting with respect to domestic and foreign competitors such that domestic ﬁrms will
ﬁnd it optimal to adjust their prices in response to exchange rate changes which alter the domestic
currency price of imports—a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy
gains direct leverage over domestic inﬂation.
In order to quantify the effects of openness on monetary transmission, we estimate, in a ﬁrst step, a
VAR on U.S. time series relative to an aggregate of industrialized countries. We identify monetary
policy shocks by imposing an identiﬁcation scheme which is consistent with our theoretical model
and trace out the transmission mechanism through impulse response functions. In a second step, we
ﬁnd parameter values of the DSGE model by matching its impulse responses to those obtained from
the VAR.We ﬁnd that the estimated modelis generally ableto mimic the empirical responsefunctions
quite closely. Importantly, for the model to do so, we require a low value for the trade price elasticity
and the exchange rate pass-through, but strong complementarities in price-setting.
In a third step, we compare the effects of a monetary policy shock in the estimated model where
imports account for 12 percent of ﬁnal goods to two alternative scenarios: an economy which is ap-
proximately closed and one in which imports account for 40 percent. We ﬁnd the effects on domestic
inﬂation and absorption to be almost identical. Closer inspection reveals two reasons underlying this
ﬁnding. First, the estimated value of the trade price elasticity is close to the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. In this case, openness has been shown to induce little change in the New Keynesian
baseline model, see Erceg et al. (2007). Second, as regards the new dimension of the exchange rate
channel, we ﬁnd that limited exchange rate pass-through prevents it from having strong quantitative
effects. If we repeat our experiment while assuming higher exchangerate pass-through, the effects of
monetary policy shocks become considerably stronger.
Finally, turning to the implications for monetary policy, we stress that while increasing openness
could, in principle, improve the trade-off faced by monetary policy, such a development is likely to
be preventedby low exchangerate pass-through. At current trends, it appearsthat while trade integra-
tion, or openness,is on the rise, exchange rate pass-through is declining as far as major industrialized
countries are concerned. We conclude that while policy makers should keep a close eye on the joint
development of openness and exchange rate pass-through, future research may investigate possible
causes underlying these trends.
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1.F The New Keynesian Phillips curve
In the following, we go through the main steps of deriving the New KeynesianPhillips curve equation
(1.24). We split the derivation into 3 parts. In part one we solve the pricing problem of a generic
intermediate good LCP-ﬁrm in the domestic market (eq. 1.18). Part 2 solves the pricing problem of
a generic intermediate good PCP-ﬁrm in the domestic market (eq. 1.17). In part 3 we bring the ﬁrst
parts together using the ﬁrst order approximation of the deﬁnition of the producer price index.
Pricing problem of LCP-ﬁrm
Deﬁning It+k =
 k
s=1(ΠA
t+s−1)κ and maximizing equation (1.18) subject to the demand function
(1.7), we derive the following ﬁrst order condition
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where the elasticity of demand for good j in the domestic market is
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Rewriting equation (1.28) using the deﬁnition of real marginal cost MCR
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In the above equation all variables are expressed in log-deviations from steady-state. Log-linearizing
the elasticity of demand for good j equation (1.29), with Γ
Q
t = Γt
P A
t , we get
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40Substituting this expression for the demand elasticity in the ﬁrst order condition, we have
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Using the deﬁnition of the steady state markup   = ǫ
ǫ−1 and the deﬁnition of Ψ =
−η 
1−η , this
expression after quasi-differencing can be written as
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The log-linearized version of the competitive price index equation (1.13) in the domestic country
implies that
  Γ
Q
t = (1 − ω)  qt, (1.31)
where qt =
P B
t
P A
t is the relative import price in domestic currency. Using this to substitute for the
relative competitive price index above we get
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Pricing problem of PCP-ﬁrm
We can derive a similar expression for the PCP-ﬁrms. Maximizing equation (1.17) subject to the
demand function (1.9), we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
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where the elasticity of demand for good j in the domestic market is similar to the LCP-ﬁrms problem
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and the elasticity of demand for good j in the foreign market is given by
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41Linearizing the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrms problem using P
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Linearizing both demand elasticities deﬁning Γ
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Substituting the demand elasticities into the ﬁrst order condition and simplifying yields
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After quasi-differencing, the expression can be rewritten as
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One can linearize the competitive price index in the foreign country analogously to the one in the
home country deﬁning the relative export price in foreign currency as qB∗
t =
P A∗
t
P B∗
t :
  Γ
Q∗
t = −ω  qB∗
t (1.34)
Using this expressionand equation (1.31) to substitute for the relative competitive price indices above
we get
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The log-linearized version of the producer price index, equation (1.10), reads as
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Using the ﬁnal equations in the two subsections above to substitute for the contract prices of LCP-
and PCP-ﬁrms one ﬁnally obtains a general formulation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
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with λ = (1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)ξ−1.
The special cases with α = 0 and η = 0 are discussed in section 1.2.6. Here we brieﬂy discuss
the case of incomplete pass-through (0 < α < 1) and strategic complementarities in price setting
(η < 0). In addition to the closed economy Phillips curve or the open economy Phillips curve
without strategic complementarities three additional terms show up:   qB
t ,   qB∗
t and   qA∗
t . We discuss
the underlying economics in turn focusing on a monetary contraction which appreciates the nominal
exchange rate.
A reduction of the relative import price   qB
t , induces domestic LCP ﬁrms to reduce their prices as their
demand elasticity increases with a decrease of the import price index relative to the domestic price
index. Domestic PCP-ﬁrms react in a similar way; in addition they adjust their price to changes in the
relative export prices.
Following a nominal appreciation, the relative export price of PCP-ﬁrms expressed in foreign cur-
rency,   qB∗
t , increases. Recall that PCP-ﬁrms can adjust export prices only through adjustments in
domestic prices which are then translated via the law of one price into foreign currency. Hence, the
increase in the export price, puts downward pressure on (domestic currency) price of PCP-ﬁrms.
Following a nominalappreciation,the exportprices of PCP-ﬁrms increase relative to the exportprices
of LCP-ﬁrms—in foreign currency terms. This is captured by a decrease in   qA∗
t . As the PCP-ﬁrms
can adjust their export price only by adjusting their domestic price, this puts additional downward
pressure on domestic prices of PCP-ﬁrms.
All these effects become stronger with the degree of strategic price-setting complementarities η and
the import share 1−ω. As stressed in the main text, the effects also depend on the degree of exchange
rate pass-through. Note that if there are only LCP-ﬁrms (α = 1), the last two terms in the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve drop out and only real marginal cost and the relative import price govern
the domestic inﬂation dynamics. Yet, in this case import prices do not directly respond to exchange
rate changes.
431.G Data
Our data are obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook database, see OECD (2007). The ROW
aggregate comprises data for Canada, the U.K., Japan and the Euro area. We use data for private
consumption (volume), private ﬁxed investment (excl. stockbuilding, volume), and the deﬂator for
private consumption and the deﬂator for GDP. The latter series are used to construct the CPI-inﬂation
and domestic inﬂation, respectively.
To construct a measure for net exports of the U.S., we deﬂate exports (exports of goods and services,
value, local currency) and imports (imports of goods and services, value, local currency) with their
deﬂators (export or import price goods and services, local currency) and compute the log-difference
of both series. Measuresfor the short term interest rates are also obtained from the Economic Outlook
database (interest rate, short-term) except for the Euro area. In this case we draw on data (STN) from
the Area-Wide Model database of the ECB, see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001).
To compute the ROW series, we calculate quarterly growth rates and aggregate these series on the
basis of GDP weights (PPP-adjusted, year 2000), based on data from the IMF (2007). To obtain
levels, we cumulate aggregated growth rates.
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New Keynesian versus Old Keynesian
Government Spending Multipliers
2.1 Introduction
In a recentpaper 1 Christina Romer, Chair ofthe President’sCouncilof EconomicAdvisers,andJared
Bernstein, Chief Economist of the Ofﬁce of the Vice-President, provided numerical estimates of the
impact of an increase in government spending on GDP and employment in the United States. Such
estimates are a crucial input for the policy making process. They help determine the appropriate size
and timing of countercyclical ﬁscal policy packages and they help inform members of the Congress
and their constituents about whether a vote for a policy is appropriate. For packages approaching 1
trillion USD including interest, as in 2009, the stakes are enormous. The estimated economic impacts
matter.
The Romer-Bernstein estimates are based on two particular quantitative macroeconomic models -
one from the staff of the Federal Reserve Board and the other from an unnamed private forecasting
ﬁrm. By averaging the impacts generated by these two models, they estimate that an increase in
government purchases of 1 percent of GDP would induce an increase in real GDP of 1.6 percent
compared to what it otherwise would be. Their results are shown in Figure 2.1. Also shown in Figure
2.1 are the estimated effects of exactly the same policy change-a permanent increase in government
purchases-as reported in another study published a number of years ago by one of us. 2
It is clear from Figure 2.1 that the results are vastly different between the different models. Perhaps
the most important difference is that in one casehigher governmentspendingkeeps on adding to GDP
"as far as the eye can see," while in the other case the effect on GDP diminishes as non-government
1See Romer and Bernstein (2009), Appendix 1, page 12. Their paper was written during the transition period in early
January before Christina Romer was sworn in as Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. The ﬁrst version of this
chapter was circulated immediately after a modiﬁed version of the Obama Administrations ﬁscal stimulus proposal was
passed into law in February 2009 as NBER working paper 14782.
2See Taylor (1993), Figure 5-8A, page 166. This is a rational expectations model with staggered wage and price setting
and thus could be described as "new Keynesian" as deﬁned below.
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Figure 2.1: Estimated Impact on GDP of a Permanent Increase in Government Purchases of 1 percent
of GDP
components are crowded out by government spending.
Macroeconomists remain quite uncertain about the quantitative effects of ﬁscal policy. This uncer-
tainty derives not only from the usual errors in empirical estimation but also from different views
on the proper theoretical framework and econometric methodology. Therefore, robustness is a cru-
cial criterion in policy evaluation. Robustness requires evaluating policies using other empirically-
estimated and tested macroeconomic models. From this perspective Figure 2.1 is a concern because
it shows that the Romer-Bernstein estimates apparently fail a simple robustness test, being far dif-
ferent from existing published results of another model. For these reasons an examination of the
Romer-Bernstein results is in order.
2.2 The Need for an Alternative Assessment
We think it is best to start by conducting a fresh set of simulations with a macroeconomic model
other than one of those used in Figure 2.1. We focus on the Smets-Wouters model of the U.S. econ-
omy.3 The Smets-Wouters model is representative of current thinking in macroeconomics. It was
recently publishedin the AmericanEconomicReviewand is one of the bestknownofthe empirically-
estimated "new Keynesian" models. It is very similar to, and "largely based on" according to Smets
and Wouters, another well-known empirically-estimated new Keynesian model developed by Chris-
3See Smets and Wouters (2007) for a complete review of their model. It determines 14 endogenous variables: output,
consumption, investment, the price of capital, the capital stock, capital services, the capital utilization rate, labor supply, the
interest rate, the inﬂation rate, the rental rate on capital, the wage rate, the marginal product of labor, and the marginal rate
of substitution between work and consumption. The 14 equations include forward looking consumption, investment, price
and wage setting as well as several identities.
46tiano et al. (2005). The Smets-Wouters model was highlighted by Woodford (2009) as one of the
leading models in his review of the current consensus in macroeconomics.4
The term "new Keynesian" is used to indicate that the models have forward looking, or rational, ex-
pectations by individuals and ﬁrms, and some form of price rigidity, usually staggered price or wage
setting. The term also is used to contrast these models with "old Keynesian" models without rational
expectations of the kind used by Romer and Bernstein.5 New Keynesian models rather than old Key-
nesian models are the ones commonly taught in graduate schools because they capture how people’s
expectations and microeconomic behavior change over time in response to policy interventions and
because they are empirically estimated and ﬁt the data. They are therefore viewed as better for pol-
icy evaluation. In assessing the effect of government actions on the economy, it is important to take
into account how households and ﬁrms adjust their spending decisions as their expectations of future
government policy changes.
We ﬁrst show that the assumptions made by Romer and Bernstein about monetary policy-essentially
an interest rate peg for the Federal Reserve-are highly questionable according to new Keynesian
models. We therefore modify that assumption and look at the impacts of a permanent increase in
government purchases of goods and services in the alternative model. According to the alternative
model the impacts are much smaller than those reported by Romer and Bernstein.
We then consider more realistic scenarios. We look at the impact when government spending follows
the ﬁscal policy legislation enacted in February 2009 and we look at a scenario in which monetary
policy is more responsive. For these scenarios the impact with the alternative model is even smaller.
2.3 The Problem with an Interest Rate Peg
Romer and Bernstein assume that the Federal Reserve pegs the interest rate-the federal funds rate-
at the current level of zero for as long as their simulations run. Given their assumption that the
spending increase is permanent, this means forever. In fact, such a pure interest rate peg is prohibited
in new Keynesian models with forward-looking households and ﬁrms because it produces calamitous
economic consequences. As Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace 6 pointed out more than thirty years
ago, a pure interest rate peg will lead to instability and non-uniqueness in a rational expectations
model. Inﬂation expectations of households and ﬁrms become unanchored and unhinged and the
4See Woodford (2009), which also contains a useful survey of the whole "new Keynesian" literature.
5There is a rational expectations version of the FRB/US model. We simulated a permanent increase in government
purchases in this version and found that the multipliers declined sharply over time unlike those reported by Romer and
Bernstein (2009) but similar to the Taylor (1993) rational expectations model as shown in Figure 2.1. We infer that the
FRB/US model and the private sector model used by Romer and Bernstein are not new Keynesian models with rational
expectations. Also, as explained below, new Keynesian models would not allow an assumption of a constant zero interest
rate forever.
6See Sargent and Wallace (1975). Though the Sargent and Wallace model assumes perfectly ﬂexible prices the same
results hold in models with sticky prices.
47price level may explode in an upward spiral.
A permanent increase in government spending as a share of GDP would eventually raise the real
interest rate. This is the mechanism by which other shares of spending (consumption, investment,
and net exports) would be reduced to make room for the increased government share. With the Fed
holding the nominal interest rate constant at the current value near zero, and thus below inﬂation, the
lower real rate would cause inﬂation to rise and accelerate without limit. Thus the combination of a
permanent increase in governmentspending and the Fed setting the interest rate at zero would lead to
hyperinﬂation.
If the combination of a permanent government spending increase and a zero interest rate peg were
assessedby the Smets-Wouters model or, for that matter, any of the new Keynesian models, the econ-
omy’s projected performance would reﬂect the aforementioned consequences. To achieve stability of
output and inﬂation in such a model one must instead assume that, at some point, the federal funds
rate is allowed to move above zero and respond to the state of the economy rather than be held ﬁxed.
For the simulations presented here we therefore assume that the Federal Reserve only keeps the fed-
eral funds rate constant for a ﬁnite period of time after which it moves the interest rate depending
on what is happening to the economy. We begin by assuming that it keeps the interest rate equal to
zero and constant through 2009 and 2010 and then follows a standard monetary policy rule there-
after. Thus, in 2011, nominal interest rates will change somewhat and forward-looking households
and ﬁrms will incorporate this monetary policy response in their decision making. Keeping interest
rates constant for two years still does not seem very realistic and would likely result in an increase in
inﬂation, but it is certainly more realistic than pegging the interest rates at zero forever, or even for
four years.
2.4 Government Spending Multipliers: New Keynesian versus Old
Keynesian
Table 2.1 shows the response of real GDP to a permanent increase in government purchases of 1
percent of GDP in the new Keynesian model and contrasts these with the average of the two models
of Romer and Bernstein. The simulations are done using a new database of macroeconomic models
designed explicitly with the purpose of doing such policy evaluation and robustness studies.7 The
increase in governmentspending is assumed to start in the ﬁrst quarter of calendar2009. The forward
looking models require explicit assumptions about what household’s and ﬁrms expect. Our assump-
tion is that, as of the ﬁrst quarter of 2009,people expectthe governmentspendingincreaseto continue
permanently (as in the Romer-Bernstein policy speciﬁcation), and that the spending increase is ini-
7The model database is described in Wieland, Cwik, Mueller, Schmidt and Wolters (2009) and used in a model compar-
ison exercise by Taylor and Wieland (2009).
48tially debt-ﬁnanced. The Smets-Wouters model assumes that any increase in debt used to ﬁnance the
increased governmentspending is paid off with interest by raising taxes in the future. We assume that
these taxes are "lump sum" in the sense that they not affect incentives to work, save or invest. They
do, however, lower future after tax earnings and thereby wealth. If we took such incentive effects
into account the increase in government spending would eventually reduce real GDP. Hence, our as-
sumptions err on the side of overestimating the size of the impact of government spending on real
GDP.
Table 2.1: Permanent Increase in Government Spending (federal funds rate zero in 2009 and 2010)
2009Q1 2009Q4 2010Q4 2011Q4 2012Q4
Romer/Bernstein 1.05 1.44 1.57 1.57 1.55
Smets/Wouters 1.03 0.89 0.61 0.44 0.40
Note: Impact of a Permanent Increase in Government Spending by 1 Percent of GDP,
Percentage increase in real GDP, federal funds rate set to zero throughout 2009 and
2010.
Observe that the Smets-Wouters model predicts a much smaller boost to GDP than the estimates
reported by Romer and Bernstein. The Smets-Wouters multiplier is smaller throughout the whole
simulation period, and by 2011 is only about one-third the size of the Romer-Bernstein multiplier.
The Smets-Wouters model also shows a rapid reduction in the size of the impact over time. Overall
the Smets-Wouters impacts are very similar in size and timing to those found in the Taylor (1993)
model shown in Figure 2.1. In sum, the Romer-Bernstein estimates are much more optimistic in their
GDP estimates than the alternative model considered here.
The Smets-Wouters model predicts that the increase in GDP by the end of 2009 is smaller than
the increase in government expenditures itself; that is, the multiplier is less than one. Thus, the
modelpredicts thatgovernment"stimulus"quickly producesa permanentcontractionin private sector
investment and/or consumption. Note that the magnitude of the contraction grows over time. By the
end of 2012, for each dollar of "stimulus", the ﬂow of goods and services produced by the private
sector falls by sixty cents.
2.5 Alternative Assumptions about Monetary Policy
Table2.2 showswhatwould happenif the length oftime for whichthe federalfundsrate is anticipated
to remain constantis shorterandextendsonlythroughthe endof2009. In otherwords wenowassume
thatthe Fedstarts following its feedbackrule for policystarting in 2010ratherthan waiting until 2011.
The impacts in Table 2.2 are uniformly smaller through 2011 than those in Table 2.1 because interest
rates can begin to increase earlier (in 2010 rather than 2011) accelerating the crowding-out process in
the new Keynesian model. Note that the differences between the Smets-Wouters simulations in Table
49Table 2.2: Permanent Increase in Government Spending (federal funds rate zero in 2009)
2009Q1 2009Q4 2010Q4 2011Q4 2012Q4
Romer/Bernstein 1.05 1.44 1.57 1.57 1.55
Smets/Wouters 0.96 0.67 0.48 0.41 0.40
Note: Impact of a Permanent Increase in Government Spending by 1 Percent of GDP,
Percentage increase in real GDP, federal funds rate set to zero throughout 2009.
2.1 and 2.2 are not nearly as large as the differences between either of these and the Romer-Bernstein
impacts. In what follows we will continue with the assumption that the Fed can start to increase
interest rates if necessary in 2010.
2.6 A More Realistic Path for Government Purchases
Although a permanent increase in government purchases of goods and services is a good way to
understandthe properties of a model,it is nota realistic descriptionof the ﬁscalpolicy packagesunder
consideration in the United States and other countries recently nor of the ﬁnal 787 billion USD ﬁscal
stimulus packageenacted and signed into law 8 on February 17, 2009. For example, about half of that
ﬁscal stimulus package consists of transfer payments for unemployment assistance, nutritional aid,
and health and welfare payments, and temporary tax cuts. In addition, the package does not provide
for an immediate permanent increase in government purchases of goods and services. Most of the
purchases authorized by the law are one-time and phased in, with the lion’s share of the purchases
completed within four years.
Table 2.3 shows the U.S. ﬁscal stimulus package’s impact on the federal deﬁcit and federal govern-
ment purchases in billions of dollars. The government purchases column corresponds to the perma-
nent increase in government purchases simulated and reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 except of course
that it is not permanent. Observe that 21 billion USD or just 2.6 percent of the total 787 billion USD
increase in the deﬁcit spending occurs in ﬁscal year 2009, which is when the economy is expected to
be weakest.9 Federal purchases then increase in 2010, stay relatively steady for two years, and then
begin to decline again in 2012. Since the stimulus bill is a mixture of increased transfer payments,
tax refunds, and higher government purchases,the path for the deﬁcit is different from the path of the
increase in government purchases.
One component of federal government transfers-certain transfers going to state and local
governments-is similar to federal purchases in that the funds are to be used by the states to purchase
goods and services. These intergovernmental transfers, which consist mainly of funds for education
8The ofﬁcial name of the legislation is The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
9The U.S. government’s 2009 ﬁscal year runs from October 1, 2008 to September 30th, 2009.
50Table 2.3: Government Purchases in the February 2009 Stimulus Legislation
Fiscal Increase in federal Increase in transfers to states, Increase in federal
year purchases localities deﬁcit
2009 21 48 184
2010 47 107 400
2011 46 47 134
2012 36 8 36
2013 25 4 27
2014 27 0 22
2015 11 0 5
2016 -2 0 -8
2017 -3 0 -7
2018 -2 0 -6
Notes: Increased Deﬁcit, Federal Government Purchases, and TransferstoStateand Lo-
cal Governments for Purchases of Goods and Services in the February 2009 Stimulus
Legislation (billions of dollars). Increase in federal deﬁcit excludes impact of interest
payments on the public debt incurred to ﬁnance the stimulus package. Authors’ calcu-
lations derived from Congressional Budget Ofﬁce.
and public safety activities, are shown in the third column of Table 2.3. During the ﬁrst three years,
these government transfers exceed federal purchases. It is difﬁcult to determine how much of the
transfers to states and localities will ultimately result in an increase in spending on goods and ser-
vices. States and localities might use some or all of the funds to avoid raising taxes or increasing
borrowing. To the extent that they do, the transfer would not produce a net increase in government
purchases of goods and services. Romer and Bernstein (2009) assume that 60 percent of these trans-
fers go to purchases of goods and services. In keeping with that assumption, we consider in what
follows the impact on GDP of an increase in governmentpurchasesequal to column 2 plus 60 percent
of column 3 in Table 2.3. We assume that the path of purchases is constant for all the quarters within
a ﬁscal year and that, as assumed Romer and Bernstein (2009), there is a one quarter lag in the effect
of the increase of transfers to states and localities on their purchases of goods and purchases. We also
experimented with other interpolation schemes but the results were not substantially different and we
focus here on the simple constant level assumption.
Figure 2.2 presents the results of the simulation. The bar graph shows the increased government
purchases as a share of GDP, and the line graph shows the impact of the increase in purchases on real
GDP according to the Smets-Wouters model.
The quarters in Figure 2.2 refer to the calendar year rather than the ﬁscal year. We show the results
through 2013 even though we simulate the impacts over the full ten years. The model solution tech-
niques that we employ take into account the particular nonlinear time proﬁle of governmentspending
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Figure 2.2: Estimated Output Effects of Government Purchases in the February 2009 Stimulus Legis-
lation.
Notes: Government purchases equal federal purchases plus 60 percent of transfers to state and local governments for
purchases of goods and services.
and ensure that households and ﬁrms form appropriate expectations. 10
2.7 Estimated Impacts
According to the Smets-Wouters model, the impacts of this package on GDP are very small. But
particularly worrisome is that during the ﬁrst year the estimated stimulus is minor and then even turns
down in the third quarter. Why the very small effect in the ﬁrst year?
The answer comes in part from the timing of the government expenditures and the forward-looking
perspective of households. The small amount of government spending in the ﬁrst year is followed by
a larger increase in the second year. Households and ﬁrms anticipate the second year increase during
the ﬁrst year. They also anticipate that ultimately the expenditures will be ﬁnanced by higher taxes.
The negative impact of the delayed government spending and the negative wealth effect on private
consumption of higher anticipated future taxes combine to reduce the positive impact of the stimulus.
As a result, the ﬁrst-year GDP impact is initially small and turns down.
In the Smets-Wouters model there is also a strong crowding-out of investment. Hence, both con-
sumption and investment decline as a share of GDP in the ﬁrst year according to the Smets-Wouters
model. This negative effect is offset, as shown in Figure 2.2, by the increase in government spending
in the ﬁrst year, but it causes the multiplier to be below one right from the start. Figure 2.3 shows the
10The ﬁscal stimulus simulations with anticipated government spending plans and temporarily constant nominal interest
rates require using nonlinear solution techniques. The methodology we use is described in Juillard (1996) and implemented
in DYNARE. This solution approach builds on earlier work by Laffarge (1990) and Fair and Taylor (1983).
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Figure 2.3: Crowding-Out of Consumption and Investment
Notes: Government purchases are as in Figure 2.2.
impact on consumption and investment.
Notethatasthe governmentpurchasescomebackdownin 2013,themultiplier turnsnegative. Thede-
clines in consumptionplus investmentare greater than the increases in governmentspending. Though
not shown in Figure 2.2, the simulations show that the impact on GDP is negative for many years be-
yond 2013.
Because of the negative effects on consumption and investment, it is possible to get negative GDP
multipliers in the ﬁrst year with government purchases paths slightly different from those in Figures
2.2 and 2.3. For example, a sharper increase in government spending in the second year compared to
the ﬁrst leads to more crowding out of consumption and investment in the ﬁrst year and the multiplier
can turn negative. In fact, our simulations of the ﬁrst stimulus bill passed by the House of Representa-
tives in 2009 had this property, but changes by the conference committee and revised estimates of the
path of government purchases by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce removed the negative multiplier.
The simulations reported in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are based on the assumption that the Fed starts fol-
lowing its feedback rule for policy starting in the ﬁrst quarter of 2010. Of course, the increase in GDP
would be greater if the zero interest rate policy is maintained till the end of 2010 as in the simulation
of a more permanent increase in governmentspending reported in Table 2.1. In this case, GDP would
rise by almost 0.8 percent in 2010 when most of the additional spending occurs. But even under
this less realistic assumption regarding the Fed’s policy response, the GDP effect of ARRA spending
remains around 1
4 of the Romer-Bernstein estimates.
532.8 Too Keynesian or not Keynesian enough?
A possible criticism of newKeynesianmodels suchas Christiano et al. (2005)and Smets and Wouters
(2007) is that they are not Keynesian enough, because they assume that all households are forward-
looking and optimize their spending decisions. Some have suggested that one should allow for the
possibility that some households follow "rules of thumb" like the original Keynesian consumption
function with a high and constant marginal propensity to consume. Others have proposed to assume
that many households are constrained to consume all their current income.11
However, it is also possible to criticize new Keynesian models because they are too Keynesian. In
contrast with real business cycle models, the estimated new Keynesianmodels assume "sticky prices"
by introducing staggered price and wage setting. But as Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009) have
emphasized the models go further in the Keynesian direction by assuming "the backward indexation
of prices" in "a mechanical way" which ampliﬁes Keynesian aggregate demand effects of policy.
It is well understood that the standard real business cycle model predicts increases in government
spending to crowd out private consumption due to the negative wealth effect that arises from higher
current or future taxes (see for example Baxter and King (1993)). The particular time path of taxes is
irrelevant if they are raised lump sum - the so-called Ricardian equivalence property. Thus, bringing
the model of Smets and Wouters more in line with standard real business cycle analysis as proposed
by Chari et al. (2009) would further strengthen the case against the "old" Keynesian multipliers used
by Romer and Bernstein (2009).
The more interesting question is whether introducing "old" Keynesian rule-of-thumb consumers in
New-Keynesian models would change our ﬁndings signiﬁcantly. To address this question we extend
the Smets-Wouters model to allow for two types of consumers. The rule-of-thumb consumers spend
alltheir after-tax laborincomewhereastheothers takeinto accountexpectedfuture earningsandtaxes
and make optimal consumption and savings decisions. In the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers,
the Ricardian equivalence property fails to hold and the time path of lump-sum taxes inﬂuences
aggregateoutcomes. As in Gali et al.(2007)we assumethat the particular pathfor taxesis determined
by a ﬁscal policy rule which responds to the level of government spending and government debt.
Taxes are raised from both types of consumers.
We re-estimate all the parameters of the model including the share of rule-of-thumb consumers and
the parameters of the ﬁscal policy rule. The additional model equations and the estimation results are
discussed in detail in Appendix 2.M. For the purpose of better comparability we use the same data
set on U.S. economic aggregates as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Using Bayesian methods requires
11Models of consumption with an exogenous share of rule-of-thumb consumers were proposed by Campbell and Mankiw
(1989). More recently, Coenen and Straub(2005) and Gali et al. (2007) have investigated theimplications of this assumption
for ﬁscal policy in New Keynesian models.
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Figure 2.4: Estimated Impact of ARRA Government Purchases in New-Keynesian models with and
without rule-of-thumb consumers
specifying a prior belief on the parameters. We choose a prior mean of 0.5 for the share of rule-
of-thumb consumers. This value is at the high end of those found in the literature. Our estimation
shows that the U.S. data is better ﬁt by a smaller value. We obtain a posterior mean for the share of
rule-of-thumb consumers of 27%.
As to the ﬁscalpolicy rule the responseof lump-sum taxes to governmentdebt is estimated to be 0.06,
while the fraction of increased government spending that is immediately ﬁnanced by higher taxes has
a posterior mean of about 0.13. This reaction function implies a considerable build-up of government
debt after an increase in government spending that is paid back slowly over time.
Figure 2.4 reports the impact of government spending increases implied by the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act in our model with rule-of-thumb consumers compared to the impact in the
Smets-Wouters model previously shown in Figure 2.2. As one might have expected the GDP effect
of ARRA spending is greater in the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers. However, the difference
remains of modest magnitude. The maximum increase above baseline comes to 0.56% in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2010 relative to 0.5% in the Smets-Wouters model. Thus, a medium-size new Keynesian
model that allows for households that simply consume current income and ﬁts U.S. data quite well,
still implies much smaller multiplier effects than the models considered in Romer and Bernstein
(2009) for important practical policy analysis. The multiplier remains well below unity reaching a
maximum of 0.73 in the ﬁrst quarter of 2010.
As shown in the lower half of Figure 2.4 increased government spending continues to crowd out
private spending on consumption and investment goods in the estimated model with rule-of-thumb
consumers. This ﬁnding stands in contrast to the study of Gali et al. (2007). There are severalreasons
55for this difference. Our empirical estimate of the share of rule-of-thumb consumersis lower than their
assumed value of 0.5.12 Furthermore our estimated model allows for wage rigidities. As a result, real
wages increase more moderately after a rise in government spending and induce less of a boost to
disposable income and consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers. Finally, the negative wealth effects
induced by the ARRA spending plan are relatively large.
2.9 Reduced-Form Empirical Evidence and the Importance of Antici-
pation Effects
So far, we have investigated the magnitude of government spending multipliers and the effects of the
ARRA legislation using estimated structural macroeconomic models of the U.S. economy. However,
there also exists a large literature that utilizes reduced-form methods in order to identify the likely
effects of government spending shocks on the U.S. economy. As emphasized by Ramey (2009)
this literature remains divided on central questions such as whether the GDP effect is greater than
unity and whether private spending rises or falls in response to government spending increases. She
points out that studies using VAR techniques in which identiﬁcation is achieved by assuming that
governmentspendingis pre-determined within the quarter typically ﬁnd a larger effect of government
spending on GDP and crowding-in of consumption (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and
Mihov (2001) or Gali et al. (2007)) while studies using the Ramey-Shapiro "war dates" (e.g. Ramey
and Shapiro (1998), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Ramey (2009)) indicate a smaller
GDP effect and crowding-out of consumption.
Indeed, a closer look at the above-mentioned studies as well several more recent empirical analyses
reveals a wide range of estimates of the GDP impact of government spending due to difﬁculties in
identifying the presumedgovernmentspendingshocks. Using VARtechniques,BlanchardandPerotti
(2002) ﬁnd a government spending multiplier close to one, Fatas and Mihov (2001) estimate it to be
greater than one, while Gali et al. (2007) obtain a high-end estimate of 1.7 after two years that could
be used as supportof the Romer-Bernstein calculations.13 Thesestudies ﬁnd that private consumption
increases following a governmentspending shock. Using a different identiﬁcation approach based on
sign restrictions on VAR impulse responses, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) estimate a multiplier well
below one for a deﬁcit ﬁnanced government spending shock. In their analysis, consumption does not
12Our estimate with U.S. data is similar to euro area estimates of 25 to 35% obtained by Coenen and Straub (2005) and
Ratto, Roeger, and in’t Veld (2009), respectively. The likely effects of euro area ﬁscal stimulus are investigated in several
macroeconomic models by Cwik and Wieland (2009) and tend to conﬁrm our ﬁndings for the United States.
13The higher estimates implied by VAR models such as Gali et al. (2007) are perhaps less surprising once one recognizes
that regressions of output on lagged values of itself and other variables are similar to the type of Keynesian-style models
with backward-looking expectations that are known to generate greater multiplier effects and appear to have been used by
Romer-Bernstein in their calculations. Gali et al. (2007) also make use of the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce estimate of
potential output, which is essentially a model construct in line with traditional Keynesian analysis, in deﬁning some of the
variables entering the VAR as gap variables.
56move much in response to government spending.
Clearly, identiﬁcation is a problem which is why other studies focus on military spending and attempt
to collect additional information on the timing of particular changes. Ramey (2009) shows that in-
creases in military spending and non-defense spending are anticipated several quarters before they
occur. Consequently, it is important to capture the timing of the news about future increases govern-
ment spending correctly. Her multiplier estimates based on an extension of the Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) "war dates" and new data series on defense news lie between 0.6 and 0.8 when World War II
is excluded, and near unity with World War II included. Similar empirical ﬁndings are reported by
Barro and Redlick (2009). They identify a defense spending multiplier of 0.6 to 0.7 including the
World War II period. In addition, they obtain some evidence that the spending multiplier may reach
unity in states with an unemployment as high as 12%. Their ﬁndings also indicate a signiﬁcantly
negative effect of defense-spending shocks on private investment and net exports.
It remains to relate our analysis of the impact of the ARRA legislation with estimated structural
macroeconomic models to the above-mentioned studies of government spending shocks. One advan-
tage is that the timing and nature of the anticipation of ﬁscal spending packages due to the ARRA
is known and need not be identiﬁed from macroeconomic time series. Of course, in estimating the
structural models one also obtains empirical monetary and ﬁscal policy reaction functions. Thus, we
can conduct a simulation in our models that is similar to the experiments considered by the above-
mentioned VAR studies, namely a one-time surprise increase in government spending that dies out
slowly according to an anticipated autoregressive process. The outcomes of these simulations are
shown in Figure 2.5.
The initial effect of a typical government spending shock in the Smets-Wouters model and in our
version of the model with rule-of-thumb consumers lies roughly in the middle of the wide range of
estimates obtained in the reduced-form empirical studies reviewed above. The ﬁrst-quarter impact
on GDP in the model with rule-of-thumb consumers is slightly above unity. The average over the
ﬁrst year is 0.81, which is consistent with studies such as Ramey (2009) and Barro and Redlick
(2009). The GDP effect however is smaller than in the simulations reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2,
becausethe spending increase is less than permanent and becausethe zero bound is not in force. With
regard to private consumption, the model with rule-of-thumb consumers delivers a smaller response
of consumption. Interestingly, in simulations with one year of constant interest rates we obtain a
small crowding-in effect.
The ARRA legislation, however, implies a different time proﬁle of government spending than the
autoregressiveproﬁle implied by standard impulse responsefunctions,reaching its peak in the second
year of the plan. In practice, such a delay and built-up period is unavoidable in executing ﬁscal
stimulus packages because effective implementation of new projects takes time. Estimated structural
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Impact of a Gradually Phased-out Government Spending Shock
Notes: Theestimated impact in the Original Smets-Woutersmodel is displayed by solid lines and the impact in the Extended
Model with Rule-of-Thumb Consumers by dashed lines.
58macroeconomic models that account for a forward-looking and optimizing response of private sector
decision makers to changes in government policies are the appropriate tool for quantifying the likely
impact of such changes. Such models are better able to quantify the effect of the anticipation of future
government spending and tax changes upon announcementof a stimulus package such as the ARRA.
Thus, it is important to use them in the type of practical policy analysis conducted by Romer and
Bernstein (2009).
2.10 Fiscal stimulus in the 2008/09 recession and the zero bound on
nominal interest rates
Many commentators on the monetary and ﬁscal responses to the 2008/09 recession have argued that
the special circumstance of near zero nominal interest rates provides a strong argument in favour of
ﬁscal stimulus. The argument goes as follows: the Federal Reserve might want to lower nominal
interest rates further but is prevented from doing so by the zero-interest-rate ﬂoor that arises because
savers can use cash as a zero-interest bearing asset. As a consequence, the Fed may not want to
increase interest rates as output rises as it usually does and instead accommodates the ﬁscal stimulus
for some time. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) suggest that ﬁscal multipliers can be
much larger than usual in such circumstances. They make use of an estimated New-KeynesianDSGE
model due to Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004).
In our simulations using the Smets-Wouters model in sections 2.4 to 2.8 we have already taken into
account this argument by assuming a constant funds rate for up to two years and then a return to
a stabilizing rule. This assumption induces a nonlinearity, which has important anticipation effects.
Nevertheless, this period of monetary accommodation only causes a modest increase in the govern-
ment spending multiplier. An even longer period of monetary accommodation would be needed to
obtain a more signiﬁcant increase in multiplier effects as in Christiano et al (2009).
Nevertheless, a reasonable question to ask is whether our ﬁndings could be inﬂuenced by the fact
that we simulate the ﬁscal stimulus as a deviation from the model’s steady state. Clearly, the U.S.
economy was still in a deep recession in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 when the ﬁscal packages were
enacted. In a linear model, it would make no difference if the stimulus is simulated in deviation from
steadystate or in a scenario far belowthis level. In the linear case one can simply apply the simulation
to any baseline of interest to the policy maker. In a nonlinear model, however, this need not be true
any more. For this reason, we conduct further sensitivity analysis to check whether our ﬁndings still
hold if the ﬁscal stimulus is applied in a deep recession during which the federal funds rate may be
endogenously constrained at the zero bound for some time.
We simulate the Smets-Wouters model with the actual U.S. data through the 1st quarter of 2009.
Then, we compute projections of the recovery implied by this model with and without the additional
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Wouters model based on Actual U.S. Data throughout 09Q:1
government spending. This projection is calculated in a version of the model that incorporates the
non-negativity restriction on the federal funds rate.14 Whether or not the federal funds rate endoge-
nously visits the zero bound depends on the monetary policy rule that determines the systematic
response of the Federal Reserve to economic developments.
IfweusetheTaylorrulethenthezero-interestﬂoordoesnotbecomea bindingconstraintformonetary
policy. The simulated recovery is sufﬁciently quick so that Taylor’s rule would prescribe an increase
in the funds rate. If we use instead the interest rate rule originally estimated by Smets and Wouters
along with the other equations in their model, then the funds rate endogenously visits the zero bound
in the second and third quarter of 2009. Figure 2.6 reports the difference in GDP projections with
and without the ARRA government purchases (dashed line). The underlying simulations are carried
out with monetary policy following the Smets-Wouters rule and start in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 from
an output gap of -6 1
2 percent annualized. Thus, the difference between the two simulations shown
in Figure 2.6 is comparable to the results shown previously in Figure 2.2 but computed at a state far
away from the steady-state level of output. We ﬁnd that the GDP impact of the additional government
purchases remains very close in magnitude to the scenario in Figure 2.2 that is indicated by the solid
line in Figure 2.6 and was simulated as a deviation from steady-state with a constant funds rate for
four quarters.
14The functional form chosen for the non-negativity constraint is the same as in earlier analysis of the implications of
the zero-interest rate ﬂoor by Orphanides and Wieland (2000), Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland (2004) and Coenen and
Wieland (2003).
602.11 Impacts of an Entire U.S. Stimulus Package
Although the simulations in this chapter have focussed on government spending multipliers in the
case of changes in government purchases of goods and services, it is possible to say something about
the impact of the broader U.S. ﬁscal stimulus package, which also includes tax rebates and one-time
transferpaymentsto individuals. Forthis purposewe focuson the impactin the fourth quarterof2010
where the size of the increased government purchases (including 60 percent of transfers to states and
localities for this purpose) is .73 percent of GDP and the impact on GDP is .46 percent, implying a
multiplier in that quarter of .63 (=.46/.73). We choose this quarter for two reasons. First, as shown
in Figure 2.2, it is close to the quarter of maximum GDP impact, so by choosing this quarter we will
in no way be understating the results. In fact, the impact declines sharply after this quarter. Second,
this is the quarter for which Romer and Bernstein (2009) report their widely-cited calculation that the
ﬁscal stimulus package of February 2009 will increase GDP by 3.6 percent and employment by 3.5
million. Hence, the last quarter of 2010 is useful for comparison purposes.
As Table 2.3 shows, the deﬁcit (excluding interest payments) increases by more than the increase in
government purchases in ﬁscal year 2009 through 2011. The lion’s share of the difference between
the deﬁcit and purchases, 80 percent, consists of temporary tax rebates and entitlement beneﬁts for
unemployment insurance, Medicaid beneﬁts, health insurance subsidies, and cash welfare payments.
The fourth quarter of 2010 (calendar year) is the ﬁrst quarter of ﬁscal year 2011. In ﬁscal year
2011, the deﬁcit minus purchases is 41 billion USD (=134-93=41). However, this is a large decrease
from ﬁscal year 2010 where the difference is 246 billion USD (400-154=246). So for the purpose of
estimating the impact of the broader package in 2010Q4 (calendar) we take the average of ﬁscal year
2010 and 2011, or the average of 41 and 246, which is 144 billion USD or about 1 percent of GDP.
How much of this "non-government-purchases" increase in the deﬁcit should we add to government
purchases to compute the impact on GDP? To the extent that the tax rebates and transfers to individ-
uals are temporary, permanent income theory, even in the presence of liquidity effects, says that the
impact on consumption and thereby aggregate demand will be small. Although there is a great deal
of uncertainty, a review of the literature over the years suggests that the marginal propensity to con-
sume for such tax and transfer payments is at most 0.3, though it will depend on timing, expectations,
and other factors. Recent aggregate evidence suggests that it may be much smaller. For example, an
examination of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 indicates that the impact of the tax rebates on
consumption was insigniﬁcantly different from zero.15 Transfers to individuals, such as entitlement
payments for unemployment compensation, and health and welfare beneﬁts, could be expected to
have an effect on consumption similar to temporary tax rebates. Although such payments may tem-
porarily boost household income, they also create employer incentives for layoffs and for household
15The estimated regression coefﬁcients reported in Taylor (2009) are not statistically different from zero.
61members to delay their return to work. In sum, in our view, a coefﬁcient of .3 for the impact of
these tax and transfers payments on consumption is likely an upper bound and certainly a generous
assumption about the size of the impact.
In any case, by assuming that the impact on consumption of the extra 1 percent discretionary increase
in the deﬁcit is .3 percent of GDP and using the above mentioned multiplier of .63 the impact will
be to increase GDP by an additional .19 percent. If we add this to the .46 percent GDP increase
from purchases, the total impact will be to increase GDP by.65 percent in the fourth quarter of 2010
compared to what it would otherwise be.
Romer and Bernstein (2009) calculated that the impact of the 2009 stimulus package would be to
raise GDP by 3.6 percent by the fourth quarter of 2010, which is 6 times greater than our calculation
based on the new Keynesianmodel simulations of the impact of purchases and a generous assessment
of the impact of tax rebates and temporary transfers.
Romer and Bernstein (2009) also give an estimate of the increase in employment from the ﬁscal
package. They assume an additional 1 million jobs for each 1 percent increase in real GDP. Thus they
estimate an increase of 3.5 million jobs as a result of the ﬁscal policy package enacted in February
2009. Using the same method our estimate is closer to 1
2 million additional jobs. To put that smaller
numberinto perspectiveitis lessthanthe598thousandpayrolljobslostin thesinglemonthofJanuary
2009 while the ﬁscal policy packages were being debated.
Romer and Bernstein also report job estimates in a number of private sector industries which would
have to be radically scaled down if the numbers we have calculated are correct. In addition, our
ﬁnding of crowding-out of private consumption and investment due to the increase in government
purchases raises doubts about the estimate that 90 percent of the jobs will be created in the private
sector. Indeed, with the impact of governmentpurchaseson GDP (.46) nearly three times greater than
the impact of tax rebates and transfers on GDP (.19), a net decline in private sector jobs is likely.
2.12 Conclusions and Outlook
In this chapter we used a modern empirical approach to estimate government spending multipliers,
and we contrasted these multipliers with those that have recently been used in practice to analyze
ﬁscal policy in the United States. We focused on an empirically estimated macroeconomic model-
the Smets-Wouters model-recently published in the American Economic Review. As attested by
leading macroeconomic researchers, such as Michael Woodford in his recent survey, this model well
representsnewKeynesianmacroeconomicthinkingofthekindthatmanymacroeconomistsnowteach
their graduate students and use in their research.
We ﬁnd that the government spending multipliers from permanent increases in federal government
purchases are much less in new Keynesian models than in old Keynesian models. The differences
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packages, such as the one enacted in February 2009 in the United States or similar ones discussed in
other countries. The multipliers are less than one as consumption and investment are crowded out.
The impact in the ﬁrst year is very small. And as the government purchases decline in the later years
of the simulation, the multipliers turn negative.
To further investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings we extend the model of Smets and Wouters to
allow for a share of "old" Keynesian rule-of-thumb households that consume all their disposable
income, estimate the extended model and re-evaluate the likely impact of the ARRA governmentpur-
chases. Then, the multiplier effect is slightly more pronounced but without changing our quantitative
ﬁndings signiﬁcantly. We also relate our analysis with estimated structural models to contributions
using reduced-form VAR models and regression analysis in order to identify government spending
shocks and their effects. A review of this literature suggests a wide range of multiplier effects from
0.6 to 1.7 depending on the particular approach to identiﬁcation. The typical time proﬁle of govern-
ment spending studied in this literature differs from the ARRA spending plan. Following an initial
surprise increase government spending gradually returns to steady state. We simulate this time pro-
ﬁle in our estimated New Keynesian models and ﬁnd that the short-run effect of such shocks in our
models lie roughly in the middle of the estimates by this literature. This experiment underscores the
need for analysis with estimated structural models that account for the reaction of forward-looking
optimizing households and ﬁrms in assessing the likely impact of changes in government policies.
The estimates reported in this chapter of the impact of ﬁscal stimulus packagesare in stark contrast to
those reported in the paper by Christina Romer and Jared Bernstein. They report impacts on GDP for
a broad ﬁscalpackagethat are six times larger than those implied by governmentspendingmultipliers
in a typical new Keynesian model and our calculations based on generous assumptions of the impacts
of tax rebates and transfers on GDP. They also report job estimates that are six times larger than
these alternative models, and the impacts on private sector jobs are likely to be at variance with the
alternative models by an even larger amount. At the least, our ﬁndings raise serious doubts about the
robustness of the models and the approach currently used for practical ﬁscal policy evaluation.
We also investigate whether our ﬁndings obtained by simulating the increase in additional spending
as a deviation from the steady-state of the economy would also result from a simulation starting in
deep recession far away from the steady-state. While the choice of baseline for the policy experi-
ment is irrelevant in linear models, the zero-interest rate ﬂoor on nominal interest rates introduces an
important nonlinearity that may affect our assessment. We simulate the Smets-Wouters model with
the actual U.S. data through the 1st quarter of 2009 and compute projections of the recovery with
and without the additional government spending. These projections imply that the funds rate would
visit the zero-interest-rate ﬂoor for two to three quarters. The GDP impact of the additional govern-
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constant funds rate for four quarters.
We have shown that the anticipation of the time proﬁle of government spending and the monetary
policy response have an important inﬂuence on the likely impact of ﬁscal stimulus in the U.S. econ-
omy. It is useful to explore such anticipation effects further. While our analysis is predicated on the
view that U.S. monetary policy will eventually act to stabilize inﬂation, an interesting study by Davig
and Leeper considers the anticipation of a shift to a monetary regime that would de-stabilize the
economy if maintained. Such a belief, they argue, would induce greater short-run multiplier effects.
By contrast, Corsetti, Meier, and Mueller (2009) suggest that the anticipation of a more conservative
ﬁscalstance that aims to contain the rise in governmentdebt by promising future spending cuts would
support greater short-run effects. Howeversuch a belief is inconsistent with the ARRA spending plan
and would have required announcing very substantial spending cuts starting as soon as the end of
2010 as discussed in Wieland (2010).
Thelonger-run effectsoftheAmericanRecoveryandReinvestmentActwill alsobeinﬂuencedbytwo
other factors that we have not accounted for in our model simulations. First, increases in future taxes
will be of a distortionary nature ratherthan lump-sumand therefore tend to depressoutput in the long-
run below the steady-state level assumed in our simulations. Uhlig (2009) indicates that this long-run
cost of short-run ﬁscal stimulus could be substantial. On the optimistic side, there is a possibility that
some of the additional government spending has an investment- rather than consumption-character
and would induce a positive long-run effect on output as suggested by countering the negative effect
of distortionary taxation. Due to implementation lags, however,expansionarygovernmentinvestment
can lead to a short-run contraction of output as indicated in Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009).
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2.M The New-Keynesian DSGE model with Rule-of-Thumb Con-
sumers
This appendix discusses how we have extended the Smets and Wouters model to include rule-of-
thumb consumers and reports the estimates we have obtained. We only review the model equations
that result from the extension. For the remainder of the model equations the reader is referred to the
appendix of Smets and Wouters (2007).
Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ [0,1]. A share 1 − ω of these households makes
optimizing, forward-looking decisions. They are indexed by j ∈ [0,1 − ω). These households have
access to ﬁnancial markets. They buy and sell government bonds and accumulate physical capital
that they rent to ﬁrms. They receive wage income and dividend payments from the ﬁrms and pay
taxes Tj,t in a lump-sum fashion to the government. Their decisions made so as to maximize a
utility function that is non-separable in consumption Cj,t and labour supply Lj,t. Their maximization
problem corresponds to the problem solved by all households in the Smets and Wouters model.
The remaining share ω of households - the "rule-of-thumb’ers" - is indexed by i ∈ [1 − ω,1]. They
simply consume their disposable income which is given by the wage income Wh
t Lt minus lump-sum
taxes:
Ci,t =
Wh
t Lt
Pt
−
Ti,t
Pt
(2.1)
Labor unions set the same nominal wage rate for both types of households. Hence, labour supply is
equalized across the two groups. Aggregating over all households implies that overall consumption
is a weighted average of the consumption function of rational and rule-of-thumb consumers:
Ct =
  1
0
Ch,tdh = (1 − ω)Cj,t + ωCi,t (2.2)
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The government purchases the ﬁnal good Gt, issues bonds Bt and raises lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance
government spending. Aggregate taxes correspond to Tt = (1 − ω)Tj,t + ωTi,t. The government
budget constraint is then given by
PtGt + Bt−1 = Tt +
Bt
Rt
(2.3)
Log-linearized model
Detrending the model variables with a deterministic trend γ and log-linearizing equations (2.1) to
(2.3) results in three linear relationships that need to be added to the Smets and Wouters model:
  ci,t =
wh
∗L∗
c∗
(  wt +   Lt) −
y∗
c∗
  tt (2.4)
  ct = (1 − ω)  cj,t + ω  ci,t (2.5)
  bt = R∗
 
  bt−1
π∗
+   gt −   tt
 
(2.6)
Steady-state consumption is set equal for rational and rule-of-thumb consumers to simplify the log-
linearization: Ci = Cj = C. The level of debt in steady-state is assumed to be zero. Furthermore
we assume that both types of households pay lump-sum taxes in equal proportions. Lump-sum taxes,
government debt and government spending are deﬁned as a percentage of steady-state output.
Smets and Wouters (2007) effectively disregard taxes and government debt dynamics because their
model exhibits the Ricardian equivalence property. Because all households act in a rational, forward-
looking manner, and because taxes are raised in lump-sum fashion, the particular time path of debt
and taxes is irrelevant. In our model with rule-of-thumb households, however, the speed at which
government debt is paid off with higher taxes matters for the model dynamics. Therefore we close
the model by deﬁning a log-linear ﬁscal policy rule as suggested in Gali et al. (2007):
  tt = φb  bt + φg  gt (2.7)
The parameters of the ﬁscal policy rule, φb and φg, determine the elasticities of lump-sum taxes with
respect to government debt and government spending.
Estimation
Just like Smets and Wouters (2007) we use Bayesian inference methods to estimate our New Keyne-
sian model with rule-of-thumb consumers.16 For better comparability we also use the Smets-Wouters
16Matlab routines for solution and estimation procedures are implemented in DYNARE. It is important to note that the
estimation can be carried out on the linearized model, while the ﬁscal stimulus simulations with anticipated government
spending plans and temporarily constant nominal interest rates require using nonlinear solution techniques.
66data set on U.S. macroeconomic aggregatescovering the period 1966:1-2004:4 and consideridentical
prior distribution as starting point in the parameter estimation. With regard to the prior distribution of
household types and the parameters of the ﬁscal policy rule we consider values similar to Smets and
Wouters (2007). Speciﬁcally, we assume that ω has a Beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard
deviation 0.1. This prior is at the high end of what is found in the literature. The parameter prescrib-
ing the response of lump-sum taxes to debt, φb, is assumed to follow an Inverted Gamma distribution
with mean 0.1 and degrees of freedom equal to 2. The coefﬁcient on government spending in the
ﬁscal policy rule is set to a Normal distribution with mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.05.
Our estimation results indicate that the new parameters are well identiﬁed. The posterior mode of
the share of rule-of-thumb consumers is estimated to be 28.6% with a standard deviation of 6.2%.
The posterior mean is 26.5%. Thus, the data clearly drive the estimate of the parameter downwards
from the prior of 50%. The parameters of the ﬁscal policy rule are signiﬁcant and of reasonable
magnitude. The posterior mode of the elasticity of lump-sum taxes to debt is estimated to be 0.043.
An increase in governmentdebt of 1% of GDP leads to an increase in lump-sum taxes of 0.05%. The
posterior mode for the elasticity of lump-sum taxes to government spending is estimated to be 0.12.
Hence 1/8 of an increase in government spending is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes directly. The other
part is initially ﬁnanced with debt and eventually implies higher taxes later on. The estimates of the
other parameters change relative to Smets and Wouters (2007) but the differences remain moderate.
Selected estimates are reported in Table 2.4.
67Table 2.4: Estimates of Key Model Parameters
Smets- Our Estimates of the New-Keynesian DSGE
Wouters Model with Rule-of-Thumb Consumers
(2007)
post. mean prior mean post. mode s.d. post. mean
ω Share of non-Ricardian - 0.5 0.286 0.062 0.2651
households
σc Inverse of intertemporal 1.380 1.500 1.332 0.134 1.286
elasticity of substitution
h Degree of habit formation 0.713 0.700 0.660 0.055 0.673
ξp Sticky prices 0.652 0.500 0.639 0.058 0.645
(Calvo parameter)
ιp Price indexation 0.243 0.500 0.194 0.083 0.221
σl Inverse of labour supply 1.838 2.000 1.963 0.566 1.869
elasticity
ξw Sticky wages 0.706 0.500 0.769 0.053 0.730
(Calvo parameter)
ιw Wage indexation 0.585 0.500 0.646 0.124 0.617
φb Elasticity of lump-sum taxes - 0.100 0.043 0.012 0.0531
with respect to debt
φg Elasticity of lump-sum taxes - 0.100 0.124 0.048 0.1242
with respect to government spending
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Keynesian government spending
multipliers and spillovers in the euro area
3.1 Introduction
In 2008 and early 2009 governments around the world announced major ﬁscal stimulus packages.
Resorting to discretionary ﬁscal policy to an unprecedented degree, they hoped to alleviate the re-
cessionary impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis. U.S. Congress, for example, approved 787 billion
dollars of additional spending, transfers and tax reductions with the 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. The European Union initiated the European Economic Recovery Plan while na-
tional European governments announced their own ﬁscal stimuli. The German government, which
was initially criticized for not spending enough, eventually announced two "Konjunkturpakete" in a
row.1
The impact of such announcements and the implied measures is difﬁcult to assess, because many
factors play a role. Proponents of ﬁscal stimulus emphasize the Keynesian multiplier effect. It fol-
lows from the national accounts’ spending identity when combined with the text-book Keynesian
consumption function. A country’s gross domestic product is equated with total spending, which
consists of private consumption, investment, net exports and government expenditures. Consumption
is believed to increase with after-tax income. Consequently, a debt-ﬁnanced increase in government
spending boosts total spending (and therefore total GDP) more than one for one.2 Since spending
1A prominent critic was Paul Krugman, who accused the German government of "boneheadedness" in an article in the
New York Times of Dec 12, 2008, titled "The economic consequences of Mr. Steinbrück". He wrote: "The world economy
is in a terrifying nose-dive, yet Mr. Steinbrueck, (the German ﬁnance minister) is standing ﬁrm against any extraordinary
ﬁscal measures, ... In Europe it is very hard to do a ﬁscal expansion unless it is coordinated ... The reason is that the
European economy is so integrated ... As a result, the multiplier on ﬁscal expansion within any given European country is
much less than the multiplier on a coordinated ﬁscal expansion. ... if Germany prevents an effective European response, this
adds signiﬁcantly to the severity of the global downturn. ... in short, there’s a huge multiplier effect at work; unfortunately,
what it’s doing is multiplying the impact of the current German government’s boneheadedness."
2The national accounts spending identity isgiven by, Y = C+I+EX−IM+G. The Keynesian consumption function
implies that consumption increases with after-tax income: 0 < dC/d(Y −T) < 1. It is then concluded that a debt-ﬁnanced
increase in government spending boosts total spending by more than one for one: 1 < dY/dG = 1/(1 − dC/d(Y − T)).
69may partly be diverted to imports, proponents have lobbied for coordinated stimulus packages across
Europe. Critics of ﬁscal stimulus, however, argue that government spending will displace private
consumption and investment (cf. Barro (2009)). Consumers will anticipate future tax burdens and
save rather than spend, while governmentborrowing will drive up interest rates and crowd out private
investment.
In a recent paper Christina Romer, Chair of the U.S. President’s Council of Economic Advisers, and
Jared Bernstein, Chief Economist of the Ofﬁce of the Vice-President, provided numerical estimates
of the impact of an increase in government spending on GDP and employment in the United States.
They estimate that an increase in government purchases of 1 percent of GDP would induce an in-
crease in real GDP of 1.6 percent compared to what it otherwise would be.3 Given this multiplier
effect they project that a package similar in size to the ARRA legislation would boost U.S. GDP by
3.6 percent. Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010), however, show that this conclusion is not
robust. Government spending multipliers in alternative, empirically estimated New-Keynesian mod-
els are much smaller. For example, estimates of the GDP effects of ARRA legislation obtained with
the model of Smets and Wouters (2007) are only one-sixth as large as the estimates of Romer and
Bernstein (2009).
This chapter aims to assess the magnitude of the stimulus programs announced by Euro area govern-
ments in 2008 and 2009 and quantify their effect on economic activity. A macroeconomic model is
needed to distinguish the impact of government actions on the economy from other factors. Because
of modeling uncertainty, it is essential that policy evaluations be robust to alternative assumptions.
For this reason, we compare the impact of the ﬁscal packages using several empirically-estimated
macroeconomic models of the euro area. The focus is on model simulations of the planned increase
in government spending rather than increases in transfers and tax rebates, because spending is sup-
posed to exhibit the largest Keynesian multiplier effect.
The models considered in this comparison are due to Smets and Wouters (2003), Laxton and Pesenti
(2003), Ratto et al. (2009), Taylor (1993) and Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2005).4 All ﬁve models
exhibit Keynesian features such as sluggish adjustment due to price and wage rigidities. Thus, they
are well-suited to investigatepossible rationales for Keynesiandemandmanagement. Severalof these
models have been developed and used at policy institutions such as the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, or the International Monetary Fund. The ﬁrst four model are best described
as New-Keynesian models. These models account for forward-looking decisions by households and
ﬁrms that anticipatefuture changesin governmentpolicies. The modelsofSmets andWouters (2003),
3See Romer and Bernstein (2009), Appendix 1, page 12. This paper was written during the transition period in early
January before Christina Romer was sworn in as Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers.
4The models are available in a new macroeconomic model archive for comparative analysis described in more detail in
Wieland et al. (2009). For analysis of monetary policy see Taylor and Wieland (2009). Earlier euro area model comparisons
have been conducted by Hughes-Hallett and Wallis (2004) and Kuester and Wieland (2010).
70Laxton and Pesenti (2003) and Ratto et al. (2009) also belong to the class of models often referred
to as New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Such models fully
incorporate recent advances in terms of microeconomic foundations from real-business-cycle models
and combine them with Keynesian-style rigidities.
We ﬁnd that New-Keynesian models provide no support for a traditional Keynesian multiplier effect.
The European spending plans would result in a reduction in private sector spending for consumption
and investment purposes. Households and ﬁrms reduce spending in anticipation of future tax burdens
and higher interest rates. Implementation lags of government spending worsen the impact on GDP.
Even if monetary policy is assumed to counteract the upward pressure on the nominal interest rate in
2009, the negative effect of ﬁscal stimulus on private spending remains. By contrast, the model of
Fagan et al. (2005) largely ignores forward-looking motives for private decision-making and provides
a more traditional Keynesian perspective. This model supports a strong Keynesian multiplier effect,
but the boom is followed by a bust. Thus, the cumulative effect of government on private spending
eventually turns negative. More importantly, models with backward-looking dynamics are not as
well-suited for the analysis of major policy changes as the New-Keynesian models. Instead, they are
used primarily for short-term forecasting.
In addition, we use the multi-country model of Taylor (1993) to assess the likely spill-over effects
within the euro area. Since half of the euro area stimulus is derived from the German stimulus plan,
we investigate the spill-over effect of German spending in the absence of similar measures in other
euro area countries. We ﬁnd that the positive direct demand effect of German spending on other euro
area economies is largely offset by the indirect negative effect of euro appreciation.
3.2 Euro area ﬁscal stimulus packages for 2009 and 2010
Table 3.1 provides an overview of discretionary ﬁscal policy measures announced by the 11 largest
euro area economies. In terms of GDP, these economies account for 99 percent of the euro area.
We have collected information from the publicly available stability programs that national ﬁnance
ministries prepared for the European Commission and compared these numbers to estimates obtained
by Saha and von Weizsäcker (2009).
Detailed information on the construction of our estimates is given in Appendix 3.F. Since we focus
on studying the effect of discretionary measures, changes in ﬁscal balances resulting from automatic
stabilizers are not included. Table 3.1 reports information on the total amount of the respective ﬁscal
package and the implied increase in government expenditures separately. The total also includes
temporary tax deductions, rebates and transfers. The amounts are reported in billions of Euro and in
relative shares in percent of 2008 GDP.
The ﬁscal stimuli differ substantially in terms of magnitude and composition. By far the largest stim-
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Total ﬁscal package Expenditures Total ﬁscal package Expenditures
(bln Euro) (bln Euro) (percent of GDP) (percent of GDP)
country 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
Austria 4.9 4.6 1.4 1 1.71 1.63 0.48 0.36
Belgium 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.24
Germany 35.9 48.4 18 13.6 1.44 1.93 0.72 0.54
Greece 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain 26.8 14.7 12.1 0 2.44 1.34 1.10 0.00
Finland 2.4 2.4 0.4 0.4 1.25 1.25 0.23 0.23
France 17 4 16.3 4 0.87 0.2 0.83 0.2
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy -0.3 -0.8 3.1 0.2 -0.02 -0.05 0.19 0.01
Netherlands 3.1 2.9 0.2 0 0.53 0.49 0.03 0.00
Portugal 1 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.18 0.54 0.18
EU-11 92 77.6 53.2 20.4 1.01 0.85 0.58 0.22
Source: Saha and von Weizsäcker (2009) "Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An
Update" and the stability programs provided by the ﬁnance ministries for the European Commission.
ulus package has been enacted in Germany: 84.3 billion Euro spread over 2009 and 2010. In relative
terms these measures amount to 3.37 percent of GDP. Thus, the German package is approaching the
magnitude of the ARRA stimulus in the United States adjusted for the size of the economy. However,
the U.S. measures are spread over four years. The German stimulus corresponds to 49.7 percent of
the total EU-11 stimulus according to the information we have been able to put together. In terms of
government expenditures, the German share in the EU-11 stimulus comes to 42.9 percent.
The second largest package was announced by the Spanish government, roughly 41.5 billion Euro,
and the third largest is the French stimulus of about 21 billion Euro. Other countries launched smaller
ﬁscal measures and some none at all. In total, the euro area stimulus measures of the eleven largest
economies sum to 1.01 percent of euro area GDP in 2009 and 0.85 per cent in 2010, much less than
the U.S. stimulus. Of these measures government purchases amount to 0.58 percent of GDP in 2009
and 0.22 percent in 2010.
3.3 The estimated impact of announced government expenditures on
euro area GDP
Cogan et al. (2010) consider two empirically estimated macroeconomic models of the U.S. economy,
one developed by Taylor (1993) and the other one by Smets and Wouters (2007). Their analysis of
the consequencesof the ARRA legislation focuses primarily on the Smets and Wouters model, which
is representative of current thinking in macroeconomics. It is very similar to, and "largely based on"
72according to Smets and Wouters, another well-known empirically-estimated New-Keynesian DSGE
model developed by Christiano et al. (2005). In earlier work, Smets and Wouters (2003) estimated
a version of this model with data from the euro area. Thus, we start by assessing the effect of the
additional expenditures announced by national governments on euro area economic activity in that
model. We focus attention on government expenditures such as direct purchases and similar mea-
sures, because traditional Keynesian analysis suggests that government expenditures have a greater
multiplier effect than tax reductions or additional transfers. The purpose of the model simulation is
to evaluate the effect of the ﬁscal measures in isolation from other disturbances that may currently
inﬂuence actual economic outcomes.
Figure 3.1 reports the increase in government expenditures (bar chart) together with the resulting
effect on euro area real GDP (solid black line). It is assumed that governments are able to start
spending immediately in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. The initial increase is phased in below the average
of 0.58 percent of GDP for 2009 and increases above the average level in the second part of the year.
Possible implementation lags and their consequences will be discussed later on.
Figure 3.1: The impact on euro area GDP in the Smets and Wouters (2003) model
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Notes: Quarterly annualized government spending is depicted by the bars in
percent of GDP: 0.29085 in 2009Q1, 0.5817 in 2009Q2, 0.727125 in 2009Q3
and 2009Q4 and 0.2225 in 2010.
Euro area GDP increases as a result of additional government spending. However, the simulation
does not exhibit a traditional Keynesian multiplier effect that would imply a greater than one-for-one
increasein GDPrelativeto governmentspending. Instead,the increasein GDPis signiﬁcantlysmaller
than the associated boost to government expenditures. Once government spending returns to baseline
at the end of 2010, GDP even declines. By implication, the increase in government spending must be
73displacing rather than multiplying private spending. As shown in Figure 3.2, the dynamic response
of private sector demand for consumption or investment purposes is negative. Private consumption
and investment decline immediately and stay below baseline until well after the end of the ﬁscal
stimulus. Thesimulation assumesthatconsumers’andﬁrms’expectationsincorporatethetime proﬁle
of government spending as announced by national governments.
These ﬁndings on European stimulus using the euro area model of Smets and Wouters (2003) are
similar to the results for the U.S. economy reported by Cogan et al. (2010). The mechanism of
private sector displacement is related to the forward-looking perspective of households and ﬁrms.
Householdsand ﬁrms anticipate from the start that governmentexpendituresincrease for two years in
a row. They also anticipate that debt-ﬁnanced expenditures will ultimately lead to higher taxes in the
future. The negative wealth effect on private consumption of higher anticipated future taxes reduces
the positive impact of the stimulus. In addition, there is also a strong crowding out of investment.
This crowding-out effect is reinforced by an increase in real interest rates.
Figure 3.2: Private spending in the Smets and Wouters (2003) model
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Modeling uncertainty and robustness
The euro area is still a young monetary union. Historical relationships may have changed due to
the shift in monetary regime and comparable cross-country data series are limited and short. The
model of Smets and Wouters (2003), for example, is estimated with historical, pre-EMU data. Their
euro area measures are artiﬁcial aggregates obtained by adding up national data from a period of
differential monetary policies and ﬁxed but adjustable exchange rates. Thus, modeling uncertainty is
particularly pronounced and comparative analysis is crucial to obtain robust conclusions as shown in
74Kuester and Wieland (2010). To this end we make use of a new database of macroeconomic models
designed explicitly with the purpose of doing such policy evaluations and robustness studies.5
First, we consider two other New-Keynesian DSGE models of the euro area for comparison. We use
the term "New-Keynesian"to indicatethat the models assumeforward-looking (rational) expectations
by individuals and ﬁrms, and some form of price rigidity, usually staggered price or wage setting.
The term "DSGE", which stands for "dynamic stochastic general equilibrium", indicates that these
models fully incorporate microeconomic foundations consistent with the optimizing decision-making
of representative households and ﬁrms, similar to earlier real-business cycle models that assumed
fully ﬂexible prices. The model of IMF researchers Laxton and Pesenti (2003) was developed at the
same time as the Smets and Wouters model, but its parameters were calibrated rather than estimated
with artiﬁcial pre-EMU data. It includes two countries, the euro area and the Czech republic. It is
referred to as the "Small IMF model" in the model comparison becauseIMF staff have also developed
several larger macroeconomic models of the world economy.6
The other model was developed by researchers at the European Commission. Ratto et al. (2009)
named the model "QUEST III" and we refer to it as the "EU-Quest" model. This model is estimated
with quarterly euro area data from 1981Q1 to 2006Q1 thereby including a large part of EMU history.
Another important departure from the assumptions made by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Laxton
and Pesenti (2003) concerns the treatment of households. These models have been criticized for
assuming that all households are forward-looking and optimize their spending decisions. Instead, it
has been proposed that one allows for the possibility that many households follow "rules of thumb"
like the original Keynesian consumption function with a constant marginal propensity to consume, or
that they are constrained to consume all their current income (see, for example, Gali et al. (2007)).
Ratto et al. (2009) estimate that 35 % of households in the euro area are liquidity-constrained in this
manner.7
Figure 3.3 reports the effect of planned spending by euro area governments on real GDP in the Small
IMF and EU-Quest models. Output follows a path that is similar to the simulation of the Smets
and Wouters model. Neither the updated empirical estimates nor the extensions accounting for the
opennessof the euro area economy or the presence of liquidity-constrained consumersfundamentally
alter the effect of the Euro area government spending measures. In both models consumption and
investment decline from the start rather than being multiplied in traditional Keynesian fashion. The
5A detailed description of this database and the comparative approach to modeling and policy analysis is provided by
Wieland et al. (2009).
6One such model is MULTIMOD, a dynamic multi-country macro model of the world economy (see Laxton, Isard,
Faruqee, Prasad, and Turtelboom (1998) for an introduction). Its companion model with microeconomic foundations is
called Global Economy Model (GEM) and described in Pesenti (2008). IMF staff also developed another structural model
for the analysis of ﬁscal and monetary policy called GIMF, which is described in Kumhof and Laxton (2007).
7This ﬁnding is similar to estimates reported by Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009).
The latter authors obtain estimates between 30 and 40% for the euro area.
75Figure 3.3: Models of IMF and EU-Commission researchers
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negative effect is even slightly more pronounced than in the Smets and Wouters model in 2009.
This ﬁnding may appear surprising, because it has been suggested that the presence of liquidity-
constrained households can induce crowding-in of consumption following a government spending
shock in New-Keynesian DSGE models (see for example Gali et al. (2007)). However, Coenen and
Straub (2005), show that it is empirically unlikely that an increase in government spending crowds in
consumption even with such assumptions. They ﬁnd that the estimated share of constrained house-
holds is not sufﬁcient to overturn the negative wealth effects that are internalized by the forward-
looking households. The Quest model further corroborates their ﬁnding.
Some have criticized New-KeynesianDSGE models for being too similar to real business cycle mod-
els andincorporating too little of the lessonsderivedfrom earlierNewKeynesianmodelswith rational
expectations or more traditional Keynesian models with backward-looking dynamics. Thus, we in-
troduce two more models in the comparison, the model of the G7 economies by Taylor (1993) and
the ECB’s area-wide model of Fagan et al. (2005).8
The Taylor model is interesting because it is a multi-country model. It allows us to look at euro area
member economies such as France, Germany and Italy, separately. Furthermore, this model offers a
different perspective on households and ﬁrms. They are assumed to be forward-looking and forming
rational expectations, but Ricardian equivalence is not enforced as in the Smets and Wouters model.
We simulate a euro area-wide ﬁscal stimulus for Germany, France and Italy combined. The exchange
rates between these three economies are ﬁxed. Short-term nominal interest rates are identical and set
8We use the linearized version of Dieppe, Kuester, and McAdam (2005).
76according to a policy rule with area-wide targets.9 As shown in Figure 3.4 the initial boost to GDP
in the ﬁrst three quarters of 2009 is slightly greater than in the Smets an Wouters (2003) model. The
effect on GDP is smaller, however, in 2010 and slightly more negative in 2011. A small crowding-in
effect is observed in the ﬁrst two quarters, but it is quickly overwhelmed and followed by a decline in
consumption and investment.
Figure 3.4: The Taylor (1993) G-7 model and the ECB’s area-wide model
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The ECB’s area-wide model provides a more traditional Keynesian outlook on ﬁscal stimulus. It
exhibits signiﬁcantcrowding-in effects of consumption and investmentthat raise output in 2010 twice
as high as the remaining increase in government spending. This result is obtained, because the model
assumes backward-looking behavior. Expectations are represented by lagged values of the variables
to beforecasted. Furthermore,privateconsumptionis modeledasa functionofdisposableincomeand
wealth, with the latter deﬁned as cumulative savings. Thus, households are not modeled as forward-
looking decision makers. The simulation of the ECB’s area-wide model indicates that the Keynesian
multiplier effect in the ﬁrst two and a half years will be followed by a signiﬁcant slump in subsequent
years. Such an oscillatory response is common to dynamic models with backward-looking dynamics.
It is neglected by the simple static text-book analysis of the Keynesian multiplier discussed in the
introduction of this chapter.
We conclude from this comparison that signiﬁcant short-run Keynesian multiplier effects appear in
models with backward-looking dynamics but disappear if forward-looking, optimizing motivations
for households’ and ﬁrms’ decision making are allowed for in the analysis. It is noteworthy that
9Wieland (1996) previously used the Taylor model to study the implications of a shift from the Bundesbank-dominated
European Monetary System with policy focused on German targets to a monetary union with area-wide targets.
77models such as the ECB area-wide model have been criticized for assuming backward-looking,
adaptive behavior. Fagan et al. (2005) themselves consider the backward-looking approach as
adequate for short-term forecasts, but unsatisfactory with regard to the evaluation of major policy
changes. Henry, de Cos, and Momigliano (2004) show that the introduction of more forward-looking
elements in the ECB area-wide model substantially reduce the government spending multiplier.10
Recently, ECB staff have introduced a New-Area-Wide model, which is more similar to the Smets
and Wouters and EU-Quest models (see Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne (2008)).
Implementation lags and negative stimulus
So far, we assumedthat governmentsstart spendingimmediately following the announcementof their
ﬁscal packages. Realistically, many spending measures take more time to be implemented. Even if
the packages have passed parliament rather quickly, the planning of speciﬁc expenditures by the
authorities who are expected to execute them still takes additional time. Once governmentauthorities
have decided and planned speciﬁc budgets, the particular work projects still need to be selected. The
offers of companies applying for tenders need to be prepared and then compared by the authorities.
Delaysof severalmonthsshould beexpectedas long as the selectionprocessis sufﬁcientlyrigorous to
avoid wastage of government funds. We recognize such limitations by shifting expenditures planned
for the ﬁrst half of 2009 to 2010 in the model simulations. This shift is shown graphically in the left
panel of Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Implementation lags and anticipation effects
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The three-New Keynesian DSGE models (Smets and Wouters, Small IMF, EU-Quest) project that
10Interestingly, the comparison of euro area macroeconomic models in Kuester and Wieland (2010) suggests that models
which allow for an important inﬂuence of forward-looking decision-making by households and ﬁrms have fared better in
terms of ﬁtting euro area inﬂation and output dynamics since the start of monetary union.
78GDP will decline in the ﬁrst half of 2009 due to the implementation lag. Thus, negative stimulus
would occur just at the time when positive stimulus is most needed. This ﬁnding is particularly
disconcerting for proponents of ﬁscal stimulus, because this class of models is judged by many to be
the best currently available framework for policy evaluation.11 By contrast, the traditional backward-
looking features of the ECB’s area-wide model ensure that output remains unchanged in the ﬁrst
two quarters of 2009. In this model, the stimulative effects are realized once government spending
is implemented successfully from summer 2009 onwards. Interestingly, the model of Taylor (1993)
indicates the possibility of a slight boost ahead of the delayed stimulus.
Further insight regarding these differential results may be obtained from the comparison of consump-
tion and investment dynamics in Figure 3.6. In the Smets and Wouters model and the Small IMF
model the negative impact of the delayed government spending and the negative wealth effect on pri-
vate consumption of higher anticipated future taxes combine to slow down the economy. Households
and ﬁrms see through the future discretionary spending stimulus. They reduce spending immediately
to save for higher taxes later. This effect also dominates in the EU-QUEST model even though one
third of the households are constrained to consume current income.
The earlier-generation New-Keynesian model of Taylor(1993) does not generate the same strong
Ricardian effects as the current vintage of New-Keynesian DSGE models. Households and ﬁrms
make forward-looking decisions. However, their expectations are inﬂuenced more by the positive
impact of additional government spending in the near term. This expectation leads to additional
spending in the ﬁrst two quarters.12 Finally, the ECB’s area-wide model essentially delivers the
same assessment as in the simulation without implementation lag, except that the crowding-in of
consumption and investment is delayed by two quarters. Again, backward-looking dynamics induce
a big oscillatory effect. The boost is followed by a slump.
Interest rates and accommodative monetary policy
It is well-known that ﬁscal policy may suffer implementation lags and that it puts upward pressure on
real interest rates that reinforces crowding-out of private consumption and investment. By contrast,
the central bank is able to implement monetary policy changes immediately. Thus, proponents of
ﬁscal stimulus have emphasized that the central bank could accommodate ﬁscal policy for some
time in order to strengthen the overall stimulus. Romer and Bernstein (2009), for example, assumed
that monetary policy keeps the nominal interest rate constant. Cogan et al. (2010) point out that
a permanent peg would lead to instability and non-uniqueness in New-Keynesian models. They
11See for example the survey of Woodford (2009).
12Perhaps, current research on credit-constrained but still forward-looking households as in Roeger and in’t Veld (2009)
may come closer to this effect.
79Figure 3.6: Consumption and investment with delayed stimulus
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80considerinsteadthattheFedwould actto preventanyincreasein theinterestrate dueto ﬁscalstimulus
for one or two years. Afterwards, central bank policy is assumed to return to a policy rule that ensures
a greater than one-for-one response to rising inﬂation. Such a rule avoids explosive and self-fulﬁlling
increases in inﬂation.
The euro area model simulations presented so far have been conducted under the assumption that
ECB monetary policy follows an interest rate rule that stabilizes output and inﬂation. The particular
policy rule implemented in all the models considered in this chapter is taken from Gerdesmeier and
Rofﬁa (2004). The rule is estimated with euro area data. It was also used by Kuester and Wieland
(2010) in a comparative study of the ﬁrst generation of euro area models developed at the ECB. It is a
rule for setting the short-time nominal interest rate, rt as a function of inﬂation, output and the lagged
interest rate:
rt = 0.66rt−1 + 0.66πt + 0.10yt (3.1)
Here, rt is the quarterly nominal interest rate (annualized), πt is the year-on-year inﬂation rate and yt
is the output gap. Monthly data from 1985 to 2002 was used in estimation.
Instead, we now introduce the possibility that the ECB deviates from the rule in order to accommo-
date the ﬁscal stimulus. Speciﬁcally, the ECB is assumed to promise keeping the nominal interest
rate constant throughout 2009. This assumption introduces an additional nonlinearity into the anal-
ysis. The monetary accommodation is anticipated by forward-looking households and ﬁrms. Thus,
crowding-out effects, to the extent that they arise due to an increase in interest rates following the
announcement of ﬁscal stimulus, are eliminated. In 2010 policy is assumed to return to the policy
rule, thereby keeping inﬂation under control in the longer run. The effect of euro area government
spending on GDP with constant interest rates in 2009 is shown in Figure 3.7. The year of monetary
accommodation implies little change from our earlier ﬁndings. The initial negative stimulus in the
New-KeynesianDSGE models of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003) is muted
but not reversed. In the EU Quest model output the initial negative effect on output is eliminated. All
three DSGE models still exhibit crowding-out effects over the 8 quarters of ﬁscal stimulus. The rea-
son is that the original 2009 increase in interest rates in response to ﬁscal stimulus was not that large
in the ﬁrst place. The small initial crowding-in effect in the Taylor model and the larger crowding-in
effect in the ECB’s area-wide model are reinforced somewhat.
What should one make of these differential assessments with multiple macroeconomic models? We
propose to focus on the cumulative effect of government expenditures on GDP relative to the re-
sources spent by the government. This difference measures the cumulative private spending multi-
plication or displacement over a given horizon. It is reported in Table 3.2 for the simulations with
delayed stimulus and constant interest rates in 2009. The ﬁrst column shows the cumulative effect
over two years, that is from the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2011. Over this period, the
81Figure 3.7: Impact on euro area GDP: constant interest rates in 2009
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three New-Keynesian DSGE models indicate signiﬁcant private spending displacement. The Taylor
model indicates a value near zero, while the ECB’s area-wide model suggests a small net increase.
However, over a four-year horizon all ﬁve models agree that government spending will crowd-out
private spending to a signiﬁcant extent as shown in the middle column.
Table 3.2: Cumulative GDP net off government spending
Percentage increase in real GDP
EU ﬁscal package EU ﬁscal package US ﬁscal package
(2011Q1) (2013Q4) (2013Q4)
Smets and Wouters (2003) -0.20 -0.34 -1.32
ECB Area Wide Model 0.37 -0.18 -0.01
Taylor (1993) 0.04 -0.11 -0.55
Small IMF Model -0.26 -0.56 -1.68
EU Quest Model -0.11 -0.02 -1
Notes: Delayed euro area ﬁscal stimulus package as in Figure 3.7 assumed for the results in column 2 and 3. The
interest rate is assumed constant in 2009. The cumulated euro area stimulus amounts to 0.80 percent of euro area GDP
(see Table 3.1) and the cumulated US government purchases to 2.21 percent of US GDP.
Would the results be better if only the euro area governments would have enacted a greater stimulus?
So far, only Germany has announced measures that come close to the spending program initiated
in the United States under the ARRA legislation (in terms relative to GDP). As a counterfactual
we consider the possibility that other euro area governments follow suit and a package similar in
magnitude to the ARRA is implemented symmetrically across Europe. To this end, we study the
impact of the packagesimulated by Coganet al. (2010) for the United States in the models of the euro
82area economy. This package implies signiﬁcant additional spending for four years. The cumulative
impact on GDP net of government spending by the end of the fourth year is shown in the third
column of Table 3.2. The four New Keynesian models indicate that discretionary ﬁscal stimulus will
substantially reduce private spending and investment. In the ECB’s area-wide model the negative
effect is delayed.
3.4 Fiscal stimulus and spillover effects in the euro area
Advocates of ﬁscal stimulus in the euro area were particularly concerned with spillover effects and
the potential for free-riding. The rationale was that unilateral stimulus in one country, for example in
Spain, would partly be diverted to a greater demand for import goods. As a result, other euro area
trading partners, say Germany, France or Italy, would beneﬁt from Spanish ﬁscal stimulus. They
would even have an incentive to go slow on domestic stimulus while encouraging other countries,
a behavior referred to as "free-riding". This criticism was directed in particular at the German gov-
ernment that was perceived to have most room for additional ﬁscal spending thanks to past budget
consolidation.13 Asindicatedbyourreviewofannouncedﬁscalpackagesin theeuroarea,theGerman
government eventually announced by far the largest ﬁscal stimulus measures accounting for almost
50 % of the total euro area stimulus. Thus, the question now is whether the effect of German govern-
ment spending increases will pull along other euro area countries. Analyzing this question requires
an estimated macroeconomic multi-country model that accounts for a sufﬁcient number of euro area
member economies separately. Unfortunately, such models are still relatively rare. One model at
our disposal is the Taylor (1993) model of the G7 economies. We use it to quantify the effect of the
spending measures announced by the German government on Germany, France and Italy.
Table 3.3 reports the effects on German, French and Italian GDP from the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 to
the fourth quarter of 2012. The ﬁrst three row indicate the outcome when these countries form a
monetary union, in other words, when the exchange rates are ﬁxed and monetary policy aims at
stabilizing union-wide targets. Interestingly, the spill-over effects are rather small. In Italy they even
turn negative by the end of 2009. This ﬁnding is obtained even though the estimated export demand
equations for Italy and France indicate an economically signiﬁcant direct foreign demand effect with
Germany as an important trading partner. This direct demand effect is overwhelmed by the indirect
effect of a real appreciation of the Euro. The ﬁscal expansion in Germany puts upward pressure on
the euro relative to the currencies of countries outside the monetary union (United States, Canada,
United Kingdom and Japan). As a result, France and Italy loose competitiveness and exports to
countries outside the euro area decline.
To further explore the role of the exchange rate in ﬁscal stimulus we conduct a counterfactual sim-
13An example, is the contribution of Paul Krugman cited in the ﬁrst footnote in the introduction.
83Table 3.3: Impact of German government expenditures
Percentage increase in real GDP
2009Q1 2009Q4 2010Q4 2011Q4 2012Q4
Monetary union
France 0.040 0.038 0.012 -0.01 0.002
Germany 0.746 0.696 0.429 -0.087 -0.153
Italy 0.015 -0.011 -0.050 -0.059 -0.02
Flexible exchange rates
France 0.058 0.065 0.023 -0.021 -0.014
Germany 0.675 0.527 0.267 -0.127 -0.072
Italy 0.047 0.057 0.027 -0.016 -0.017
Notes: The impact of the German ﬁscal stimulus package is simulated
with the Taylor-Model. Euro area inﬂation and output gap are deﬁned as
a weighted average of German, French and Italian values. In the case of the
monetary union simulation the euro area nominal interest rate reacts to euro
area inﬂation and output gap. We assume no change in the ﬁscal policy of
France and Italy.
ulation with ﬂexible exchange rates between France, Germany and Italy and independent monetary
policies. In this case, the effect of ﬁscal stimulus in Germany is reduced, because it is faced with a
larger appreciation of its currency vis-a-vis others. The spill-over effects to France and Italy, how-
ever, would be positive. As emphasized by Wieland (2006) it is important to account for this regime
change in assessing the extent of likely spill-overs between euro area member economies. While em-
pirical VAR studies that use data from before and after monetary union will confound the differential
spill-over effects from these two periods, they may be distinguished by using a structural model. The
ﬁndings with the Taylor (1993) model underscore the drawbacks of discretionary ﬁscal stimulus in
the euro area. It would be of interestto estimate a New-KeynesianDSGE modelofthe G-7 economies
with more recent data and conduct a robustness analysis.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have constructed an estimate of the additional government expenditures in the euro
area in conjunction with the measures announced in national ﬁscal stimulus packages for 2009 and
2010. According to our calculations the euro area stimulus is primarily driven by measures taken
by the German government and to a smaller part by the Spanish and French governments. We have
then used a comparative, model-based approach to assess the likely impact of these measures on
euro area GDP. Proponents of discretionary ﬁscal stimulus emphasize the Keynesian multiplier effect
that implies that additional government spending would induce an increase in private spending and
therefore a greater than one-for-one effect on aggregateGDP. We investigatethis proposition by using
84empirical macroeconomic models with Keynesian features such as price and wage rigidities. Four of
the models we use have been developed and estimated at central banks and international institutions.
Three of these models are New-Keynesian DSGE models that represent the current state of the art of
policy analysis.
Our ﬁndings provide no support for a Keynesian multiplier. Instead they suggest that additional
government spending will reduce private spending for consumption and investment purposes. The
reason is the forward-looking behavior of households and ﬁrms. They anticipate higher tax burdens
and higher interest rates in the future and therefore reduce consumption and investment. Thus, the
initial effect on GDP may even be negative if government spending faces an implementation lag.
Monetary accommodation in terms of a constant level of the nominal interest rate for all of 2009
helps but is not sufﬁcient to offset the crowding-out of private spending.
Only the ECB’s area-wide model, which largely ignores forward-looking behavior, is found to gen-
erate government spending multipliers that are signiﬁcantly above one. Although such models are
useful for short-term forecasting in the absence of major policy changes they are not well-suited
for analyzing the effect of such changes. The New-Keynesian models instead account for the likely
response of forward-looking optimizing households and ﬁrms.
We have also analyzed the possibility of spillover effects within the euro area using the Taylor (1993)
model. This model, which assumes forward-looking, rational expectations and price and wage rigidi-
ties, accounts for the French, German and Italian economies separately. The spillover effects of the
German stimulus measures with regard to France are very small. They even turn slightly negative in
the case of Italy at the end of 2009. Direct demand effects are overwhelmed by the indirect effect of
euro appreciation. For further research on euro area spillovers it would be of interest to estimate a
multi-country New-KeynesianDSGE model with more recent data and conducta robustnessanalysis.
In this chapter, we have investigated the possibility of Keynesian multiplier effects using empirical
macroeconomic models with Keynesian features. In contrast with real business cycle models, the
estimated New-Keynesian models assume "sticky prices" by introducing staggered price and wage
setting. But as Chari et al. (2009) have emphasized the models go further in the Keynesian direction
by assuming "the backward indexation of prices" in "a mechanical way" which ampliﬁes Keynesian
aggregate demand effects of policy. Addressing this criticism by eliminating these features from the
NewKeynesianmodelswould tend to further strengthen the caseagainstdiscretionary ﬁscalstimulus.
For example, Uhlig (2009) considers a neoclassicalgrowth model with endogenouslabor and various
ﬁscal instruments and concludes that massive expansions in government spending such as the ARRA
package in the United States come at substantial costs in terms of total output over the longer run.
85Appendices
3.F Country details on the ﬁscal packages in the euro area
Netherlands
2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Tax cuts Accelerated depreciation of investments 0.90 0.90
Tax cuts for SMEs 2.00 2.00
2.90 2.90
Extra spending Unemployment beneﬁts (working hours reduction) 0.20 0.00
0.20 0.00
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, Netherlands stability programme
December 2008 Addendum.
Ireland
2009 2010
Category (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Tax cuts 0 0
0 0
Extra spending 0 0
0 0
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, Addendum to the Irish Stability
Programme Update January 2009.
86Portugal
2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Tax cuts Special support to economic activity, exports and SME 0.10 0.00
0.10 0.00
Modernisation of schools 0.30 0.30
Fostering Renewable Energies, Energy Efﬁciency and
Extra spending Energy Transmission Infrastructure 0.25 0.00
Modernisation of technological infrastructure,
new generation broadband networks 0.05 0.05
Protecting employment and strengthening social protection 0.30 0.00
0.90 0.30
Source: Portuguese Republic Stability and Growth Programme 2008 - 2011, January 2009 Update, "Investment and
Employment Initiative (IEI)" Programme.
Belgium
2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Tax cuts Measures for construction sector 0.30 0.30
No tax on credit insurance 0.02 0.02
0.32 0.32
Higher unemployment pay 0.10 0.00
Energy subsidy to households 0.14 0.14
Higher social security allocations 0.51 0.51
Extra spending Investments into green technology 0.02 0.02
Larger fund for energy cost reduction 0.01 0.01
Accelerated public investments 0.12 0.12
Lower cost of using food safety agency 0.03 0.03
0.93 0.83
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update
87Germany
2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Degressive depreciation deduction 1.94 4.33
Higher tax-free allowances for companies 0.24 0.37
Suspension of car tax on on new vehicles 0.44 0.13
Tax deductibility of professionel commute 4.00 4.00
Package for tax burden reduction, stabilisation of
Tax cuts Social security contributions and investment in families 4.22 12.04
Income tax cut 2.90 6.04
Reduction in health insurance contributions 3.00 6.50
State payment of 50 percent social insurance for
short-time workers 1.15 1.15
Reform of car tax 0.09 0.17
17.98 34.73
Investments into transport infrastructure 1.00 1.00
Longer eligibility for short-time compensation 0.00 0.00
Improvement of regional economic structure 0.30 0.00
Infrastructure investment programme 8.65 8.68
Extra spending Innovation support programme 0.45 0.45
Retraining and stronger job service 1.59 1.59
Increased child beneﬁts 4.42 2.84
Premium for new car purchases 1.50 0.00
Increased housing beneﬁts 0.06 0.06
17.97 13.62
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, Brot und Butter Brief " Der
Wirtschaftskrise entgegensteuern", GDP: OECD Economic Outlook, Gross domestic product, value, market prices.
Greece
2009 2010
Category (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Tax cuts 0 0
0 0
Extra spending 0 0
0 0
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, Addendum to the 2008 update of
the Hellenic Stability and Growth Programme 2008 - 2011, February 2009.
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2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Longer tax-exemption of saving accounts for housing
purchases even if no house is bought 0.03 0.03
Extended eligibility for tax deductions when selling houses 0.11 0.11
Tax cuts Reduction in employer social contributions for
hiring previously unemployed workers 0.08 0.08
permanent tax measures (major reform of direct taxation
2007 + additional tax measures) 14.5 14.5
14.72 14.72
Employment Plan 1.1 0.00
Extra spending Public Investment Fund 8.00 0.00
Sector speciﬁc support 3.00 0.00
12.1 0.00
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, Stability Programme update Spain
2008-2011.
Finland
2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
New building and renovation
Tax cuts (increase in household tax deduction) 0.10 0.10
Tax cuts and improvements in beneﬁts
(Tax cuts on labour and pension income, lower VAT) 1.83 1.83
1.93 1.93
Extra spending Transport routes, infrastructure and energy projects 0.08 0.08
Business subsidies, R and D 0.36 0.36
0.44 0.44
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, Stability Programme update
for Finland 2008, information on the ﬁscal measures (12.2008).
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2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Tax cuts Reduced obligation to contribute to social insurance
conditional on new hiring, for very small ﬁrms 0.70 0.00
0.70 0.00
Direct public investment (government and local government) 6.50 4.00
Sectoral subsidies: housing industry, subsidies to building,
renovation, buyers and renters 1.20 0.00
Sectoral subsidies: car industry 0.60 0.00
Extra spending Increased payment to the endowment for the basic
income provision 0.80 0.00
Employment policies 0.50 0.00
State-owned enterprises investment 4.05 0.00
Social package (announced on 18.02.2009) 2.60 0.00
16.25 4.00
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, French Stability Programme
2009-2012.
Italy
2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
No increase of highway toll 0.09 0.00
Tax cut for productivity bonuses 0.46 0.15
Deductibility of corporate tax from regional corporate tax 1.19 1.19
Deferred VAT payments 0.19 0.19
Tax cuts Municipal infrastructure investment 0.00 0.00
Voluntary revision of company book values -2.76 0.00
More tax inspections -1.88 -1.88
Tax inspections of private associations -0.15 -0.15
Increased taxation of TV services -0.47 -0.47
-3.33 -0.97
Spending on low income families 2.40 0.00
Aid to house mortgages 0.35 0.00
Extra spending Unemployment beneﬁts 0.10 0.10
Financing of strategic infrastructure 0.06 0.00
Increased tax revenue costs 0.05 0.05
Renewal of school cleaning contracts 0.11 0.00
3.07 0.15
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, Italys stability programme 2008
update, Decree-Law no. 185/2008.
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2009 2010
Category Measure (bln Euro) (bln Euro)
Early implementation of income tax reform 2.30 2.30
Degressive depreciation deduction 0.23 0.34
Tax cuts Reduced VAT rate on medication 0.28 0.28
Tax exemptions 0.16 0.16
Burden reduction for families with children 0.51 0.51
3.48 3.59
Regional employment initiatives 0.08 0.08
Spending package, September 2008 0.40 0.00
Additional research expenditure 0.05 0.05
Mandatory kindergarten year for all 0.07 0.07
Extra spending Energy saving cheques 0.10 0.00
Investment in public facilities 0.36 0.52
Advancing of railroad investments 0.24 0.24
Subsidies to house saving scheme 0.02 0.02
Investments into broad-band internet infrastructure 0.01 0.00
"Mittelstandsfonds"- venture capital fund for SMEs 0.04 0.04
1.37 1.02
Source: Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update, Österreichisches Finanzminis-
terium.
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Fiscal consolidation in Germany
4.1 Introduction
During the ﬁnancial crisis the majority of countries worldwide has introduced considerable measures
to stabilize the banking sector and additional discretionary ﬁscal packages to stabilize domestic de-
mand. Germany for instance has launched two "Konjunkturpakete" in the beginning of 2009 with a
size of 3.37% of GDP for 2009 and 2010. They include for instance infrastructure investment pro-
grams or the "Abwrackprämie" on the government spending side and income tax cuts on the revenue
side.1 This has lead to a large build up of debt. In Germany the debt to GDP ratio has increased
to 77.4% of GDP after 65.3% in the end of 2007, which now exceeds the reference value of the
Maastricht Treaty by almost 18%.2 And a further increase is to be expected through the discretionary
ﬁscal packagesin 2010. Clearly, a further increase in the debt level increases governmentinterest rate
payments in the future given equal ﬁnancing conditions, which leads to less room for ﬁscal policy or
an even greater increase in the debt level.
Blanchard et al. (2010) propose in their paper "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy" to reduce target
debt levels. They write: "Still, the lesson from the crisis is clearly that target levels should be lower
than those observed before the crisis. The policy implications for the next decade or two are that,
when cyclical conditions permit, major ﬁscal adjustment is necessary and, should economic growth
recover rapidly, it should be used to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios substantially, rather than to ﬁnance
expenditure increases or tax cuts." They also propose to use medium-term ﬁscal frameworks like
credible commitments and ﬁscal rules to reduce debt-to GDP ratios. In Germany the "Föderalis-
muskommission II" agreed to introduce a debt brake from 2011 onwards, which demands government
spending including interest on outstanding debt to be on average equal to trend revenues. This rule
acts as an automatic stabilizer since the government ﬁnances in a recession part of the interest pay-
1See Cwik and Wieland (2009) for an overview of the ﬁscal packages of the eleven biggest euro area countries.
2The Maatricht Treaty obliges Member States of the European Union to avoid deﬁcits exceeding 3% of GDP and debt
levels above 60% of GDP.
92ments and spending by running deﬁcits, while in booms it runs surpluses. Surpluses and deﬁcits
are booked on an adjustment account, which is cleared over time through cutting or raising future
government spending.
In this chapter I study the duration and macroeconomic implications of ﬁscal consolidation in Ger-
many. I construct a DSGE model with a detailed ﬁscal policy speciﬁcation. The model builds on
the New-Keynesian DSGE model à la Smets and Wouters (2007), which has shown to ﬁt the data
well. Because the focus of this chapter is on government debt, I allow for rich dynamics induced
by the interactions between policy variables and debt. Following Kollmann (1998) and Leeper et al.
(2010) government transfers, the income tax, capital tax and consumption tax can respond to gov-
ernment indebtedness. In addition the income, consumption and capital tax rate can adjust to the
state of the economy to allow for progressive taxation. I introduce a debt brake for government
spending as described above, but allow spending to respond stronger to the state of the economy
to describe the economy before the introduction of the debt brake. Since the literature on ﬁscal
policy has emphasized the importance of non Ricardian consumers in DSGE models, I introduce a
share of rule-of-thumb consumers as described in Gali et al. (2007) together with forward-looking
households in the model. I also include government transfers, which are paid to Ricardian and non
Ricardian households in equal proportions. The model is estimated on German data from 1970Q1 up
to 2009Q4 with Bayesian techniques using the following 12 time series: consumption, investment,
GDP, the real wage, hours worked, inﬂation, the interest rate, the government debt to GDP ratio, the
government labour income tax, consumption tax and capital tax revenues and transfer payments. I
especially focus on the estimates for the ﬁscal rule parameters and their implications for the evolution
of debt. To my knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper, which analyses and quantiﬁes the impact of the debt
brake on the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio in Germany.
I ﬁnd that through the expected economic recovery after the severe ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 and 2009,
it is possibleto reducethe debt-to-GDPratio signiﬁcantly in the medium-term. This seemssurprising,
but it is feasible if the governmentsticks to the policy rules. The following channels are at work. First
the debt-to-GDP ratio decreases directly when GDP increases faster than debt. Second through the
economic recovery hours worked and real wages are expected to increase leading to higher labour
income tax revenues. Third the average tax rates in the economy increase through the economic
recovery. And ﬁnally the tax rates react to debt, which leads to lower expected tax rates in the
future, when debt is decreasing. I also compute conditional forecasts implementing the effects of the
"Konjunkturpaket"and "Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz"in 2010. I ﬁnd that the stimulus packages
have only a moderate effect on GDP. The debt-to-GDP ratio increases stronger in 2010 than in the
baseline forecasts and peaks at 81.3%. But still it is expected to be lower than the Maastricht criteria
of 60% in the second quarter of 2015. Enforcing the debt brake and halving the output elasticity of
93the labour income tax from 2010 on puts more pressure on the government to reduce spending and
increases the labour income tax rate, which lowers hours worked. Both measures lead to a faster
reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio on the cost of reducing GDP slightly in the short-run compared
to the baseline forecast scenario. The uncertainty of the forecasts given by the error bands is mainly
driven by unforeseen shocks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a description of the DSGE
model. Section 4.3 explains the estimation procedere and section 4.4 employes the estimated model
to run forecast scenarios for the debt-to-GDP ratio. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
In this section I develop a closed economy New-KeynesianDSGE model to study ﬁscal consolidation
in Germany. Mostof the modelfeatures are standardandfamiliar from so-calledmediumscale DSGE
models, as put forward, for instance, in Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007). A
fraction of the representative households are forward-looking, smooth their consumption over time
by buying domestic government bonds, own the capital stock, which is rented together with labor
services to intermediate goods producers on a period-by-period basis and pay value added tax, labour
income tax and capital income tax. The other fraction, the rule-of-thumb consumers, consume their
after tax labour income. They work an equal proportion of their time as Ricardian households and
receive the same wage. Adjusting investment is costly.
I assume there is a continuum of intermediate good producers operating under monopolistic compe-
tition and being constrained in price setting à la Calvo. They produce using a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function and rent capital and labour services in competitive factor markets. Labour services
are provided by an intermediate labour union sector, which pools labour services from Ricardian and
non Ricardian households and set wages. Wages are sticky á la Calvo. Final goods ﬁrms combine
intermediate goods to provide private consumption, investment and government consumption.
I introduce a policy rule for government spending into the model. Fiscal authorities are forced to
consumeand transfer to householdson averageas much as they earn, which consistsof capital, labour
income and consumption taxes, but they are allowed to react to the current state of the economy.
Differences between trend revenues and spending are booked on an adjustment account, which is
cleared over time. Taxes and transfers are adjusted via ﬁscal rules to changes in the overall debt level
and the state of the economy. I close the model with a characterization of monetary policy in terms
of an interest feedback rule. In the following I give a formal exposition of the model.
944.2.1 Firms
Final goods are composites of intermediate goods produced by a continuum of monopolistic compet-
itive ﬁrms and are used for domestic consumption, Ct, investment, It, and government spending, Gt.
I use i ∈ [0,1] to index intermediate good ﬁrms as well as their products and prices. Final goods ﬁrms
operate under perfect competition and purchase intermediate goods, Yt(i). They use the following
Kimball aggregation technology with the elasticity of demand being an increasing function of the
relative price of the intermediate good Pt(i) and the ﬁnal good Pt
  1
0
G
 
Yt(i)
Yt
;λp,t
 
di = 1 (4.1)
G is a concave and increasing function such that G(1) = 1 and (1 + λp,t) is the time-varying price
markup with
lnλp,t = (1 − ρp)lnλp + ρp lnλp,t−1 + θpǫp,t−1 + ǫp,t (4.2)
The representative ﬁnal goods ﬁrms produce Yt while minimizing expenditures. The resulting de-
mand function for an individual intermediate good i is given by
Yt(i) = YtG
′−1
 
Pt(i)
Pt
  1
0
G
′
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Yt(i)
Yt
)
Yt(i)
Yt
di
 
(4.3)
The production of intermediate goods, Yt(i), is governed by a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt(i) = ZtKs
t (i)α  
γtLt(i)
 1−α − γtΦ, (4.4)
where Lt(i) and Ks
t(i) respectivelydenote labour and capital employed by ﬁrm i and Φ denotes ﬁxed
costs of production, which are set so that proﬁts are zero in steady state. γt represents the labour-
augmenting deterministic growth rate in the economy and Zt governs total factor productivity, which
is given by the following shock process
lnZt = ρz lnZt−1 + ǫz,t (4.5)
where ǫz,t is iid distributed. Let Wt and Rk
t denotethe nominalwagerate and the rental rate of capital,
respectively. Minimizing the costs of producing intermediate goods implies for (nominal) marginal
costs
MCt = α−α(1 − α)−(1−α)W1−α
t (Rk
t )αγ−(1−α)t(Zt)−1, (4.6)
which are independent of the level of production and identical across ﬁrms, because both factors of
production can be adjusted freely across ﬁrms.
I assume that price setting is constrained exogenously by a discrete time version of the mechanism
suggested by Calvo (1983). Each ﬁrm has the opportunity to change its price with a given probability
951 − ξp. Firms that do not reoptimize in a certain period index their price to a combination of last
period’s inﬂation and steady state inﬂation π∗, where the degree of indexation to last periods inﬂation
is given by the parameter ιp ∈ [0,1].
The optimal price   Pt(i) set by the ﬁrm that is allowed to re-optimize at time t results from the follow-
ing optimization problem
maxEt
∞  
s=0
ξs
p
βsΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
 
  Pt(i)
 
Πs
l=1π
ιp
t+l−1π
(1−ιp)
∗
 
− MCt+s
 
Yt+s(i) (4.7)
subject to the demand function deﬁned by (4.3).3
4.2.2 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ [0,1]. A share 1 − ω of these households makes
optimizing, forward-looking decision. They are indexed by j ∈ [0,1 − ω). These households have
access to ﬁnancial markets. They buy and sell government bonds Bt(j) and accumulate physical
capital Kt(j). Given capital utilization costs a(ut(j)) they decide, how much of the accumulated
capital they rent to ﬁrms. They receive wage income Wh
t (j)Lt(j), transfers from the government Tt,
dividend payments from the ﬁrms and proﬁts from the labour unions denoted Divt and pay capital
tax τk
t , consumption tax τc
t and labour income tax τn
t to the government. Their decisions made so as
to maximize a utility function that is separable in consumption Ct(j) and labour supply Lt(j). I use
an additive separable utility function to make consumption and hours worked substitutes, which cor-
responds to the ﬁndings in the German data, and speciﬁcally the log utility function for consumption
to ensure a balanced steady state growth path as put forward in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
Et
∞  
s=0
βs log(Ct+s(j) − λCt+s−1) −
1
1 + σl
Lt+s(j)1+σl (4.8)
subject to the budget constraint
(1 + τc
t+s)Ct+s(j) + It+s(j) +
Bt+s(j)
dtPt+s
≤ (1 − τn
t+s)
Wh
t+s(j)Lt+s(j)
Pt+s
+(1 − τk
t+s)
 
Rk
t+sut+s(j)Kt+s−1(j)
Pt+s
− a(ut+s(j))Kt+s−1(j)
 
+
Bt+s−1(j)Rt+s−1
Pt+s
+ τk
t+sδKt+s−1(j) + Tt+s(j) +
Divt+s
Pt+s
the capital accumulation equation
Kt(j) = (1 − δ)Kt−1(j) +  t
 
1 − S
 
It(j)
It−1(j)
  
It(j) (4.9)
3Proﬁts are discounted with the stochastic discount factor of the Ricardian households,
βsΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s , that are the ﬁnal
owners of the ﬁrms.
96and the deﬁnition of employed capital
Ks
t (j) = ut(j)Kt−1(j) (4.10)
where λ ∈ [0,1] measures the extent of consumption habits and δ denotes the depreciation rate. I
assume for simplicity that the utilisation costs of physical capital and physical capital depreciation
are exempted from taxation as in Coenen, McAdam, and Straub (2008). It may be costly to adjust the
level of investment, It. Here S is the adjustment cost function, with S(γ) = S′(γ) = 0 and S′′ > 0
ensures that the steady state capital stock is independent of the investment adjustment costs.4 dt is an
exogenous premium in the return to bonds given by
lndt = ρd lndt−1 + ǫd,t (4.11)
and  t is a stochastic shock to the price of investment relative to consumption goods of the following
form
ln t = ρ  ln t−1 + ǫ ,t (4.12)
The remaining share ω of non Ricardian households is indexed by s ∈ [1 − ω,1]. They simply con-
sume their disposable income which is given by the after-tax wage income and the transfer payments
from the government.
(1 + τc
t )Ct(s) = (1 − τn
t )
Wh
t Lt(s)
Pt
+ Tt(s) (4.13)
Aggregating over all households implies that overall consumption is a weighted average of the con-
sumption function of rational and rule-of-thumb consumers
Ct =
  1
0
Ch,tdh = (1 − ω)Cj,t + ωCs,t (4.14)
Labour packers buy the labour supplied by the households from labour unions l ∈ [0,1], package Lt
using the following aggregation technology and resell it to the intermediate goods producers.
Lt =
   1
0
Lt(l)
1
1+λw,tdl
 1+λw,t
(4.15)
(1 + λw,t) denotes the time varying wage markup in the labour market driven by the moving average
process of the form
lnλw,t = (1 − ρw)lnλw + ρw lnλw,t−1 + θwǫw,t−1 + ǫw,t (4.16)
The labour packers maximize proﬁts in a perfectly competitive environment leading to the following
demand for individual labour l.
Lt(l) =
 
Wt(l)
Wt
 −
1+λw,t
λw,t
Lt (4.17)
4See Christiano et al. (2005).
97where Wt is the aggregate wage index. Labour unions allocate and differentiate the labour services
from the households and set the same nominal wage rate for both types of households. They choose
the wage given nominal rigidities á la Calvo subject to the labour demand equation (4.17) and the
following household labour supply decision
Wh
t
Pt
=
(1 + τc
t )
(1 − τn
t )
(Ct − λCt−1)L
σl
t (4.18)
The wage setting problem for a union that can adjust its wage in period t,   Wt(l), becomes
maxEt
∞  
s=0
ξs
w
βsΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
 
Wt+s(l) − Wh
t+s
 
Lt+s(l) (4.19)
with Wt+s(l) =   Wt(l)(Πs
l=1γπ
ιw
t+l−1π1−ιw
∗ ). Labour unions that cannot adjust the wage in a given
period index their wage to a combination of last periods inﬂation and steady state inﬂation, where ιw
denotes the degree of indexation to last periods inﬂation.
4.2.3 Fiscal and monetary authorities
The government raises consumption, capital and labour income taxes and decides on government
expenditures subject to the following budget constraint
Gt + Tt +
Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
=
Ψt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
(4.20)
where real government revenues are given by
Ψt
Pt
= τn
t
Wh
t Lt
Pt
+ τk
t Kt−1
 
Rk
tut
Pt
− a(ut) − δ
 
+ τc
t Ct (4.21)
I deﬁne the ﬁscal rule for government spending in the following way building on an approach by
Mayer and Staehler (2009).
(Rt−1 − γπt)
Bt−1
Pt
+ Gt + Tt =
Ψ∗γt(1+φg
y)
P∗
 
Y∗
Yt
 φg
y
− ρ
ACt−1
Pt
+ υtγt (4.22)
If φ
g
y is equal to zero this rule corresponds to the german debt brake.5 Real government spending,
transfer payments and interest on outstanding real debt must be equal to real trend revenues Ψ∗
P ∗ to
ensure a structural balanced budget in the medium-term. To allow for countercyclical ﬁscal policy in
the short-run, governmentspendingcan exceedcontemporaneousgovernmentrevenuesin recessions,
which needs to be balanced through government surpluses in booms. To describe ﬁscal policy before
the introduction of the debt brake, I allow φ
g
y to vary. A value greater than zero indicates a stronger
5TheGermandebt brakewasproposed bythe"Föderalismuskommission II", signedintolawfromtheGermanparliament
on the 29th May 2009 and becomes operative in 2011. However, the rule will be legally binding for the federal government
from 2016 onwards and for the state governments from 2020 onwards.
98countercyclical ﬁscal stance, whereas a value lower than zero more procyclical ﬁscal spending. Dif-
ferences between government spending and trend revenues are booked on an adjustment account
ACt. ρ denotes the fraction of the amount on the adjustment account, which is cleared every period
and υt is a discretionary government spending shock process to explain nonsystematic changes in
government spending
υt = ρυυt−1 + ǫυ,t. (4.23)
The evolution of the adjustment account is deﬁned by
ACt
Pt
= (1 − ρ)
ACt−1
Pt
+ υtγt +
 
Ψ∗γt(1+φg
y)
P∗
 
Y∗
Yt
 φg
y
−
Ψt
Pt
 
(4.24)
As in Kollmann (1998), I assume that taxes are adjusted to stabilize government debt. Additionally
the tax rates respond to the state of the economy to allow for automatic stabilization i.e. progressive
taxation.
τn
t =
 
Bt−1
Pt−1γt−1
 φn
b  
Yt
γt
 φn
y
τ
n,ǫ
t (4.25)
τc
t =
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 φc
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t (4.26)
τk
t =
 
Bt−1
Pt−1γt−1
 φk
b  
Yt
γt
 φk
y
τ
k,ǫ
t (4.27)
where φn
b, φc
b and φk
b measure the elasticity of labour income, consumption and capital tax to govern-
ment debt and φn
y, φc
y and φk
y the elasticity of the tax rates w.r.t. output. AR(1) processes τ
n,ǫ
t , τ
c,ǫ
t
and τ
k,ǫ
t are included, which capture the persistence in the tax rates.
lnτ
n,ǫ
t = ρτn lnτ
n,ǫ
t−1 + ǫτn,t (4.28)
lnτ
c,ǫ
t = ρτc lnτ
c,ǫ
t−1 + ǫτc,t (4.29)
lnτ
k,ǫ
t = ρτk lnτ
k,ǫ
t−1 + ǫτk,t (4.30)
The ﬁscal rule for transfer payments is deﬁned in a similar way. Transfers are reduced, when debt
increases and are increased when output falls below trend to capture higher transfer payments in
recessions i.e. higher unemployments beneﬁts.
Tt =
 
Bt−1
Pt−1γt−1
 −φT
b  
Yt
γt
 −φT
y
Tǫ
t (4.31)
Tǫ
t is a AR(1) process explaining persistent non systematic movements in transfers
lnTǫ
t = ρT lnTǫ
t−1 + ǫT,t. (4.32)
99I assume that monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule as in Smets and
Wouters (2007). Speciﬁcally, I assume for the interest rate
Rt
R∗
=
 
Rt−1
R∗
 ρR
  
πt
π∗
 ψ1  
Yt
Y ∗
t
 ψ2
 1−ρR  
Yt/Yt−1
Y ∗
t /Y ∗
t−1
 ψ3
rt (4.33)
where R∗ is the steady state gross nominal interest rate and Y ∗
t is the natural output level deﬁned
as the output level in absence of nominal frictions. The parameter ρR ∈ [0,1] captures interest rate
smoothing. Finally, rt represents a shock to the short-term interest rate not-accounted for by the
systematic feedback rule. It thus represents a monetary policy shock
lnrt = ρr lnrt−1 + ǫr,t. (4.34)
The following resource constraint closes the model
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Next + a(ut)Kt−1 (4.35)
where Next is an autocorrelated stochastic shock reﬂecting the effects of changes in foreign demand
on net exports, which is given by
Next = ρnexNext−1 + ǫnex,t. (4.36)
I assume that debt, government revenues, transfers and government spending grow in steady state
with the same rate than output. Therefore I detrend the variables including the ﬁscal policy variables
with a ﬁxed common growth trend γt. Then the equations are linearized around the deterministic
steady state.
4.3 Estimation
I use quarterly German data for the period 1970Q1-2009Q4 to estimate the model with Bayesian
estimation techniques and match the following 12 variables: the log difference of real consumption
(dlConst), real investment (dlInvt), real GDP (dlGDPt) and the real wage (dlWaget), log hours
worked (lHourst), the log difference of the GDP-Deﬂator (dlPt), the quarterly short-run interest rate
(Interestt), government debt (ldebtt), government labour income tax revenues and social security
beneﬁts received (linctaxt), consumption tax revenues (lconstaxt), capital tax revenues (lcaptaxt)
and social security beneﬁts paid (ltransfert).6 All government variables are expressed relative to
GDP. The following measurement equations are employed to link the model variables to the data.
6A detailed description of the data is given in appendix 4.H.
100

 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

dlGDPt
dlConst
dlInvt
dlWaget
lHourst
dlPt
Interestt
ldebtt
linctaxt
lconstaxt
lcaptaxt
ltransfert


 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

=


 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

γm
γm
γm
γm
lm
πm
rm
bm
Ψm
n
Ψm
c
Ψm
k
tm


 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

+


 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

  yt −   yt−1
  ct −   ct−1
  it −  it−1
  wt −   wt−1
  lt
  πt
  rt
  bt
b∗ −   yt
  Ψn
t
Ψn
∗ −   yt
  Ψc
t
Ψc
∗ −   yt
  Ψk
t
Ψk
∗ −   yt
  tt
t∗ −   yt


 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

(4.37)
where dl stands for 100 times the log difference and l for 100 times the log.   xt = xt−x
x deﬁnes the
percentage deviation of a variable from trend. γm = 100(γ −1) denotes the common quarterly trend
growth rate, πm the quarterly steady state inﬂation rate, rm the steady state nominal interest rate,
lm steady state hours worked, b∗ the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio, with bm = 100ln(b∗), Ψn
∗ the
steady state ratio of labour income tax revenues to GDP, Ψc
∗ the steady state ratio of consumption
tax revenues to GDP, Ψk
∗ the steady state ratio of capital tax revenues to GDP and t∗ the ratio of
steady state social security beneﬁts paid by the government to GDP. Ψm
i with i ∈ [n,c,k] is given by
Ψm
i = 100ln
 
Ψi
∗
 
and tm by tm = 100ln(t∗).
I estimate the mode of the posterior distribution by maximizing the log posterior kernel, which com-
bines the prior information on the parameters with the likelihood of the data. Then the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm is used to evaluate the whole posterior distribution and the marginal likelihood of
the model. 7
A few parameters are kept ﬁxed throughout the estimation. The depreciation rate, δ, is set to 2.5 %,
which is uncontroversialand the steady state wage markup, (1+λw), to 1.5. The curvature parameter
of the Kimball aggregator in the goods market η, which is given by η = 1/λp
 
2+
G′′′
G′′
1+
G′′
G′
− 1
 
, is
not identiﬁed. Therefore I ﬁx it to 10 analogous to Smets and Wouters (2007). The steady state
government debt to GDP ratio, b∗, is calibrated to 0.426, which corresponds to the mean of this
variable using the whole estimation sample from 1970 up to now. I calibrate the steady state tax
revenues to GDP ratios in the same way, where the ratio of labour income tax revenues plus social
security beneﬁts received to GDP, Ψn
∗, is set to 0.282, the consumption tax revenues ratio, Ψc
∗, to
0.115 and the capital income tax revenues ratio, Ψk
∗, to 0.004. The sample mean of social security
7All estimations are executed with Dynare (http://www.cpremap.cnrs.fr/dynare). A sample of 5,000,000 Metropolis-
Hastings draws was created (neglecting the ﬁrst 1,000,000 draws).
101beneﬁts paid by the government relative to GDP, t∗, is 0.177. The income, consumption and capital
tax rates in steady state are calculated to match the tax revenues to GDP ratios stated above. See
Table 4.1 for an overview of the calibrated parameters. Finally, the government spending to GDP
ratio in steady state is pinned down to ensure that the government budget constraint is fulﬁlled.
Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters for the estimated model
Parameter Value
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
(1 + λw) Wage markup 1.5
η Curvature parameter Phillips Curve 10
b∗ SS debt to GDP ratio 0.426
Ψn
∗ Income tax revenues ratio 0.282
Ψc
∗ Consumption tax revenues ratio 0.115
Ψk
∗ Capital tax revenues ratio 0.004
t∗ Transfers to GDP ratio 0.177
τn SS labour income tax rate 0.48
τc SS consumption tax rate 0.17
τk SS capital tax rate 0.13
G∗ Government spending to GDP ratio 0.22
4.3.1 Prior distributions of the estimated parameters
I estimate 43 parameters and 12 standard deviations of the shock innovations. The parameter χ
governing the capital utilisation costs is given by χ = 1
1+
a′
a′′
, where a’ and a” are the ﬁrst and second
oder derivatives of the capital utilisation cost function w.r.t. capital utilisation evaluated at the steady
state. The estimated parameter βm, which drives the discount factor is deﬁned as follows βm =
100( 1
β − 1). Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in the appendix show the assumptions for the prior distributions,
which are similar to Smets and Wouters (2007) for the standard model parameters. I assume the same
inverse gamma distribution with mean 0.1 and standard deviation 2 for all the 12 shock innovations.
For the AR(1) coefﬁcients of the shock processes I select analogous to Smets and Wouters (2007) a
beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. For the share of rule-of-thumb consumers
ω I assume a beta distribution with mean 0.3 and standard deviation 0.1, with the mean being close
to the ﬁnding of Coenen and Straub (2005), who estimate the share of rule-of-thumb consumers in
the euro area. There is no evidence on the parameter ρ, which governs the fraction of the amount on
the adjustment account, which is cleared every period. Mayer and Staehler (2009) ﬁnd, that a small
value of 0.05 is welfare optimal in their calibrated model given the tuple [0.00,0.05,0.10,0.15,0.20].
Therefore I choose an inverse gamma distribution with mean 0.1 and standard deviation 2. I assume
for the elasticities of the tax rates with respect to debt and output the same prior distribution as
102for the ρ parameter reﬂecting my view that tax rates are adjusted sluggishly by the government. It
is controversial in the literature if ﬁscal policy reacted procyclical or countercyclical in Germany.
Gali and Perotti (2003) ﬁnd empirically for a sample from 1980-2002 a procyclical ﬁscal stance on
discretionary ﬁscal measures and a countercyclical stance on automatic stabilizers. Therefore I set
a rather ﬂat prior for the elasticity of government spending w.r.t. output using a normal distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5.
4.3.2 Posterior distributions of the estimated parameters
The results of the posterior maximization can be ﬁnd in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in the appendix, which
display the posterior mode and mean together with the 90% conﬁdence bands for all the estimated 55
parameters. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 in the appendix showgraphically the prior and posterior distributions
of the structural model parameters and the parameters of the shock processes. The estimated shock
standard deviations are reasonable. The investment speciﬁc technology shock is with 1.34 of a larger
value,which could bepartly due to the inclusion ofthe recentrecession,which was capturedin DSGE
models through large negativedemand and investment shocks. Additionally the standard deviation of
the innovation to the capital tax rate is with 2.74 large. Capital taxes and capital tax revenues seem
to ﬂuctuate stronger than predicted by the model. This could be due to the fact, that I don’t include
dividend payments from intermediate ﬁrms into capital taxation or that legal features like accounting
policies amplify the variability of the observed capital tax revenues. The AR(1) coefﬁcients in the
shock processes for the ﬁscal variables are quite high with values close to 0.95, which capture the
persistence in the decision making of government policy. The standard structural parameters of the
model look also reasonable. The Calvo parameter in the goods market is with a value of 0.88 quite
highdespitestrategiccomplementaritiesthroughaKimballtypeaggregatorforﬁnalgoods. ButSmets
and Wouters (2003) ﬁnd with 0.909 a value of similar magnitude in their estimated model for the euro
area without Kimball aggregator and inﬂation persistence was even higher in Germany compared to
other european countries. The estimates for the indexation parameters in the goods and labor market
and the degree of habit formation are found to be low with values of 0.11, 0.27 and 0.11, respectively.
There seem to be enough persistence in the model, that additional parameters to generate ad hoc
persistence are hardly needed. The estimate for the coefﬁcient on inﬂation in the monetary policy
rule is 1.4. Thus monetary policy reacts moderately to movements in inﬂation despite the strong
commitment to price stability during the Bundesbank regime in the 80s and 90s and the ECB policy
thereafter. This could be due to the inclusion of the 70s in the data sample. I estimate with 56% a
high share of non Ricardian consumers in the model. The estimate is of double the size than the one
by Cogan et al. (2010) for the U.S., despite lower wage inequality in Germany compared to the U.S.
Maybe this is due to the fact, that I assumed an equal allocation of transfers between Ricardian and
103non Ricardian consumersand in reality transfers are allocated primarily to non Ricardian households.
I estimate the fraction of the adjustment account which is cleared every period to 0.18. This value
is higher than the one assumed in Mayer and Staehler (2009). The elasticities of the tax rates w.r.t.
debt are 0.06, 0.05 and 0.14, i.e. tax rates are slowly adjusted to the debt level in Germany. But I
ﬁnd higher estimates for the elasticities of the tax rates w.r.t. output, which are 0.28, 0.53 and 1.14,
respectively. Especially the average capital tax rate seem to move very strongly with the business
cycle. Transfers relative to GDP react only slightly to debt and the business cycle. I ﬁnd a very
limited movement of this ratio in the data too, where transfers move slowly between 14 and 20% of
GDP. I estimate the posterior mean of φ
g
y to 0.24 i.e. government spending is higher in bad times
than in good times, which points to some degree of countercyclical government spending. But the
estimate is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Together with an increase of transfers in recessions
and lower average tax rates in recessions, ﬁscal policy reacts countercyclical in the model.
The dynamics of ﬁscal policy in the model are quite complex, with all ﬁscal instruments reacting
to debt and the business cycle. As Uhlig (2009) pointed out the effect of discretionary ﬁscal policy
depends very strongly on the reaction of the other ﬁscal instruments to a higher level of government
spending. Corsetti et al. (2009) bring forward that the government spending multiplier increases
if government spending reacts to the debt level i.e. after an increase in government spending the
government announces spending cuts in the future. With the tax rates also reacting to movements in
debt and the state of the economy the overall evolution of the ﬁscal variables depends on the size of
the parameters in the ﬁscal rules.
4.4 Debt Forecasts
In this section I use the estimated model for Germany decribed before to construct density forecasts
for the debt-to-GDP ratio from the ﬁrst quarter of 2010 until 2020 to see how ﬁscal consolidation
in Germany in the medium-term could take place if ﬁscal policy sticks to the estimated ﬁscal policy
rules for spending, transfers and taxes. The adjustment of ﬁscal instruments in practise depends
on political negotiations and results of the elections, which leads to variability in the parameters of
the ﬁscal policy rules over time. I take this uncertainty regarding the parameters in the model into
account and pick 5,000 Metropolis-Hastings draws of the posterior parameter distributions randomly.
For each parameter combination a forecast for the model variables is then computed using the linear
modelsolution. Additionally policymakersdon’thaveperfectforesightanddon’tknowcertainlyhow
the economy will evolve in the future. To cope with this uncertainty I create every period random
draws from the distributions of the 12 shock innovations in the model and add them to the model
solution while computing the forecasts.
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Figure 4.1: Forecasts
Notes: 5000 subdraws of the Metropolis Hastings algorithm and draws from the shock distributions are used to generate
density forecasts. Smoothed variables from 2005 until 2010 are displayed with a solid black line, the mean forecast by a
dashed-dotted black line and the 10th up to the 90th percentiles are displayed by grey shaded areas.
105Figure 4.1 showsa panelofforecasts for the main ﬁscalvariables. Foreachforecastthe 10th up to the
90th percentiles are plotted. Thus the widesterror band includes 80%of the 5,000 generatedforecasts
and the dashed-dottedblackline displays the mean of the forecasts. I also plotted the last observations
of the smoothed variables from 2005 on to show how the variables evolved before the start of the
forecasts (black solid line). Overall one can see that there is great uncertainty in the forecasts for
the ﬁscal variables. This is not surprising since the evolution of the ﬁscal stance depends to a large
degree on political negotiations and not only on economic and government budget conditions. The
widest forecast band for the debt-to-GDP ratio in the ﬁrst row of column one ranges between 100%
and 40% in 2013, which is a wide range. The result is mainly driven by the large standard deviations
of the shock innovations especially for the residuals of the ﬁscal instruments. This leads to forecast
uncertainty in the ﬁscal instruments, which can be seen in the forecasts for the other ﬁscal variables.
But the majority of forecasts predict a ﬁscal consolidation given the ﬁscal policy rules, the parameter
estimates and the shock distributions. The mean forecast for the debt to GDP ratio shows a slight
increase from 77.4% in the last quarter of 2009 until 79% in the third quarter of 2010 and afterwards
decreases and the error bands above the mean forecast are wider than below.
The main reason is the predicted recovery of GDP in Germany. The GDP variable in the last column
of the ﬁrst row displays the percentage deviation of GDP from the estimated linear trend, which
grows by 0.41% every quarter. In the beginning of 2010 GDP in Germany was 13-14% below the
trend growth path mainly through the ﬁnancial crisis in the recent years, which lead to a big slump
in GDP as can be seen by the historical time series displayed with a solid black line. The mean
forecast for GDP predicts a recovery of GDP and a GDP growth rate above the trend. This is in
line with the expectations of the economic research institutes. The OECD for instance predicts an
annual growth rate of around 2% for the next years.8 This has several implications for the evolution
of the ﬁscal instruments and especially the debt-to-GDP ratio. First when GDP growth faster than the
common growth trend and debt growth with trend this reduces ceteris paribus the debt to GDP ratio.
Second with the economic recovery capital employed increases due to higher capital utilisation and
investment. Theincreasein capitalemployedraisesthemarginalproductoflabourandthereforeleads
unions to enforce higher wages. Hours worked by the households increase slightly, too. Additionally
the negativerisk premium shock, which captures partly the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis in the model,
diminishes, which leads to a recovery of consumption of Ricardian households. Both the increase
in hours worked and the higher wages paid to Ricardian and non-Ricardian households makes the
labour income increase and leads to higher labour income tax revenues, which can be seen from the
ﬁrst chart in row three displaying the percentage deviation of labour tax revenues from the common
growth trend. Consumption tax revenues and capital tax revenues increase slightly too -see chart
8See the OECD Economic Outlook 87 published May 2010.
106two and three in row three- through the recovery of consumption and the increase in revenues from
renting capital employed. All effects reduce the budget deﬁcit and reduce debt. Third the tax rates
act as automatic stabilizers. Due to progressive taxation for labour income tax and capital tax and tax
allowancesthe averagetax rate is lowerwhen the economyis in a recessionthan in a boom. Therefore
with the economic recovery the average tax rates are expected to increase leading to further revenues.
The last row of Figure 4.1 shows the three distortionary tax rates in percentage points, where the
labour income tax rate consists of the income tax rate plus the fraction of the labour income, which
is paid for social security beneﬁts. As one can see in the ﬁrst ﬁgure the average labour income tax
rate is projected to increase slightly in the next years. But fourth the tax rates also react to the debt
status. I plotted the debt in percentagedeviation from the common growth trend in the secondcolumn
of row one. Debt is expected to shrink through the increase in tax revenues discussed above. This
lowers the interest payments by the government and offers room for lowering tax rates. Therefore
the labour income tax rate is projected to increase only slightly and the consumption tax rate and the
capital tax rate decrease. The ﬁscal rule for government spending keeps spending almost constant
until 2013 although the rule allows the government to react more countercyclical than the debt brake.
A lower debt burden after 2012, which decreases interest payments on debt, offers room for slight
increases in government spending and transfers. This can be seen from the second and third chart
in row two, which show transfer payments by the government and spending in percentage deviation
from the common growth trend.
In the forecasts of the model I do not take into account how the evolution of debt effects the interest
rate. Laubach (2010) estimates a signiﬁcant positive impact of expected budget deﬁcits and the ex-
pected debt-to-GDP ratio on long-term real interest rates in the US. Taking this channel into account
the ﬁscal consolidation in Germany would lower future interest payments on outstanding government
debt further. This would offer even more room for additional government spending or lowering tax
rates.
4.4.1 Conditional forecasts
Some parts of the German Konjunkturpaket and the Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz enacted by
the government on 9th November 2009 become operative in 2010. Therefore these measures, which
increase the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2010, are not included in the forecasts in the section above. In
Appendix 4.G I list in detail the ﬁscal measures and the size of both programs and group them to the
ﬁscal instruments in the model. Table 4.2 contains an overview for the ﬁve ﬁscal instruments in the
model. Measures to lower the income tax wedge, which sum up to 29.6 billion euro or 1.24% of 2009
GDP, build the major part of the Konjunkturpaket in 2010, which consists of the reduction in health
insurance contributions, tax deductibility of professionel commute or direct income tax cuts. Addi-
107Table 4.2: Germany‘s ﬁscal stimulus measures in 2010
Konjunkurpakete Wachstumsbeschleunigungsg. Total ﬁscal packages
bln Euro % of GDP bln Euro % of GDP bln Euro % of GDP
Income tax 29.6 1.24 0 0 29.6 1.24
Consumption tax 0.4 0.02 1 0.04 1.4 0.06
Capital tax 4.7 0.20 2.4 0.10 7.1 0.30
Spending 10.1 0.42 0 0 10.1 0.42
Transfers 4.5 0.19 5 0.21 9.5 0.40
All instruments 49.3 2.06 8.4 0.35 57.7 2.41
Source: German Finance Ministry: Brot und Butter Brief " Der Wirtschaftskrise entgegensteuern", and "Wachstums-
beschleunigungsgesetz".
tional governmentspending has a size of 10.1 billion euro mainly due to the infrastructure investment
program. The major part of the Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz are higher tax exemptions for de-
pendent children and child beneﬁts with a value of 4.6 billion euro, which I grouped as transfers.
Changes in the legislation of business tax, which are estimated to lower capital tax revenues by 2.4
billion euro in 2010 are the second biggest part. Overall both programs are expected to lower the tax
base by 57.7 billion euro or 2.41% of 2009 GDP in 2010. To take the effect of these ﬁscal changes
on the forecast for the german debt-to-GDP ratio into account I compute conditional forecasts. I add
in every quarter in 2010 a discretionary government spending shock in the size of 0.105% of GDP
and a transfer shock in the size of 0.10% of GDP to the model solution, together with the random
shock realisations, while computing the forecasts.9 Additionally, I use the baseline forecasts for the
different tax revenues in 2010 in the subsection above and lower the respective tax rates to decrease
the labour income tax, consumption tax and capital tax revenuesin the amount of 0.31%, 0.015% and
0.075% of GDP every quarter in 2010.
Figure 4.2 shows the conditional density forecasts including the stimulus programs. Overall the
picture does not change much. The mean forecast for the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to peak at
a value of 81.3% in the last quarter of 2010 compared to 79% in the baseline forecast and some
forecast scenarios drive the debt-to-GDP ratio up to 110% of GDP compared to 100% before. Thus
the uncertainty increases further. One can see the reduction in tax rates due to the stimulus programs
especially the one for the capital tax rate, which lowers tax revenues in 2010. The capital tax rate
decreases stronger than the other distortionary taxes due to the lower overall capital tax revenues.
Therefore a reduction of 0.3% of GDP has a sizeable effect on capital tax revenues but not on overall
tax revenues. The ﬁscal expansion through both stimulus programs has only a moderate effect on
GDP. GDP increases by 0.7% from -12.6% below trend to -11.9% below trend in the last quarter of
9The size of the quarterly discretionary government spending and transfer shock is 1/4 of the value stated in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Conditional forecasts
Notes: 5000 subdraws of the Metropolis Hastings algorithm, draws from the shock distributions and shocks in the size of
the Konjunkturpaket and the Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz for 2010 are used to generate density forecasts. Smoothed
variables from 2005 until 2010 are displayed with a solid black line, the mean forecast by a dashed-dotted black line and
the 10th up to the 90th percentiles are displayed by grey shaded areas.
1092010 compared to the baseline mean forecast. Thus the stimulus programs are expected to support
GDP in 2010 but at a high cost of increasing debt, which prolongs the ﬁscal consolidation. Still the
economicrecoveryafter the ﬁnancialcrisis drives highertax revenuesleadingto a ﬁscalconsolidation
in Germany, where the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to be lower than 60% of GDP and thus below
the critical value of the Maastricht criteria in the second quarter of 2015. This seems optimistic and
is only possible if the government sticks to the ﬁscal policy rules and doesn’t increase discretionary
transfers and spending, when the budget situation improves and no unforeseen crisis emerge, which
deteriorates the GDP recovery. But as we can see from the historical debt-to-GDP series (solid black
line), the debt-to-GDP ratio also declined between 2005Q4 and 2007Q4 from 71.1% to 65.3%, which
implies a similar annual decrease in the variable than the one, which is projected by the mean of the
conditional forecasts from the end of 2009 until 2015.
4.4.2 German debtbrake
In this subsection I analyse how the medium-term forecasts change if I enforce the german debt brake
in the model from 2010 on, although the rule becomes operative in 2011 and legally binding not
until 2016. Since the government knows that the rule will be binding in the future, it may adjust its
ﬁscal instruments already in 2010 to fulﬁll the requirements of the debt brake more easily later on. In
addition I lower the output elasticity of the labour income tax rate by one half to see how the results
change if for instance the progressive income tax tariff would be ﬂattened. I ﬁx φ
g
y to 0, which is
lower than the estimated posterior mean of 0.23. Thus transfers, government spending, interest on
outstanding debt and the amount of debt which is cleared need to be equal to trend revenues. This
allows for countercyclical ﬁscal policy but less than in the case of φ
g
y > 0. If revenues are lower than
trend the government will run a budget deﬁcit and a budget surplus vice versa, but there need to be
a structural balanced budget. Additionally I allow the labour income tax rate to vary less with the
business cycle by setting φn
y to 0.15, which is almost half of the posterior mean used for the baseline
forecasts. Figure 4.3 contains the resulting evolution of the ﬁscal variables.
As one can see from the chart for government spending in the third column of the second row, the
debt brake forces the government to lower spending immediately by 0.6% of GDP in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2010 from -1.9% below trend to almost -2.5% below trend. Later on when tax revenues pick up
and the debt level is reduced spending increases slightly like in the baseline forecasts. With the lower
output elasticity of the labour income tax rate, it ﬂuctuates less with the business cycle, leading to
an immediate increase in the average labour income tax rate. This increases the wedge between the
labour income before and after tax making it less proﬁtable for households to work. Therefore hours
worked decrease slightly. Both the lower demand for ﬁrms ﬁnal goods through lower government
spending and the increase in the labour income tax, which reduces hours worked, lowers the mean
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Figure 4.3: Counterfactual forecasts
Notes: 5000 subdraws of the Metropolis Hastings algorithm and draws from the shock distributions are used to generate
density forecasts setting φ
g
y = 0 and φ
n
y = 0.15. Smoothed variables from 2005 until 2010 are displayed with a solid black
line, the mean forecast by a dashed-dotted black line and the 10th up to the 90th percentiles are displayed by grey shaded
areas.
111GDP forecast slightly compared to the baseline forecasts. On the other hand the debt-to-GDP ratio
decreases faster than in the baseline scenario.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I compute density forecasts for Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore I derive a
DSGE Model for Germany based on Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007) integrating
non-Ricardian consumers as well as Ricardian consumers, adding distortionary taxes like consump-
tion tax, capital tax and labour income tax, a ﬁscal rule for transfers and a framework to simulate the
effects of the German debt brake. Then I estimate the model on 12 German time series including the
major ﬁscal time series like the debt-to-GDP ratio, direct tax revenues and social security beneﬁts
received by the government, indirect tax revenues, capital tax revenues and social security beneﬁts
paid. I ﬁnd that all ﬁscal instruments react signiﬁcantly to debt and the state of the economy, with the
exemption of the parameter φ
g
y, which indicates how countercyclical the government allocates their
spending. In a ﬁnal step I compute density forecasts taking account of parameter uncertainty and
shock uncertainty.
I ﬁnd thatthrough the expectedeconomicrecoveryafter the severeﬁnancialcrisis in 2008and2009,it
is possible to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio signiﬁcantly in the medium-term although the uncertainty
of the forecasts given by the error bands is large mainly driven by unforeseen shocks. The following
channels are important for the result. The economic recovery reduces directly the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Hours worked and real wages are expected to increase leading to higher labour income tax revenues.
The averagetax rates in the economyrise through the economicrecovery,but are expectedto decrease
later on, when debt is reduced. I also compute conditional forecasts implementing the effects of the
two "Konjunkturpakete" and the "Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz" in 2010. I ﬁnd that GDP in
2010 is stimulated only moderately through the stimulus packages. The debt-to-GDP ratio increases
stronger than in the baseline forecasts, peaks at 81.3% and is expected to be lower than the Masstricht
criteria of 60% in the second quarter of 2015. Enforcing the debt brake and halving the output
elasticity of the labour income tax from 2010 on, puts more pressure on the government to reduce
spending and increases the labour income tax rate, which lowers hours worked. Both measures lead
to a faster reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio on the cost of reducing GDP slightly in the short-run
compared to the baseline forecast scenario.
Overall the results show that ﬁscal consolidation in Germany is possible in the medium-term in times
of expected economic recoveries or booms, if the government sticks to the ﬁscal policy rules, uses
the expected increases in tax revenues to consolidate the budget and doesn’t increase discretionary
spending. With this model I look at the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio overthe businesscycle and
the implications of ﬂuctuations of GDP on this ratio. Hence the model does not take developments
112into account, which drive the trend of debt and GDP, like demographic issues. Germany’s population
will grow slowlier or shrink in the future and people are expected to become older on average. This
drives up social security payments and will lead to a lower trend growth rate, both increasing future
debt. But with a ﬁscal consolidation in the medium-term Germany would certainly be better prepared
for the requirements in the longer term.
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4.F Estimation results
Table 4.3: Prior and posterior distributions of the shock processes
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type mean std.dev. mode std.dev. mean 5 % 95 %
ρz Technology shock beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.01 0.97 0.96 0.98
ρp Price mark-up shock beta 0.50 0.20 0.09 0.01 0.41 0.19 0.61
ρ  Investment shock beta 0.50 0.20 0.26 0.01 0.28 0.19 0.37
ρd Risk premium shock beta 0.50 0.20 0.92 0.01 0.89 0.84 0.94
ρr MP shock beta 0.50 0.20 0.17 0.02 0.23 0.10 0.35
ρw Wage mark-up shock beta 0.50 0.20 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.96 0.99
ρυ Gov. spend. shock beta 0.50 0.20 0.96 0.00 0.95 0.92 0.98
ρnex Net exports shock beta 0.50 0.20 0.98 0.01 0.96 0.93 1.00
ρτn Labour tax beta 0.50 0.20 0.96 0.01 0.95 0.93 0.98
ρτc Consumption tax beta 0.50 0.20 0.98 0.03 0.97 0.96 0.99
ρτk Capital tax beta 0.50 0.20 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.97 1.00
ρT Transfers beta 0.50 0.20 0.95 0.01 0.95 0.94 0.97
θp MA price mark-up beta 0.50 0.20 0.28 0.01 0.42 0.23 0.60
θw MA wage mark-up beta 0.50 0.20 0.83 0.02 0.78 0.63 0.90
ǫz Technology shock invg 0.10 2.00 0.48 0.03 0.48 0.43 0.53
ǫp Price mark-up shock invg 0.10 2.00 0.47 0.03 0.46 0.40 0.52
ǫ  Investment shock invg 0.10 2.00 1.34 0.08 1.34 1.16 1.53
ǫd Risk premium shock invg 0.10 2.00 0.28 0.02 0.30 0.23 0.37
ǫr MP shock invg 0.10 2.00 0.21 0.01 0.21 0.19 0.24
ǫw Wage mark-up shock invg 0.10 2.00 0.53 0.04 0.50 0.42 0.59
ǫυ Gov. spend. shock invg 0.10 2.00 0.96 0.06 0.98 0.82 1.15
ǫnex Net exports shock invg 0.10 2.00 0.83 0.05 0.82 0.75 0.90
ǫτn Labour tax invg 0.10 2.00 0.67 0.04 0.69 0.61 0.76
ǫτc Consumption tax invg 0.10 2.00 1.06 0.16 1.07 0.97 1.17
ǫτk Capital tax invg 0.10 2.00 2.74 0.06 2.70 2.48 2.93
ǫT Transfers invg 0.10 2.00 0.25 0.02 0.26 0.23 0.28
Notes: Prior and posterior distributions for the estimated shocks processes. Estimates obtained from Bayesian estima-
tion of the DSGE model using German data from 1970:1-2009:4.
114Table 4.4: Prior and posterior distributions of the structural parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type mean std.dev. mode std.dev. mean 5 % 95 %
ξw Calvo wages beta 0.50 0.10 0.64 0.01 0.65 0.53 0.72
ξp Calvo prices beta 0.50 0.10 0.90 0.00 0.88 0.86 0.91
ιw Indexation wages beta 0.50 0.15 0.40 0.02 0.27 0.16 0.38
ιp Indexation prices beta 0.50 0.15 0.36 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.18
SS price markup norm 1.25 0.13 1.89 0.01 1.93 1.82 2.05
S′′ Investment adj. cost norm 4.00 1.50 6.17 0.08 5.89 4.40 7.31
λ Habit formation beta 0.70 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.12
ω non Ricardian cons. beta 0.30 0.10 0.55 0.01 0.56 0.49 0.63
σl Labour supply elas. norm 2.00 0.75 0.88 0.04 0.80 0.55 1.08
χ Capital utilization beta 0.50 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.15 0.09 0.20
α Capital share norm 0.30 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.15
ρR Int. rate smoothing beta 0.75 0.10 0.94 0.00 0.93 0.91 0.96
ψ1 Inﬂation response norm 1.50 0.25 1.69 0.01 1.40 1.24 1.58
ψ2 Outputgap response norm 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.18
ψ3 Diff. outputgap resp norm 0.13 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.25 0.22 0.28
ρ AC clearing invg 0.10 2.00 0.23 0.04 0.18 0.08 0.27
φ
g
y Government spending norm 0.00 0.50 0.22 0.02 0.24 −0.11 0.77
φn
b Labour tax invg 0.10 2.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.09
φc
b Consumption tax invg 0.10 2.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.07
φk
b Capital tax invg 0.10 2.00 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.27
φt
b Transfers invg 0.10 2.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
φn
y Labour tax invg 0.10 2.00 0.25 0.02 0.28 0.16 0.38
φc
y Consumption tax invg 0.10 2.00 0.55 0.02 0.53 0.36 0.69
φk
y Capital tax invg 0.10 2.00 1.19 0.07 1.14 0.64 1.66
φt
y Transfers invg 0.10 2.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
γ Trend growth rate norm 0.40 0.10 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.38 0.43
l SS hours worked norm 0.00 2.00 −1.90 0.04 −1.86 −2.78 −0.78
π SS inﬂation rate gamm 0.63 0.10 0.62 0.00 0.48 0.41 0.57
β Discount rate gamm 0.25 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.35 0.20 0.45
Notes: Prior and posterior distributions for the estimated structural parameters. Parameter estimates obtained from
Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model using German data from 1970:1-2009:4.
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Figure 4.4: Prior and posterior distributions of the shock processes
Notes: Prior (solid grey) vs. posterior (solid black) distributions for the estimated shocks processes. Estimates obtained
from Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model using German data from 1970:1-2009:4.
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Figure 4.5: Prior and posterior distributions of the structural parameters
Notes: Prior (solid grey) vs. posterior (solid black) distributions for the estimated structural parameters. Estimates obtained
from Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model using German data from 1970:1-2009:4. 1174.G Details of Germany´s ﬁscal stimulus measures in 2010
Konjunkturpakete
Instrument Measure (bln Euro)
Tax deductibility of professionel commute 4.00
Package for tax burden reduction, stabilisation of
social security contributions and investment in families 11.91
Income tax Income tax cut 6.04
State payment of 50% social insurance for short-time workers
for short-time workers 1.15
Reduction in health insurance contributions 6.50
Suspension of car tax on new vehicles 0.13
Consumption tax Reform of car tax 0.17
Decrease of tax on Biodiesel 0.13
Capital tax Higher tax-free allowances for companies 0.37
Degressive depreciation deduction 4.33
Investments into transport infrastructure 1.00
Spending Infrastructure investment programme 8.68
Innovation support programme 0.45
Retraining and stronger job service 1.59
Transfers Increased child beneﬁts 2.84
Increased housing beneﬁts 0.06
49.31
Source: Brot und Butter Brief " Der Wirtschaftskrise entgegensteuern", German Finance Ministry
Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz
Instrument Measure (bln Euro)
Consumption tax Decrease of VAT on Hotels and restaurants 1.00
Capital tax Changes in the legislation of business tax 2.40
Transfers Higher tax exemption for dependent children and child beneﬁts 4.60
Lower inheritance tax 0.40
8.40
Source: Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz, German Finance Ministry
1184.H Data
The data I employ are from the OECD Economic Outlook Database. For the period 1970:1-1991:1
I use data for West-Germany, which are scaled so that the observation in the ﬁrst quarter of 1991
matches the observation for reuniﬁed Germany in this quarter. Precisely I use the following OECD
time series: Gross domestic product, volume, market prices (DEUGDPV, WGRGDPV), Gross do-
mestic product, deﬂator, market prices (DEUPGDP,WGRPGDP), Private ﬁnal consumption expendi-
ture, value (DEUCPAA, WGRCPAA), Private non-residential gross ﬁxed capital formation, volume
(DEUIBV, WGRIBV), Private non-residential ﬁxed capital formation, deﬂator (DEUPIB, WGRPIB),
Total employment (DEUET, WGRET), Short-term interest rate (DEUIRS, WGRIRS), Trend labour
force (DEULFS, WGRLFS), Hours worked per employee, total economy (DEUHRS, WGRHRS),
Compensation rate, total economy (DEUWSST, WGRWSST), General government gross ﬁnancial
liabilities, as a percentage of GDP (DEUGGFLQ, WGRGGFLQ), Capital tax and transfers receipts,
value (DEUTKTRG, WGRTKTRG), Indirect taxes, value (DEUTIND, WGRTIND), Total direct
taxes, value (DEUTY, WGRTY), Social security contribution received by general government, value
(DEUSSRG, WGRSSRG), Social security beneﬁts paid by general government, value (DEUSSPG,
WGRSSPG).
I use the general government gross ﬁnancial liabilities variable of the OECD instead of gross debt
according to the Maastricht criterion, which is not available for West-Germany before 1991. The
concepts differ in two respects. Gross debt according to the Maastricht criterion does not include
trade credits and advances and government bonds are valued at market value not nominal value.
Times series in monthly frequency are converted to quarterly frequency by using the average of the
monthly rates. Annual ﬁscal data are converted to quarterly data by assuming that the variable grows
with the same rate during the year.
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